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Abstract 
From 28 October 1999 to 26 September 2000 Mbeki publically endorsed the 
position of ‘denialist’ AIDS scientists – a marginal group who oppose the claim 
that HIV causes AIDS – and used their views as the basis for a policy of not 
providing ARVs (antiretrovirals – the treatment that prevents HIV from 
replicating) via the public health system. This policy persisted until 2004, with 
severe consequences – best estimates indicate that it resulted in 171, 000 
avoidable new infections and 343,000 deaths over the 1999 – 2002 period. I use 
this case to address two questions. First, is it reasonable for policy makers to 
consult non-mainstream scientists in the process of policy development?  Second, 
can they be held personally morally responsible for the consequences of having 
done so when things go very badly wrong?  
 
I begin by providing a motivation for why philosophers should be interested in 
real-world cases. Having justified the philosophical “methodology” of this thesis, I 
move on to describing the specific case of South African AIDS denialism in the 
early 2000s. I then take a chronological step back in order to assess the 
rationality of accepting HIV as the sole cause of AIDS in 1984, when the virus was 
first identified. I argue that it was rational, but that some explanatory power was 
lost when other competing accounts of the disease’s aetiology were discarded. I 
argue that this explanatory loss can be accounted for by re-considering the way 
causation is understood in biomedicine and epidemiology. Having settled the 
scientific issues of the case, I then move on to the question of moral 
responsibility. I specifically look at when an agent can be held morally 
responsible for their ignorance, and the role of suppressed disagreement in the 
production of that ignorance.  
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Introduction  
 
From 28 October 1999 to 26 September 2000 the South African President, Thabo 
Mbeki, endorsed the position of ‘denialist’ AIDS scientists – a marginal group who 
oppose the claim that HIV causes AIDS.  
 
Throughout this thesis the term ‘AIDS denialist’ will refer to anyone who adopts 
the position that HIV does not cause AIDS, even though they might accept both 
the existence of AIDS and the existence of HIV, as Peter Duesberg, the most 
prominent of the AIDS denialists, does (more will be said about this in Chapter 
3). Individuals who believe that HIV does not cause AIDS prefer to refer to 
themselves as ‘AIDS dissidents’, rather than ‘denialists’ (Kalichman, 2009, p. 12). 
Using either term is value laden. Referring to those who accept this position as 
‘dissidents’ casts them as valiant heroes, standing up for their beliefs against the 
oppressive force of mainstream science, and draws on associations with political 
and religious dissidence. The term ‘denialist’ implies that they deny obvious and 
well-established pieces of evidence, similar to Holocaust denialists (Kalichman, 
2009, p. 11). Using either term implies the rightness or wrongness of the position 
from the outset. However, in order to write intelligibly, I need to call those who 
support the position something. I could introduce a third more neutral term, but 
to do so would be a departure from the current nomenclature and literature on 
the subject. I anticipate that as this thesis progresses, readers will be in 
increasing agreement that ‘denialist’ is the more appropriate term.  
 
Two claims constitute Mbeki’s particular brand of denialism: 1) ARVs 
(antiretrovirals – the treatment that prevents HIV from replicating), specifically 
AZT (azidothymidine), are toxic; and 2) HIV is not a necessary condition for AIDS 
(Cherry, 2009, p. 16). On the basis of these beliefs, Mbeki adopted a policy of not 
providing ARVs via the public health system. It is important that he held both 
beliefs (that HIV is not a necessary condition for AIDS, and that ARVs are toxic) at 
the same time. If he had just believed that HIV is not a necessary condition for 
AIDS, but had not held the belief that AZT is toxic, he may still have concluded 
that ARVs should be publically available, perhaps guided by something like the 
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Precautionary Principle. Similarly, if he had held the belief that AZT has severe 
(or “toxic”) side effects, but had accepted that HIV causes AIDS, he may also have 
made ARVs available, based on the calculus that the risks associated with the 
treatment are outweighed by the benefits. This policy persisted until 2004, with 
severe consequences. Best estimates indicate that it resulted in 171,000 
avoidable new infections and 343,000 deaths over the 1999–2002 period 
(Nattrass, 2008, p. 157).  
 
Thabo Mbeki’s support for these scientists and the resulting policies he adopted 
in the 1999-2002 period are puzzling. Mbeki built his leadership reputation as a 
rational intellectual, often to his detriment – this aspect of his public persona also 
made him appear aloof, and ultimately led to a sense that he was disconnected 
from ordinary citizens. Some argue that this was the cause of his loss of support 
within the ANC (African National Congress – the South African ruling party) in 
2008 and his replacement by Jacob Zuma, who is taken to be the less intellectual 
and more charismatic leader (Lodge, 2009). In the context of Mbeki’s 
intellectualism, his support for denialist AIDS science seems incongruous. Posel 
asks: 
 
Why did an intelligent and politically shrewd President, with no expertise 
or training in matters of health, weigh in so directly and heavily on the 
question of AIDS, risking all the national and international turbulence 
provoked by his interventions? (Posel, 2008, p. 18) 
 
This incongruity has generated a range of literature on Mbeki’s AIDS denialism 
from a wide variety of perspectives: economic (Nattrass, 2004); psychological 
(Kalichman, 2009); anthropological (Fassin, 2007); and political (Butler, 2005). 
Little has been said about the case from a philosophical perspective, with the 
notable exception of Ward Jones’s short paper, “Dissident versus Loyalist: Which 
Scientists Should We Trust?” (2002), written in the midst of Mbeki’s denialism, 
he warns against consulting non-mainstream scientists in the process of policy 
development. Robert Kowalenko, in a more recent paper, “Thabo Mbeki, 
postmodernism, and the consequences” (2015), uses the case of AIDS denialism 
as a counter-example to postmodern/post-colonial theories of science. Both 
Jones and Kowalenko focus on the case in the context of compartmentalized 
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issues in philosophy of science – the relationship between mainstream and 
marginal science (Jones), and the status of postmodern/post-colonial scientific 
approaches (Kowalenko). Neither provides a detailed analysis of the case. This 
thesis offers the first thoroughgoing analysis of AIDS denialism from a 
philosophical perspective.   
 
There are good reasons, both practical and philosophical, for philosophers to pay 
attention this case. Practically, the harms of Mbeki’s policy decision were severe, 
both in terms of avoidable loss of life and new infections. Further, his public 
statements about HIV and AIDS introduced an element of uncertainty about AIDS 
into the public sphere in South Africa, which continue to hinder public health 
education efforts to tackle the disease (Grebe & Nattrass, 2012, pp. 770-771). 
Due to these harms, there has been a call from members of South African civil 
society to assess whether Mbeki can be held morally responsible for his actions 
(see, for example, Geffen (2009)). Philosophical reflection on this topic is thus 
practically useful. AIDS denialism is also worth considering for its own sake due 
to the variety of philosophical questions that it raises. Providing a full assessment 
means addressing a wide range of philosophical topics; spanning from issues of 
disease causation through to epistemic considerations in attributions of moral 
responsibility. This case is philosophically rich.  
 
In my analysis I consider two main questions. First, was it reasonable for Mbeki 
to consult non-mainstream scientists? Second, can he be held personally morally 
responsible for the consequences of having done so?  
 
I begin, in Chapter 1, by providing a motivation for why philosophers should be 
interested in real-world cases. In particular, I argue that the thought experiments 
that are the central methodological tool of contemporary analytic philosophy run 
the risk of excluding philosophically relevant material in the streamlining 
process that is required for their production. Real-world cases avoid this 
problem, and can provide a check that this has not occurred in philosopher’s 
streamlined hypothetical cases. Furthermore, real-world cases can help to ensure 
that the results of philosophical study are transferrable to novel scenarios (i.e. 
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they can help with external validity), and they provide a ‘context of discovery’ for 
generating new philosophical hypotheses.  
 
Having justified the methodology employed in this thesis, I move on to the case. I 
provide a brief history of South African AIDS denialism in chapter 2 and then I 
take a chronological step back in chapter 3 to consider early AIDS science in the 
1980s. Contemporary AIDS denialists claim that they were unfairly and 
prematurely cut out of the debate when HIV was accepted as the definitive cause 
of AIDS. I take their complaint seriously. If they are correct then we might be 
mistaken in some aspects of current AIDS science, and Mbeki might have been 
acting to remedy an epistemic injustice by including members of an unfairly 
marginalized scientific group on his advisory panel. I use Lakatos’s theory of 
scientific research programmes to assess the rationality of accepting the viral 
theory of AIDS in the 1980s; concluding that the acceptance of the viral 
explanation was rational, but that corroboration came late, and that some 
explanatory power was lost in the move from multiple theories of the disease’s 
aetiology to the strictly viral account. For instance, it became difficult to explain 
the role that socio-economic factors played in aetiology of AIDS, which in turn 
made it difficult to account for the disproportionate prevalence of AIDS in 
southern Africa.  
 
This was the state of AIDS science when Mbeki entered the debate in the late 
1990s. HIV was accepted as the definitive cause of AIDS, and there was no room 
for non-viral (socio-economic) factors in the account. In chapter 4 I argue that 
one plausible (albeit charitable) reading of the Mbeki case is that he became 
aware of this explanatory gap and began to consult non-mainstream AIDS 
scientists in an effort to remedy it. Non-mainstream AIDS scientists were able to 
include socio-economic factors in their account of the disease, and were thus able 
to explain the disproportionate prevalence of AIDS in southern Africa, however 
they incorrectly excluded the causal role of the virus in the process. I argue that 
underpinning this problem is too strict a divide in biomedicine and epidemiology 
between mono-causal and multi-causal theories of disease explanation: accounts 
of disease that favour single, typically microbial, sources of disease, and those 
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that permit multiple causes, but fail to distinguish the causal salience of microbial 
factors. I suggest that these accounts can be integrated by thinking of the issue as 
a causal selection problem. The task then becomes one of distinguishing the 
‘causes’ from the ‘background conditions’, and Woodward’s (2011) criteria of 
causal selection provides guidance on how to do this with some rigour.  
 
Having a thorough grip on the scientific and political issues that cumulated in 
Mbeki’s AIDS denialism, in chapter 5 I move on to questions of moral 
responsibility and blame. In particular, I assess whether Mbeki can be held 
personally morally responsible for the consequences of his policy decision. I 
explore the possibility that Mbeki might have an excuse from ignorance available 
to him for his harmful action – he might (hypothetically) argue that had he really 
known that HIV causes AIDS, and that ARVs prevent the virus from replicating, 
then he would have made the treatment available via the public health system. 
However, excuses from ignorance are only acceptable if the ignorance itself is not 
culpable. One can avoid culpable ignorance by satisfying one’s ‘procedural 
epistemic obligations’ – that is, one is required to take care when forming beliefs 
that inform actions with potentially harmful outcomes.  One way to take care is to 
pay attention when one’s epistemic peers – those with similar reasoning abilities 
and similar access to evidence – disagree. In the Mbeki case, it is plausible that 
his epistemic peers were other members of his political party. However, when we 
look at the state of debate around the issue of AIDS in his political party in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, there is surprisingly little disagreement with Mbeki’s 
view. Commentators on the case argue that members of his party did disagree 
with Mbeki, but that their disagreement was suppressed because they feared 
him. I explore the issue of suppressed disagreement in the context of culpable 
ignorance assessments, concluding that ignorance resulting from suppressed 
disagreement typically cannot provide an excuse for wrongful action. 
Furthermore, I argue that if the agent who draws on ignorance as an excuse in 
situations of suppressed disagreement is the same agent who suppressed the 
disagreement, then they are additionally blameworthy for the harms associated 
with silencing their disagreeing interlocutors.  
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Ultimately, I conclude that Mbeki was not wholly unreasonable in his 
consultation of non-mainstream AIDS scientists. There were explanatory gaps 
created by the move from multiple theories of AIDS’s aetiology to the strictly 
viral account. Too strict a divide between mono-causal and multi-causal theories 
of disease worsened the situation. However, his decision to follow the AIDS 
denialist scientists in their rejection of the virus was incorrect and had harmful 
consequences. Further, he silenced those who might have been able to prevent 
him from making the wrong decision. It will thus be concluded that his ignorance 
is culpable, and he is morally responsible for the tragedy of AIDS denialism.  
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1. What use are real-world cases for philosophers? 
 
1.1. Introduction  
 
This thesis focuses on the detailed study of a real-world case from a philosophical 
perspective. This is a relatively unusual project in contemporary analytic 
philosophy, where the emphasis is on abstracting away from the particularities 
of the world.  If a purported piece of philosophical writing strays too far in the 
direction of the practical, its credibility as a work of philosophy is at risk 
(Srinivasan, 2016, p. 1).1 To see how philosophical concern is typically focussed 
on abstracting away from particulars, note that Cohen argues that facts about the 
world are irrelevant to developing an account of justice:  
 
[F]acts are irrelevant in the determination of fundamental principles of 
justice. Facts of human nature and human society of course (1) make a 
difference to what justice tells us to do in specific terms; they also (2) tell 
us how much justice we can get; and they (3) bear on how much we 
should compromise with justice, but, so I believe, they make no difference 
to the very nature of justice itself (Cohen, 2008, p. 285).2 
 
To see that if one strays too far in the direction of the practical, there is a risk that 
one’s work will be dismissed as not philosophical, note that Srinivasan’s first 
reaction to reading Nancy Bauer’s How to Do Things with Pornography (2015), 
which deals with a range of real-world concerns related to sexuality, was: “Is this 
philosophy?” (Srinivasan, 2016, p. 1). Srinivasan indicates that she is hopeful that 
the answer to that question is “yes”. Less optimistically, Jenkins reports that on 
telling a fellow philosopher about her work on the applications of metaphysics to 
gender, she was met with the response: “That’s not philosophy” (Jenkins, 2014, p. 
262). 
 
                                                        
1 Srinivasan does not defend this view of philosophy. She merely notes (with some regret) that 
this is typically the case.   
2 I initially encountered this quote in Wilson (2014, p.19).  
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It is not entirely clear why this stance persists, given that criticism against this 
isolationist vision of philosophy has been put forward for some time. Williams, 
for instance, in Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (1972) is famously critical of 
approaches to philosophy that neglect the real world, claiming that although 
“[m]ost moral philosophy at most times has been empty and boring… 
contemporary moral philosophy has found an original way of being boring… by 
not discussing moral issues at all” (Williams, 1972, p. 9).3 In a similar vein, he 
argues in the preface to Moral Luck (1981) that moral theorising needs to be 
attached to moral experience. Further, as Williams himself points out, this is a 
concern that substantially pre-dates his work, when he introduces an article on 
the role of history in philosophy with this 1878 quote from Nietzsche: “Lack of a 
historical sense is the hereditary defect of philosophers… So what is needed now 
is historical philosophising, and with the virtue of modesty” (Williams, 2002, p. 9 
quoting Nietzsche). Regardless of the persistence of this issue, it is clear from the 
discussion above – Cohen arguing in favour of the philosophical armchair on the 
one end of the spectrum, and Srinivasan and Jenkins lamenting philosophical 
detachment from the real world on the other – that making philosophical use of 
material from the world still requires a defence if it is to be taken seriously. In 
this chapter, I aim to provide such a defence.  
 
To start, it is fairly uncontroversial that the clarity and rigour provided by 
philosophical thinking can be useful for achieving better understanding in certain 
real-world cases (Srinivasan, 2016, p. 2; Kamm, 2009, pp. 19-20). For instance, in 
the sciences, philosophers often perform important clarificatory work when 
conceptual confusion arises (Kitcher, 2011, p. 253). Somewhat more 
controversially, it might be argued that philosophers have an obligation, either 
professionally or ethically, to spend a portion of their work-time devoted to real-
world cases in order to assist with this important clarificatory work (Jones, 
                                                        
3 In an interview in 1983 he claims that between 1969, when he initially wrote Morality, and the 
interview being conducted, that this problem had begun to resolve itself and that his criticism had 
become out of date. Instead, he argues that a new problem entered philosophy in the form of 
“applied philosophy”, which is that philosophers had begun to develop something of a cottage 
industry around quickly applying pre-existing philosophical theories to practical problems, which 
risks turning philosophy into a boring “quasi-legal” enterprise. However, in 2002, in a piece in the 
London Review of Books, he once again laments the lack of historical concern in contemporary 
analytic philosophy.  
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2006). I will not address either of these claims in this chapter – namely, that 
philosophical rigour is likely to be of benefit to better understanding real-world 
cases, and that philosophers might be obliged to assist in this regard. In this 
chapter I will not attempt to produce a defence of real-world philosophical 
engagement as a kind of professional public service.4 
 
Instead, my target in this chapter is the naysayers – those who believe that no 
philosophical gains can be achieved by considering the real world. Taking this as 
my target, I focus on defending the claim that philosophical benefits can be 
achieved by paying careful attention to real-world cases: that is, over and above 
the thought experiments that are already a standard part of the philosophical 
practice, or the more detailed fictional cases that are often advocated for when 
thought experiments are found to be insufficient (see, for instance, Nussbaum 
(1990)). My intention is not to argue that thought experiments or fictional cases 
should be excluded from philosophical methodology, just that real-world cases 
ought to be included. That is, material from the real-world should be available to 
philosophers as a legitimate part of their philosophical toolkits – no philosopher 
is required to make use of material from the real-world, but it should be available 
to those whose practice would benefit from doing so.  In particular, I argue that if 
thought experiments and cases from fiction were the only kinds of cases available 
in philosophical methodology, there would be a gap.  
 
The main line of argument that will be pursued is as follows. Thought 
experiments (or ‘streamlined hypothetical cases’) are effective because they 
allow for potential ‘confounders’ to be removed. In the sciences, a confounder is a 
factor that interferes with the relationship between the cause under study and its 
purported effect.5 Typically, in the scientific context, this interference occurs 
when there is unaccounted for difference between the test case (the case in 
                                                        
4 However, I do believe that this is a valuable way for philosophers to spend their time, and much 
of this thesis will be focussed in that direction – on using the tools and techniques of philosophy 
to provide greater clarity to a real-world case. For instance, in Chaper 3, I use Lakatos’s theory of 
scientific research programmes to assess the transition from multiple theories of the aetiology of 
AIDS to the strictly viral account.  
5 There is also a use of the term ‘confounder’ which refers to a common cause that undelies a 
spurious correlation – such as the correlation between yellowed fingers and lung cancer, where 
smoking is the confounder. This is not the intended use here.   
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which the experimental intervention occurs) and the control case (the case in 
which there is no experimental intervention). For instance, to borrow a 
hypothetical example from the medical sciences, if I were studying the effects of a 
new headache medication, but the individual receiving the treatment was very 
dehydrated at the time, and dehydration has an independent effect on the rate of 
recovery, then this is a confounder because it interferes with one’s ability to track 
the causal relationship between the experimental treatment and the relief from 
the headache.  
 
In philosophy, a confounder is similarly taken to be an interfering factor; in 
particular, a confounder is anything that interferes with the relationship between 
one’s intuition and the philosophical principle under consideration.6 The term 
‘confounder’, when used in the philosophical context, is much broader than how 
it is typically used in the sciences – anything that disrupts the pathway from 
intuition to principle is going to count as a confounder in philosophy, not just 
unaccounted for differences between tests and controls.  I take ‘intuition’ here to 
mean what Kamm describes as a “judgement about a case”, where that 
judgement is reason-driven and not merely a gut-feel emotional response 
(Kamm, 2009, p. 23).7 By ‘interfere with one’s intuitions’ I mean any factor that 
distracts one’s intuitions from the philosophical principle being assessed. For 
instance, this might occur in cases in which there is more than one morally 
relevant factor present, such that one’s intuition gets drawn away from the 
particular issue that is being analysed. For example, note the role of malice in 
Rachels’s (1978/1997) famous Bathtub Case, which is meant to provide a test for 
whether killing is morally worse than letting die. The case asks the respondent to 
imagine two scenarios, as follows:  
 
In the first, Smith stands to gain a large inheritance if anything should 
happen to his six-year old cousin. One evening while the child is taking his 
bath, Smith sneaks into the bathroom and drowns the child, and then 
arranges things so that it will look like an accident. In the second, Jones 
                                                        
6 I am following Elgin (2014) and Wilson’s (2016, forthcoming) use of terminology here.  
7 This use of the term ‘intuition’ is different to how psychologists use it. Psychologists use it to 
describe a response that is “automatic, quick, effortless, associative, and often emotionally 
charged… [and] not open to introspection” (Kahneman, 2009, p.72). The usage in this chapter 
tracks the standard use in moral philosophy.  
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also stands to gain if anything should happen to his six-year-old cousin. 
Like Smith, Jones sneaks in planning to drown the child in his bath. 
However, just as he enters the bathroom Jones sees the child slip and hit 
his head, and fall face down in the water. Jones is delighted; he stands by, 
ready to push the child’s head back under if it is necessary, but it is not 
necessary. With only a little thrashing about, the child drowns all by 
himself, “accidentally,” as Jones watches and does nothing (Rachels, 
1978/1997, p. 79). 
 
The cases are intended to differ only in that the first involves killing, while the 
second involves letting die (Wilson, 2016, forthcoming, p. 2). Rachels takes the 
second case to be no worse than the first, concluding that there is no morally 
relevant distinction between killing and letting die. However, in both cases the 
protagonist has malicious intent (a morally relevant factor), and malice swamps 
any finer distinctions that might be drawn between the cases. If we were able to 
examine the distinction between killing and letting die without the influence of 
malicious intent, we might find one worse than the other. Rickless (2011) makes 
the same point (albeit in response to a different set of cases), arguing that cases 
such as these show that there is no distinction been maliciously causing harm 
and maliciously allowing (or enabling) harm, they do not show that there is no 
distinction between non-maliciously causing harm and non-maliciously allowing 
(or enabling) it (p. 71).  
 
Excluding potential confounders is useful, but I argue that doing so comes at a 
risk. The risk is that in the process of streamlining out potential confounders, 
important ‘support factors’ might be unwittingly removed. A ‘support factor’ in 
the sciences is any factor that is required for the cause to achieve its effect – for 
instance, oxygen would be an important support factor in an experiment 
examining the causal relationship between matches and combustion (Cartwright 
& Hardie, 2012, p. 62). In philosophy, the ‘support factors’ are, strictly speaking, 
those factors that need to be present for the key factor of interest to ‘do its work’. 
What this amounts to in the philosophical context is that support factors are 
those that are required in order for one’s intuitions to latch on to the salient 
philosophical relationships: those factors that are required to keep one’s 
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intuition on the target principle.8 For instance, in the standard Trolley Problem 
(which I will discuss in more detail below), a support factor might be that the 
respondent needs to imagine herself some distance away from the person that 
they are considering sacrificing. Evidence suggests that once distance is taken out 
of the scenario, and the respondent is required to imagine themselves physically 
closer to the person that they might sacrifice (such as is required in the 
Footbridge Case9), they lose focus on the principle under consideration (whether 
it is permissible to sacrifice one to save five), and become distracted by how 
repulsive they find direct physical violence (Kahneman, 2009, p. 79; Singer, 
2005). Distance, it turns out (if Kahneman and Singer are correct), is a support 
factor in the standard Trolley Problem. 
 
A large part of the problem with support factors is that it hard to identify them 
just by looking at a case – if they were easily identifiable, we could just check that 
we hadn’t factored them out in the process of streamlining and the problem 
would be solved. Support factors often only become visible once we have a 
detailed understanding of how the mechanism driving a particular effect works, 
or once a particular support factor has been removed and the effect ceases. For 
example, Cartwright and Hardie (2012) use the California Class Size Experiment 
(an example from the social sciences) to show that support factors may only 
become identifiable on the ex post analysis. In this case, there had been a 
successful educational intervention in Tennessee, in which class sizes had been 
reduced in order to improve school pupils’ reading scores. The same policy was 
subsequently implemented in California and the intervention was unsuccessful. 
On the ex post analysis it became clear that in Tennessee there had been 
adequate space for the increased number of smaller classes and available well-
trained teachers to take over the additional classes. These were both important 
                                                        
8 Note, “support factors” are the inverse of “confounders”. A confounder disrupts one’s intuition 
from tracking the principle under consideration, by dragging one’s intuition toward something 
else (like the race of the hypothetical participants, or additionally morally relevant factors), while 
a support factor is something that needs to be in place to keep one’s intuition on track.  
9 The Footbridge Case asks the reader to imagine that there is an out-of-control trolley hurtling 
down the tracks, which if left un-intercepted will kill five people further down the track. You are 
watching the scene from a footbridge over the track. Next to you is a very fat man; so fat that he 
would stop the trolley if he were pushed in front of it. Do you push the fat man off the footbridge, 
which will kill him, in order to intercept the trolley and save the five (Thompson, 1985)? Most 
respondents say that it is impermissible to do so.  
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support factors for the success of the intervention in Tennessee and neither was 
present in California, which is why the policy failed there. That these were 
support factors only became clear once they were removed and the effect was 
not achieved (Cartwright & Hardie, 2012, pp. 65-66).10  
 
The philosophical analogue is that we are typically unable to tell precisely what 
the support factors are in a particular case until we have a detailed 
understanding of the relationship between the intuition and the principle, or 
once we remove a relevant support factor and the intuition suddenly no longer 
holds. For instance, this is the case when distance was removed from the 
standard trolley problem and respondents no longer had the intuition that it was 
permissible to sacrifice one in order to save five.  
 
Consulting real-world cases helps us to check that important support factors 
have not been inadvertently excluded in the process of streamlining out potential 
confounders. Given that fictional cases are extended thought experiments (a 
claim that I will defend later in this chapter), cases from fiction will not be able to 
fulfil the function of checking that support factors have not been excluded, 
because they run the same risk as more austere thought experiments – support 
factors might unknowingly be removed by mistake. Real-world cases are the only 
remaining place to look in order to make sure that all the relevant support 
factors have been included. There are two related risks to not consulting the real 
world: the first is that our philosophical methodology would not be as rigorous as 
it could be, the second is that we might miss out on important philosophical 
relationships. Given these risks, real-world cases fulfil an important philosophical 
function, as I will defend below, and should be part of philosophical 
methodology.  
 
                                                        
10 However, Cartwright and Hardie (2012) argue that this mistake could have been avoided by 
devoting more time to uncovering the mechanism that had driven the success of the intervention 
in Tennessee, which would have made the support factors visible and would have allowed policy 
makers to ensure that they (or suitable substitutes) were present in the California case. Either 
way, the point is that support factors are unlikely to be immediately obvious just by looking at the 
case, which increases the risk that they might be accidentally removed.  
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In addition to the main line of argument presented in this chapter, I also discuss 
two further philosophical benefits that can be achieved by consulting real-world 
cases. These are: 1) ensuring that the findings from studying particular 
philosophically-relevant cases (be those standard thought experiments, fictional 
cases, or real-world cases) can be translated to novel scenarios (in the language 
of experimentation in the natural sciences, ensuring ‘external validity’); and 2) 
consulting real-world cases is a useful way of generating philosophical 
hypotheses in the first place, and (relatedly) for helping to extend and adapt pre-
existing philosophical concepts.  
 
A few caveats before proceeding. First, the emphasis in this chapter is 
predominantly on thought experiments in moral and political philosophy, 
because this is an area of philosophy in which thought experiments are used to 
test out hypotheses and principles, while in other areas of philosophy thought 
experiments are often focussed on examining conceptual entailments (Wilson, 
2016, forthcoming, p. 1). As a result, the arguments presented here might not be 
transferrable to other areas of philosophy, such as metaphysics or epistemology. 
Second, I focus on cases (thought experiments, fictional cases, real-world cases) 
in their capacity as experiments, by which I mean, as tests for hypotheses and 
principles (Wilson, 2014, p. 13). I ignore the other philosophical functions that 
cases might play – such as the illustrative role that they might serve at certain 
points in the exposition of a philosophical argument (Brown & Fehige, 2014 ) or 
the educational role that they might play in training philosophers to be sensitive 
to identifying that which is morally relevant (Nussbaum, 1990). These are 
undoubtedly useful functions for cases to play in our philosophical practice, but 
they will not be discussed here.  
 
1.2. Starting with Thought Experiments 
 
Williamson (2011) argues that one of the salient features of contemporary 
analytic philosophy is the importance of thought experiments in its methodology 
(p.215). I take thought experiments to be the major methodological rival to real-
world cases, and so it is important to have an idea of what thought experiments 
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are and how they function before drawing comparisons. Also, given that my main 
line of argument in this chapter is that real-world cases fill a gap left behind by 
thought experiments and fictional cases, a clear description of that gap needs to 
be provided. Providing an account of thought experiments is the focus of this 
section.  
 
Fischer describes thought experiments as “schematized hypothetical scenarios in 
which only a few details are filled in, and all the other details are left out” 
(Fischer, 1995, p. 4). Similarly, Wilson (2016, forthcoming) describes them as: 
“toy ethical cases that are designed to simplify an ethical problem along a 
number of dimensions, thus making the problem more philosophically tractable” 
(pp. 1-2). Relatedly, Elgin (2014) argues that this streamlining process in 
philosophical thought experiments should be understood as analogous to 
scientists’ lab experiments, and she is echoing a relatively popular position in the 
literature (also see Wilkes (1993 ), Fischer (1995) and Wilson (2016, 
forthcoming)). Elgin describes this commonality between philosophical thought 
experiments and scientific lab experiments as follows:  
 
It is a controlled manipulation of events, designed and executed to make 
some particular phenomenon salient… Important properties and relations 
are often masked by the welter of complexities that embed them. In 
experimenting, a scientist isolates a phenomenon from many of the forces 
that typically impinge on it. To the extent possible, she eliminates 
confounding factors. She holds most ineliminable factors fixed, effectively 
consigning them to the cognitive background of things to be taken for 
granted. This enables the effect of the experimental intervention on the 
remaining variables to stand out. Through such a strategy, she casts into 
bold relief factors that might be typically hidden from view. (Elgin, 2014, 
p.222).  
 
 
An illustrative example of streamlining out potential confounders in the sciences 
is that of a controlled trial (Elgin, 2014, p. 222 - 223). To see this, it is worth 
returning to the headache treatment example from the introduction. Imagine that 
we want to test a new headache medication and we know that various factors 
impact on how quickly individuals recover from headaches, independently of 
whether or not they receive any treatment. These factors may include things 
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such as age, sex, weight, whether the patient is a smoker, how many hours the 
patient sleeps a night, etc. In an ideal test of the treatment, we would want there 
to be two groups, an experimental group (the group that receives the treatment) 
and a control group (the group that does not receive the treatment), and the 
members of the two groups would be identical in terms of the things that are 
relevant to the effect – they would all be the same age, sex, weight, they would all 
be non-smokers (or smokers), and they would all sleep the same number of 
hours each night, etc. The only thing that should differ between the groups is 
whether or not they receive the treatment, and this allows for the causal 
relationship between the treatment and the effect to be isolated. At least, this is 
the case for a particular type of methodologist. A lesser requirement would be 
that the groups be balanced, but not necessarily homogenous, in which case the 
researcher would isolate the average causal effect on heterogeneous but identical 
groups of that sort. Either way, the point is to streamline out confounders and to 
focus just on the factors that are relevant for the hypothesis being tested.  
 
Thought experiments in philosophy are meant to do something similar. The 
intention is to factor out potential confounders. I take the standard Trolley 
Problem to be a classic example of a thought experiment in moral philosophy. In 
this case, a runaway trolley is hurtling down the tracks, where it will kill five 
people. As a passer-by, you happen upon a switch, which allows you to divert the 
trolley down a neighbouring track, where it will only kill one person. The 
philosophical question is this: do you sacrifice the one in order to save the five 
(Foot, 1967)?11 Importantly, obvious potential confounders have been factored 
out of the case. For instance, things that might trigger implicit biases have been 
excluded – such as the race, age and gender of the individuals on each of the 
tracks, etc.12 The set of possible actions has also been significantly curtailed 
(Wilson, 2014, p. 14) – you can only allow the trolley to continue or you can 
divert it; the five cannot escape, nor can you warn the one on the neighbouring 
                                                        
11 This is not quite Foot’s original version of the Trolley Problem, in which the reader is asked to 
imagine herself in the position of the driver of the trolley, but it more clearly reflects what is 
taken to be the classic version of the problem, which is Thompson’s (1985) version of the case. 
12 Again, this is not quite the same as Foot’s original version of the problem, in which the five are 
male railway workers, but it does accurately reflect the current version of the standard trolley 
problem.  
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track.13 Additionally, other potentially morally relevant factors that might 
distract one’s intuition have been excluded; for instance, nobody involved in the 
case has malicious intent, and so there is no risk of malice obscuring the finer 
distinctions present in the case. By streamlining these extraneous factors out of 
the case, we are able to focus on just that which is relevant to the philosophical 
investigation at hand – whether it is permissible to sacrifice a few in order to 
save many.  
 
For an even clearer analogue between controlled laboratory experiments and 
philosophical thought experiments, remember Rachels’s Bathtub case from the 
introduction. The only thing that is meant to differ between the cases of Jones 
and Smith is that Jones kills the child while Smith merely allows the child to die – 
the intention being that the philosopher can focus exclusively on that distinction. 
This is analogous to the ideal test of the headache treatment, in that the only 
thing that is meant to differ between the test group and the control group is that 
the one receives the treatment and the other does not. Unfortunately, in the 
Rachels case the distinction is lost because of the role of malice, but the analogy 
with the control trial is still clear. Being able to streamline out potential 
confounders and focus just on that which is philosophically relevant seems to be 
obviously useful.  
 
1.3. The smuggled intuition worry 
 
One worry the reader might have at this point is that thought experiments might 
not actually produce ‘clean’ intuitions – that is, there might still be extraneous 
factors influencing our intuitions and distracting us from what is philosophically 
important. In particular, we might smuggle extraneous factors into our 
interpretation of cases and this might have an impact on our intuitions. There are 
at least two ways in which this might happen. First, in the way that we 
imaginatively fill in the details of sparsely described thought experiments. 
                                                        
13 Anyone who has taught the trolley problems to undergraduate students will understand the 
importance of severely curtailing the range of available actions. Otherwise, questions like “why 
don’t the five run away?” and “why don’t you sacrifice yourself?” distract from the philosophical 
problem under investigation.  
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Second, we might unknowingly allow our intuitions about the real world to 
colour how we view the thought experiment. Each of these will be discussed in 
this section.  
 
Wilson (2016, forthcoming) suggests that an unavoidable consequence of very 
austere thought experiments might be that respondents can fill in the details of 
the case however they choose. This creates a methodological problem in that 
different individuals might effectively be responding to different thought 
experiments, depending on how they personally fill in the details (Wilson, 2016, 
forthcoming, p.10). Williamson (2007) makes the same point about individuals 
filling in the details of very austere thought experiments when he states that:  
 
In philosophy, examples can almost never be described in complete detail. 
An extensive background must be taken for granted; it cannot all be 
explicitly stipulated. Although many of the missing details are irrelevant to 
whatever philosophical issues are at play, not all of them are. This applies 
not just to highly schematic descriptions of examples, such as the initial 
abstract Gettier schema, but even to much richer stories Gettier and other 
philosophers like to tell… Similarly, when moral philosophers assess 
imaginary examples, one can almost always fill out the case with 
unintended but morally relevant additions that would reverse the verdict. 
Any humanly compiled list of such interfering factors is likely to be 
incomplete (p. 185)[emphasis added]. 
 
Wilson (2016, forthcoming) uses Kamm’s (2006) Reach Case to illustrate this 
point. In the Reach Case, the reader is asked to imagine an agent with arms that 
are so long that they reach from one side of India to the other, allowing the agent 
to rescue a child who is drowning in a pond on the other side of the country. The 
intuition is meant to be the same as if the child were physically close by: that is, 
the agent with very long arms is morally required to rescue the child drowning 
on the other side of the country the same as if the child were drowning in a pond 
right next to the agent. However, Wilson argues that there are various ways of 
filling out the details in this case (2016, forthcoming, p. 7). For instance, are we 
meant to imagine a normal human-sized agent with disproportionately long 
arms, or is the whole person supposed to be scaled up to the size of a giant, so 
that the long arms are in proportion to the rest of their body? When I asked a 
friend to imagine this case he told me that he pictured Mr Tickle (a cartoon 
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character, composed of a round orange body and very long arms), which gives an 
indication of how vast the interpretative range might be.   
 
Wilson notes that the fact that there are various ways that one might fill in the 
details of the case is likely to be a problem, but he does not fully articulate what 
that problem is. It seems to me that the problem is that our intuitions about what 
is morally required of the agent in the case are likely to vary depending on how 
we imagine it. The principles that we come up with are more specific (i.e. 
pertinent to the particular type of scenario) than we initially think. If we imagine 
a normal-sized person with disproportionately long arms, then it is unlikely that 
our intuitions would be the same as for the case of a child drowning in a nearby 
pond. This is because the agent’s head (along with their eyes and ears) is still on 
the other side of the country. The concern is that the agent might not know about 
the child drowning in the pond on the other side of India, and that even if they 
did know, they might not have enough information to intervene effectively, 
because they lack relevant sense data that they would have if the child were right 
next to them. Having arms that are long enough to rescue the child drowning on 
the other side of the country is not enough for us to agree that the agent has the 
same moral duties toward that child as the agent would have to the child 
drowning right next to them. We might have to imagine that the whole agent is 
scaled up to giant size, or that the agent’s neck is also long enough that their head 
reaches the other side of the country, before we agree that the agent has the 
same duty to save the distant drowning child as they would to the nearby 
drowning child.  
 
The second concern is that even if we are able to imagine thought experiments in 
the way that the author of the case intends, we might still bring our intuitions 
about the actual world into the world of the thought experiment. Fischer (1995) 
gestures toward this concern when he notes that intuitive responses are not 
strictly compartmentalised (p. 9). He argues that we spend the rest of our lives 
encountering moral problems in context, and that it might not be possible to turn 
off our contextualised reactions when we encounter streamlined hypothetical 
cases.  
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Thompson’s (1985) Transplant Case helps to illustrate this concern. In this case, 
a brilliant surgeon has five patients, each with a different failing organ, and they 
will each die if they do not receive a transplant for the required organ. A healthy 
passer-by, who just happens to be a match for all five of the patients, drops by the 
surgeon’s practice. We know that all of the transplants will be successful 
(because this is a thought experiment). Is it permissible for the surgeon to 
sacrifice the passer-by in order to save the five? Thompson notes that while 
almost everyone thinks it is permissible to sacrifice one in order to save five in 
the standard Trolley Problem, almost nobody thinks it is permissible for the 
surgeon to sacrifice the passer-by in order to save five in the Transplant Case 
(Thompson, 1985, p. 1396). This is puzzling, given that the underlying 
philosophical principle in both cases seems to be the same. It seems as though, if 
our intuitions were unimpinged, we would expect to have the same responses to 
both cases.  
 
One reason we might have differing intuitive responses to the two cases is that 
we have smuggled in our intuitions about doctors and our trust in the medical 
establishment into the Transplant Case. This is both because it is difficult to 
accept the specification that all of the operations will be successful, given what 
we know about the riskiness of transplant surgery in the real-world, and because 
even if we could really accept the specifications of the thought experiment, we 
might find it difficult to endorse a moral principle that makes it permissible for 
doctors to distribute the organs of healthy bystanders to the ill (could we ever 
trust the motivations of our own doctors once we had accepted the moral 
permissibility of such a principle?) Our own experience of the medical 
establishment taints our reading of the Transplant Case, and distracts our 
intuition away from the principle being assessed: Is it permissible to sacrifice one 
in order to save the lives of five? If this is a correct reading of what is going on in 
the Transplant Case, then this shows that not all of the relevant confounders have 
been streamlined out of the case, because the introduction of medical details is 
distracting, and so it might not be a good thought experiment for testing the 
hypothesis. Alternatively, it might be a very good case for testing the hypothesis, 
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because it gives us a taste of what being committed to the principle that it is 
permissible to sacrifice one in order to save five would really amount to if we 
took it seriously. Either way, it seems plausible that our intuitions are responding 
to factors that have either been explicitly excluded from the case (that the 
surgeries might not succeed) or to factors that are external to the case (what if 
doctors were actually permitted to harvest the organs of healthy bystanders?), or 
to both.  
 
Another example (albeit not an example from moral philosophy) of the smuggled 
intuition problem is provided by Tversky and Kahneman’s (1983 ) Conjunction 
Fallacy. In this case respondents are presented with details about Linda’s life and 
are asked to make a judgement about what she is most likely to be doing now. 
Respondents are told that: “Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very 
bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with 
issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear 
demonstrations” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983 ). They are then provided with a 
range of options about her current occupation, and are asked to rank the choices 
in terms of likelihood. Amongst the available options are that she is a ‘bank teller’ 
and that she is a ‘bank teller and is active in the feminist movement’. 
Overwhelmingly, respondents rank that she is a ‘bank teller and is active in the 
feminist movement’ over ‘Linda is a bank teller’, in terms of likelihood. This is 
taken to be an obvious error because the conjunction of two events is always less 
probable than a single event.  
 
Tversky and Kahneman’s explanation of why individuals get this case wrong so 
often is that they are making use of a misplaced heuristic. In this case, they are 
“replacing the attribute that was the target of the question (the relative 
probability of the descriptions’ truth) with an attribute that comes more easily to 
mind (the relative resemblance of the description to the introductory statement 
about Linda)” (Voorhoeve, 2009, p. 68). Bovens and Hartmann (2003) argue that 
it would be too quick to judge the respondents as merely irrational, and they 
offer an alternative interpretation. On their reading of the case, the respondent 
does not assess the probability of the various statements as they stand; rather 
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they assess the probability of the statements as though they were being informed 
of the statement by a source (a newspaper, an acquaintance, etc.), which is how 
one would ordinarily receive such information in the real world. When the 
respondents assess the likelihood of the statement that Linda is a bank teller, 
they suspect that the informant is unreliable, given how different this statement 
is from the information they have already received about Linda from the vignette. 
When they are presented with the statement that Linda is a bank teller and active 
in the feminist movement, this makes the informant seem more reliable (and the 
statement thus more likely) because it coheres better with what the respondent 
already knows about Linda (Bovens & Hartmann, 2003, pp. 85-88). If Bovens and 
Hartmann are correct – that is, we respond not the statement itself, but to the 
statement as though it were presented by an informant (which is the way we 
would typically receive such statements) – this is provides a nice illustration of 
Fischer’s point above about how it is difficult to turn off our real-world intuitive 
responses in the context of the thought experiment.   
 
If it turns out that our intuitive responses to thought experiments are not as 
clean as we had initially hoped, then perhaps we should discard thought 
experiments entirely. The initial claim was that thought experiments are useful 
because they allow us to streamline out extraneous factors and to focus just on 
that which is philosophically relevant. If extraneous factors are interfering 
anyway, then perhaps we are better off just focussing on real-world cases. I am 
not going to pursue this line of argument here. It still seems preferable to be able 
to factor out some extraneous factors in order to better focus on certain things, 
even if this process is imperfect, than to be constantly confronted with the whole 
“blooming, buzzing confusion [of reality]” – or at least it would be useful to be 
able to do it some of the time (Elgin, 2014 , p. 222). At this stage it is just worth 
flagging that there are various ways in which our intuitions about thought 
experiments might not be as clean as we would have hoped. This should make us 
somewhat more open to allowing real-world cases into our philosophical 
methodology, given that a standard objection to consulting real-world cases is 
that they are too “messy” and that there is too much going on in the real world 
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that might distract our intuitions, but it seems as though this is also a problem 
with thought experiments.  
 
1.4. Support Factors and Thought Experiments 
 
In this section I describe what I take to be the central methodological problem 
with thought experiments: that they run the risk of inadvertently streamlining 
out support factors when confounders are removed. 
 
So far I have argued that thought experiments play a useful role in philosophical 
methodology because they allow for extraneous factors that might otherwise 
interfere with philosophical intuitions to be streamlined out, even if this is only 
done imperfectly (due to the smuggled intuition problem). However, in the 
process of excluding potential confounders, required support factors may be 
inadvertently removed. To borrow (and somewhat adapt) an example from 
Fischer (1995) to illustrate this problem in the sciences, we can imagine a 
scientist who is very eager to study the relationship between matches and 
combustion. In their eagerness to be thorough, the scientist decides to perform 
the experiment in an airless vacuum to make sure that all potential confounders 
have been excluded. However, oxygen (an important support factor) has been 
inadvertently removed in the process, and so the scientist incorrectly concludes 
that there is no relationship between matches and combustion (Fischer, 1995, p. 
10).  
 
The ‘Ticking Bomb” case makes it clear that the problem of unwittingly excluding 
support factors is a real risk for philosophical thought experiments, and not just 
for scientific laboratory experiments.14 Walzer (1973) first introduces the 
Ticking Bomb case in his discussion of the dirty hands problem.15 In the thought 
experiment, the reader is asked to imagine a scenario in which a terrorist has 
been captured. Authorities have good reason to suspect that the terrorist knows 
                                                        
14 Many thanks to Andy Lamey who brought this case to my attention.  
15 There were precursors to the case, which make the same point about it being permissible to 
use torture when it would save the lives of a great number of people, but which do not invoke the 
case of the bomb directly. See, for instance, Gert (1969, p.623). 
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the location of a bomb (or a number of bombs) that will go off shortly. The 
question posed is whether it is permissible to torture the terrorist in order to get 
the information about the location of the bombs, and thus save the lives of 
innocent people who will die if the bombs are not located in time (Walzer, 1973, 
p. 173). The issue that the thought experiment highlights is that we typically 
think torture is unacceptable under all circumstances, but this case shows one 
scenario in which that intuition does not hold – overwhelmingly respondents say 
that it is permissible to torture the captured terrorist.  
 
Bufacchi and Arigo (2006) argue that our intuitive response to the Ticking Bomb 
case (that it is permissible to torture the terrorist to save the innocents) rests on 
relevant details having been stripped away for the purposes of creating the 
thought experiment – that is, our intuitions are the result of the streamlining 
process and they are not tracking that which is actually salient. Their point is that 
once those details have been reintroduced, so that the case more closely 
resembles actually torturing a captured terrorist, our response to the case would 
be reversed and we would no longer accept that torture is permissible (p. 359). 
 
To focus in on just one factor that Bufacchi and Arigo highlight as being salient 
and excluded, the case assumes that the captured terrorist will provide accurate 
information about the location of the bombs. That information will then allow the 
relevant authorities to locate and defuse the bombs, thus saving the lives of 
innocents, which makes the torture permissible. However, pre-existing evidence 
on coercive interrogation techniques show that torture leads to false confessions 
and inaccurate information being offered in the majority of cases. This is often 
because prisoners will say whatever they believe the interrogator wants to hear 
in order to put an end to the torture. Alternatively, savvy prisoners may 
intentionally give false information in order to mislead their captors and keep 
their plot intact. For instance, the Japanese captured a US fighter pilot in August 
1945, and after “rough interrogation” the pilot told his captors that the US 
intended to drop atomic bombs on Kyoto and Tokyo (when the truth was 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki), thus misleading the Japanese and ensuring that the 
plan went forward unimpeded. In yet another alternative, in scenarios in which 
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members of organisations are likely to be captured and tortured, and they are 
aware that this is the case, those higher up within the organisation might 
intentionally give individuals in lower ranks incorrect information. The idea is 
that false testimony will then be offered to their enemies when they are 
predictably captured and tortured (Bufacchi & Arigo, 2006, pp. 361-362). Once 
we recognise the high probability of false testimony in torture scenarios, it no 
longer seems that the bombs will be located and that any lives will be saved. 
Thus, it is no longer permissible to torture the prisoner. The excluded details, 
once reintroduced, reverse our moral judgment of the case. 
 
The principle that the Ticking Bomb case set out to test was whether torture is 
always impermissible. Assessing the case results in the conclusion that it is 
sometimes permissible. However, that conclusion is based on having removed 
information that we know to be true of torture – that it produces unreliable 
testimony. We only accept that it is permissible in the context of the thought 
experiment because of the implausible assumption that doing so will produce 
true testimony and thus saves lives. But what we are interested in is whether 
torture is ever permissible (not some other practice), and unreliable testimony 
seems to be very closely associated with torture (based on the evidence that we 
have about it). Removing salient information about the quality of testimony 
produced under conditions of torture thus means that our intuitions are no 
longer able to latch on to the relevant philosophical issue. Support factors in the 
context of thought experiments are those factors that are required to be in place 
for our intuition to latch on to the salient philosophical principle (see the 
introduction). The problem in the Ticking Bomb case, phrased slightly differently 
is thus: unreliable testimony is a support factor of the intuition that it is always 
morally impermissible to torture, once that support factor is removed our 
intuition shifts and we conclude that it is sometimes permissible to do so; but 
unreliable testimony is closely bound to the practice of torture, such that 
removing it means that we no longer seem to be assessing whether torture is 
ever morally permissible. Removing the support factor means that our intuition 
misses the philosophical target.  
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1.5. In search of an appropriate supplement  
 
Given the problem of excluding potential support factors in the process of 
streamlining, a supplement to philosophical thought experiments is required. 
This section will assess whether fiction might provide a suitable supplement to 
the very austere thought experiments that are typically used in philosophy. It will 
be argued that cases from fiction do not offer an appropriate supplement, 
because they are subject to the same risks as thought experiments, and that, as 
such, real-world cases should be used to fill this function. I will conclude this 
section by noting that precedent exists in the sciences for using real-world cases 
as a supplement to experimental methods.  
 
Elgin argues that cases from fiction ought to be included in philosophical 
methodology, because they provide more detail than very schematized thought 
experiments do. Fictional cases are also more manageable than examples taken 
from the real world, due to the streamlining process that authors subject reality 
to in the production of fiction. Fictional cases thus seem like the ideal solution: 
more detailed, but still manageable (Elgin, 2014 , p. 232).  The example that she 
uses to illustrate this point is that of Jane Austen’s novels. Her argument is that 
they provide substantially more detail than a standard philosophical thought 
experiment, but by focusing on only three or four families in a boring English 
village (Austen’s characters rarely venture into London where there is a lot going 
on, there are no peasant revolutions in her novels, etc.), Austen is able to remove 
extraneous factors and focus in on that which is relevant: the relationships. Elgin 
makes the point as follows:  
 
Austen devises a tightly controlled thought experiment. Restricting the 
factors that impinge on her protagonists enables her to elaborate on the 
effects of those that remain… Real families, however, are affected by too 
many forces for the social and moral trajectories exhibited by Austen’s 
characters to stand out. Too many other factors impinge on them; too 
many descriptions are available for characterizing their lives. Any 
sociological study would be vulnerable to the worry that unexamined 
factors played a non-negligible role in the interactions studied, that other 
forces were significant (Elgin, 2014 , p. 233) [emphasis added].  
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As the italicized text makes clear, Elgin argues for the inclusion of fictional cases 
over real-world cases because she is concerned that important support factors 
might go unnoticed when studying cases taken from the real world. Her worry is 
that we will be so distracted by all of the other things going on in the case that we 
will fail to pick out that which is really important. However, as I have already 
argued in this chapter, missing out on support factors is more of a problem for 
those making use of highly schematized thought experiments, where almost all 
factors have been intentionally excluded from the description, thus substantially 
increasing the likelihood that support factors have been excluded in the process. 
Further, given the streamlining process involved in fiction (which is precisely 
what Elgin thinks is good about these cases), fictional cases cannot provide a 
suitable supplement to thought experiments, because they also involve the risk of 
unwittingly streamlining out support factors.  
 
Fiction also involves an additional risk, which is that the authors might not be 
streamlining the world in ways that are philosophically useful. The author’s aim 
in producing a fictional case is typically to create a compelling narrative, not to 
create a rigorous thought experiment. Some of the extraneous and distracting 
factors that are left behind by the author might make for good fiction, but might 
not be conducive to philosophical rigour. Writers might also include atypical 
factors in their descriptions, which may act as confounders when they are taken 
up by philosophers.  
 
The only suitable supplement to thought experiments is cases from the real 
world. Williams (2002) makes a similar suggestion when he argues that: “real 
history fills in the merely schematic picture”. For instance, in the Ticking Bomb 
case, it was only by checking the thought experiment against the real world that 
it became clear that salient factors had been removed in the creation of the 
thought experiment.  
 
A potential criticism that could be made at this point is that we do not need to 
turn to the real world to check that support factors have not been accidentally 
excluded, we can do this just by having more thought experiments, with more of 
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the potentially relevant factors varied across the experimental cases. The way 
that Frances Kamm uses trolley problems is a good example of this – she assesses 
a vast number of trolley problems in which very subtle things are changed in 
each of the permutations, so that potentially relevant and irrelevant factors are 
screened in and out of the thought experiment, and that principles can be devised 
at a suitable level of context specificity. For instance, it was by looking at 
Thompson’s (1985) Footbridge case in contrast to the standard Trolley Problem 
that it became clear that distance might be a support factor that was present in 
the standard version of the problem and absent from the Footbridge case. No 
consultation of the real world was required. However, it still seems like the risk 
of inadvertently excluding potential support factors persists, because what is and 
is not varied across the permutations of the thought experiments (even if there 
are many of them) will still be dependent on the imagination of the philosopher, 
and they might miss out on something crucial. To reiterate Williamson’s point 
from before: “Any humanly compiled list of such interfering factors is likely to be 
incomplete” (2007, p. 185). 
 
An example of how we would use real-world cases as a ‘supplement’ to thought 
experiments (which is my suggestion in this chapter) is offered by Judith Jarvis 
Thomson’s (1971) Violinist Case, and its relationship to recent philosophical 
thinking about real cases of pregnancy. Thomson’s thought experiment asks that 
you imagine waking up to find that your circulatory system has been plugged 
into the circulatory system of an unconscious famous violinist. It turns out that 
the famous violinist is suffering from kidney disease. The Society of Music Lovers 
has checked all the available medical records and has determined that you are 
the only person whose blood is a match to his, so they kidnapped you during the 
night and hooked you up to the violinist so that your kidneys can circulate his 
blood. If you stay attached to the violinist for nine months he will make a 
complete recovery and you can both go back to your regular lives. If you detach 
yourself at any point in that time period the violinist will die (Thomson, 1971, pp. 
48-49). Thomson’s argument is that nobody would think that you are morally 
required to remain attached to the violinist for nine months (although that might 
be a very nice thing for you to do). Similarly, no woman should be morally 
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required to act as a human life-support system for a foetus for nine months in the 
case of pregnancy (Thomson, 1971, pp. 49-50).  
 
In the thought experiment Thompson relies on what has become known as the 
‘foetal container’ view of the relationship between the pregnant woman and her 
foetus (Kingma, 2016, forthcoming, p. 7; Purdy, 1990). That is, a woman is an 
incubator in which the foetus resides for nine months. This assumption is what 
makes the thought experiment work – being pregnant, according to the thought 
experiment, is like having a stranger plugged into your circulatory system. 
However, recent work on the relationship between mother and foetus argues 
that given the various ways that the anatomy of the foetus and the mother are 
integrated – for instance the foetus “resides not in the uterine cavity, but is 
implanted in the uterine wall, within the maternal deciduous tissue and is, at 
least in its early stages, completely covered by it” (Kingma, 2016, forthcoming, p. 
18) – it makes more sense to think of the mother-foetus relationship as a part-
whole relation (where the mother is the whole and the foetus is one part) rather 
than thinking of the foetus as something that is merely inside the mother “the 
way ‘a bun is in the oven’ or ‘a tub of yogurt is in the fridge’” (Kingma, 2016, 
forthcoming, p. 5). I am not going to venture into what the implications are for 
the abortion debate by questioning the foetal container picture of pregnancy on 
which Thomson relies. The point here is just that looking at the real world (for 
instance, the integration of a mother and foetus’s anatomy) can be a useful 
supplement to philosophical thought experiments (for instance, Thomson’s 
Violinist case), and for checking that nothing important has been excluded or 
missed out on in the creation of the thought experiment.  
 
It is also useful to note that, maintaining the analogy that has been used 
throughout this chapter between thought experiments in philosophy and 
laboratory experiments in the sciences, precedent exists for using real-world 
cases (or natural experiments) as a supplement to experimental methods (John, 
2011, p. 496). One area where this is particularly clear is in the history of 
psychology. Historically, there was a strong tradition of only studying 
psychological responses in laboratory settings, in order to maintain rigour and to 
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ensure that irrelevant factors were excluded. However, concern began to grow 
within the field that the phenomena of interest might not occur in laboratory 
conditions, particularly aspects of individuals’ social lives – for instance, how 
would one study psychological aspects of friendship in a laboratory setting? It 
seems as though many psychological phenomena that we might be interested in 
just cease to exist in the context of the laboratory. Studies of individuals in their 
everyday environments were thus included to capture the phenomena that had 
been previously streamlined out of experimental methods (Dechesne & De Roon, 
2014, pp. 186-188). That is, real-world cases were included as a supplement to 
streamlined experimental cases.  
 
Given that schematized thought experiments and cases from fiction both run the 
risk of unwittingly excluding support factors when confounders are removed, 
real-world cases should be included as a supplement in philosophical 
methodology.  
 
1.6. A criticism 
 
One potential criticism against the position presented in this chapter is that 
streamlining also occurs when describing real-world cases. That is, even though 
the case is taken from the world, the process by which it is described before 
philosophical analysis can occur involves streamlining. Not all of the details can 
be included in that description. The writer needs to pick out that which they take 
to be salient, excluding much of what actually happened as they do so.  In that 
selection process, important support factors might be excluded. Someone critical 
of the position that I advocate might thus argue that real-world cases are just as 
susceptible to the kinds of problems I have argued are applicable to very 
streamlined hypothetical cases (like the Trolley Problems) and to cases from 
fiction (like Jane Austen’s novels).  
 
The critic makes a good point. A selection process does occur when real-world 
cases are described, and so there is a risk that philosophically relevant factors 
might be factored out in that process. But this is not just a problem that occurs 
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when describing real world cases; it is likely that this would even be a problem 
for the philosopher experiencing a real-world case directly. For instance, we can 
imagine a philosopher being present for an interrogation in an actual ticking 
bomb case. Even when the philosopher is present in the room, there will be 
aspects of the experience that stand out as salient to them, and others that fade 
into the background of irrelevancy, and some of the factors that fade into the 
background might very well be philosophically relevant. Anyone who has had the 
experience of only noticing a coffee shop in their neighbourhood after walking 
past it hundreds of times before will be familiar with this experience. This just 
seems to be a limitation to our ability to engage with the world – we are always 
streamlining out (hopefully) extraneous factors and doing so imperfectly, and so 
we are always at risk of inadvertently excluding support factors. The question, 
then, is whether this problem is more or less severe when describing real world 
cases for philosophical purposes than it is for streamlined hypothetical thought 
experiments and cases from fiction.  
 
Part of the problem with the streamlining process that occurs in producing 
austere thought experiments and fictional cases (in contrast to the streamlining 
that occurs when describing real cases), is that the philosopher is entirely reliant 
on their imagination when attempting to figure out what is an extraneous 
confounder and what might be a support factor. While we are still required to 
factor things out in our descriptions of real-world cases, and how this is done will 
be a matter of interpretation, at least the real world places constraints on that 
interpretation, and we can test our interpretations against the real world – for 
instance, would the torture in a ticking bomb case really produce the effects that 
the thought experiment requires to be successful? These checks are absent in 
fictional cases and more austere thought experiments. As such, real-world cases 
are less likely than the alternatives to accidentally exclude important support 
factors. Thus, they still provide a valuable supplement to our philosophical 
methodology.  
 
In the rest of this chapter, I will consider two further reasons why considering 
real-world cases might be philosophically beneficial. These are that they might 
  40 
help us to improve the external validity of our philosophical findings (that is, 
make the results of our philosophical analysis more likely to transfer to new 
cases), and they are a useful source of hypotheses and conceptual clarification.  
 
1.7. External Validity  
 
Up until this point the discussion in this chapter has focused exclusively on the 
issue of ‘internal validity’, where “a thought experiment is internally valid to the 
extent that it allows its readers to make judgments that are confident and free 
from bias or other confounding factors about the hypothesis or point of principle 
that it aims to test.” (Wilson, 2016, forthcoming, p. 5). But as Wilson correctly 
points out, knowing that a thought experiment has high internal validity, does 
not tell us how well that result will generalize to further cases (Wilson, 2016, 
forthcoming, p. 1).16 Or, to borrow Cartwright and Hardie’s language, just 
because we know that something worked there (the test scenario), does not tell 
us that it will work here (the new case that we are trying to assess) (2012, p. 91).  
 
In the case of philosophical thought experiments, knowing that we have a 
particular intuition about the moral permissibility of an action in the context of a 
thought experiment (even if that thought experiment was conducted superbly, 
and we accept that it has high internal validity) does not mean that we would 
necessarily accept the moral permissibility of similar-looking actions in new 
scenarios. The result might not generalize – that is, external validity might be 
low. Wenar (2011) argues that Singer’s (1972) Child in the Pond case is like this.  
 
In Singer’s original thought experiment, the reader is asked to imagine that they 
come across a child drowning in a pond. Singer argues that we would all agree 
that, in that situation, you are morally required to wade into the pond and save 
the child, regardless of the damage to your shoes that would result (Singer, 1972, 
p. 231). He argues that if you accept the conclusion that you should save the child 
                                                        
16 Cartwright makes the same point earlier about Randomised Control Trials, arguing that they 
have high internal validity, but that does not give us information on how well those results 
generalize. That is, by themselves, they do not give us information about external validity 
(Cartwright, 2010).  
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in the pond, then you are also committed to the idea that you are morally 
required to donate to international aid organisations in order to save the lives of 
the distant poor who would otherwise die, based on the principle that if you can 
prevent a very bad thing from happening without sacrificing anything of 
comparable moral importance then you are required to do so (Singer, 1972, p. 
231). He later goes on to describe the relationship between the Child in the Pond 
case and our responsibilities to the distant poor like this:  
 
We are all in the situation of the person passing the shallow pond: we can 
all save lives of people, both children and adults, who would otherwise 
die, and we can do so at a very small cost to us: the cost of a new CD, a 
shirt or a night out at a restaurant or concert, can mean the difference 
between life and death to more than one person somewhere in the world 
– and overseas aid agencies like Oxfam overcome the problem of acting at 
a distance (Singer, 1997).  
 
Singer assumes that translating the results from the Child in the Pond case to the 
situation of international poverty will be easy: phrased slightly differently, he 
assumes that external validity almost automatically follows internal validity. 
Wenar challenges the external validity of Singer’s thought experiment. He argues 
that once we have taken into account the complexity of the international aid 
system, which sometimes means that our best efforts to help the distant poor 
actually causes more harm than good (for instance, when donated money is 
channelled off by the corrupt leadership of a country), it becomes less clear that 
aiding on the international level is anything at all like wading into the pond to 
rescue the drowning child (where the required action is straightforward, and the 
result predictably good) (Wenar, 2011, p. 105).  
 
The questionable external validity of Singer’s thought experiment is likely to be a 
much broader problem in philosophy. Given that a large part of the point of doing 
moral and political theory is to produce principles that are applicable in a wide 
range of scenarios, it would be a real problem if the results of our considered 
cases have low external validity. It also seems likely that this is a widespread 
problem in philosophical theorising. One of the issues to have emerged in the 
preceding discussion in this chapter is that philosophical intuitions and the 
resulting principles are actually quite context-sensitive – whether we think the 
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agent in the Reach case has an obligation to save the child drowning on the other 
side of the country, for instance, depends on the details of how the case is 
imagined.  
 
Wilson (2016, forthcoming; 2014) argues that consulting cases from the real 
world can help with the problem of external validity. To show how this works he 
introduces what he terms the ‘translational model’. Again, this is a piece of 
methodological thinking borrowed from the medical sciences. The translational 
model in medicine developed out of the erroneous way that the relationship 
between abstract and applied research was historically understood. In the 1940s, 
the dominant idea was that the bulk of available time and funding should be 
devoted to abstract research (what was termed “basic research”); the thought 
being that advances in abstract scientific problems would translate directly into 
improvements in applied medical science. However, in reality, it was difficult to 
get advances in the basic sciences to translate into practical biomedical 
improvements. The translational model in the medical sciences was introduced 
in an attempt to overcome this. The idea was that research should be funded and 
conducted across the spectrum – from the very abstract to the very applied – 
with basic science informing practice, and applied research informing basic 
science. Wilson argues that philosophical methodology should be thought of in 
the same way: philosophical study should traverse the spectrum from the most 
abstract to the most applied, with feedback occurring across the spectrum 
(Wilson, 2016, forthcoming, pp. 16-17; 2014, pp. 8-13).  
 
Wilson produces a model for thinking about how one would go about moving 
from a very theoretical piece of research to realising its application (Wilson, 
2014, p. 12). However, he does not fully articulate how one might move from the 
more applied end of the spectrum (real cases) to theoretical developments at the 
more abstract end, although it is clear that he thinks that this is the case. 
Cartwright and Hardie (2012) provide us with the theoretical tools to better 
understand how one might move from applied cases to theoretical developments.  
In particular, their discussion of “horizontal searches” and “vertical searches” is 
helpful (and it has the additional benefit of linking back to the previous 
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discussion on support factors). I discuss each of these terms in the following 
paragraphs.  
 
Cartwright and Hardie (2012) develop an account of horizontal and vertical 
searches as part of their broader project of using evidence for policy 
development, where the ‘evidence’ will often be an RCT with high internal 
validity. The concern is then how to move from an experiment with high internal 
validity to a new policy scenario (this is very similar to the question of how one 
might move from an intuition about an internally valid case to new scenarios in 
philosophy). They suggest that doing so involves doing two things. First, you 
should figure out what the relevant support factors were that produced the effect 
in the successful experiment, because if you want to achieve the same result in a 
new scenario, you will need to make sure that those support factors (or 
appropriate substitutes) are present. Seeking out the relevant support factors is 
termed the ‘horizontal search’.  The way this would occur in the philosophical 
context is to figure out what the salient support factors were in the case being 
assessed. That is, what it was about the case that generated the specific judgment 
in response to it – what was the philosopher’s intuition latching on to? For 
instance, this would require that you figure out exactly what it was about the 
Ticking Bomb case that resulted in your judgment that it is permissible to torture 
the prisoner in that case. The idea being that if you want to apply your judgment 
about the case to new cases (for instance, saying it is permissible to torture a 
prisoner in a new scenario) then you would have to make sure that the same 
support factors were also present in the new case, which requires that you know 
what those support factors are. Consulting real-world cases is going to be 
extremely useful at this stage of the process, given that (as has already been 
argued) at least in real-world cases we know that all the support factors were 
present.  
 
The second thing that Cartwright and Hardie suggest is to seek out more abstract 
causal principles from the specific case being studied (that is, to abstract away 
from the case), which will allow you to apply the more abstract principle to new 
scenarios. This is the ‘vertical search’. For instance, (to borrow their example), 
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imagine that you used the claw end of a hammer to pull a nail out of a wall. From 
the specific case, you can abstract away to a more general causal principle about 
levers. When you later encounter a large stone that you need to move, you can 
draw on the more general causal principle about levers that you developed from 
the hammer scenario and use that to figure out that you need a crowbar (another 
type of lever) to move the stone (Cartwright & Hardie, 2012, pp. 76-88). In the 
philosophical analogue, for instance, Singer used his Child in the Pond case to 
develop the more abstract principle that an agent is morally required to prevent 
great harm whenever it is the case that nothing of comparable moral importance 
will be sacrificed in the process of doing so.  
 
In the philosophical context, the idea is that you would start with an intuitive 
judgment about a case; such as an assessment about the rightness or wrongness 
of an action in the real world. Then you would try to figure out what contributed 
to that intuition; potentially listing all of those features. That is the horizontal 
search. Then you would ask why those particular principles brought about that 
judgement; trying to construct a more general principle that explains why those 
features yield that judgement – i.e. you develop a more abstract principle. That is 
the vertical search.  
 
It thus seems, as Wilson suggests, that consulting real-world cases can also help 
with the problem of external validity.  
 
1.8. Hypothesis Generation and Conceptual Modification 
 
So far, in this chapter, it has been argued that consulting the real world is 
important for achieving internal and external validity, but little has been said 
about where the philosophical hypotheses that are being tested come from. In 
this section it will be argued that considering the real world is also important for 
generating philosophical hypotheses in the first place (or to keep the analogue 
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with the sciences going – it provides the ‘context of discovery’). Relatedly, real-
world considerations help to cast light on new aspects of pre-existing concepts.17 
 
The real world is an obvious place to look when one is attempting to generate 
philosophical hypotheses to test. This offers an additional method for coming up 
with hypotheses, the alternative being that one studies pre-existing philosophical 
problems in-depth in an effort to find a conceptual gap in the details that requires 
filling in (Wilson, 2014, p. 5). A particularly successful example of using the real 
world to generate a philosophical hypothesis is Miranda Fricker’s Epistemic 
Injustice (2007). Here, Fricker argues that we often misjudge individuals who are 
the members of groups that are the victims of prejudice as not being credible 
bearers of knowledge. The consequences of this are that we not only miss out on 
important information that we would otherwise have had access to, but we also 
subject these individuals to an injustice.18 It is unlikely that Fricker would have 
stumbled upon the overlap between issues in epistemology and justice if she had 
just conducted conceptual analysis of these terms.  
 
Similarly, news from the real world can call into question the plausibility of 
various pre-existing philosophical positions,19 and thus creates the impetus for 
generating new hypotheses to test. Philippa Foot (2009) for instance, reports 
that it was news on the discovery of concentration camps during the Holocaust 
that made her question the plausibility of moral subjectivism. She notes: “in the 
face of the news of the concentration camps, I thought, ‘It just can’t be the way 
Stevenson, Ayer, and Hare say it is, that morality is just the expression of an 
                                                        
17 This can be seen in Chapter 5 of this thesis, where the Mbeki case brings to light the problem of 
suppressed disagreements at the intersection between culpable ignorance and peer 
disagreement.  
18 There might be another problem here, which is that many of those who are the victims of 
epistemic injustice may never read Fricker’s work, because they are precisely the people who 
lack access to university philosophy programmes. But given that the focus in this chapter is on 
what philosophical benefits can be achieved paying attention to real-world cases, this issue will 
be bracketed. Philosophy has benefitted from Fricker uncovering the relationship between 
epistemology and justice, because we now understand a conceptual relationship that we did not 
before.  
19 This can be seen in Chapter 4 of this thesis, where the disproportionate prevalence of AIDS 
cases in southern Africa, and the crisis of AIDS denialism, places conceptual pressure on the strict 
distinction between mono-causal and multi-causal accounts of disease, and provides motivation 
to resolve this distinction.   
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attitude,’ and the subject haunted me.” (Foot, 2009, p. 91). In particular, she was 
concerned that subjectivism lacked the conceptual resources to be able to tell a 
Nazi that they were ‘wrong’, even though it was obviously clear that they were. 
Foot then spent a substantial portion of her career responding to subjectivism.   
 
In the same vein, consulting the real world can also help to extend and modify 
pre-existing philosophical concepts. Srinivasan (2016), for example, notes that 
historically ‘marital rape’ was considered to be conceptually impossible, but the 
testimony of women over time eventually made it clear that the pre-existing 
concept of rape needed expansion to accommodate this (pp. 5-6). Many reasons 
were offered for why marital rape was a ‘conceptual impossibility’. For instance, 
that marriage marked the merger of the spouses into a single unified entity, 
making rape within a marriage incomprehensible: “Since nobody can rape 
himself or herself, it is strictly speaking impossible – a legal oxymoron – for a 
man to rape his wife” (Burgess-Jackson, 1996, p. 113).20 Once this spousal 
merger argument was abandoned (perhaps because of how metaphysically 
dubious it is), it was argued that the harm of non-consensual sex within a 
marriage is not as severe as it is in other kinds of situations in which non-
consensual sex might take place. For instance, two commenters in the early 
1950s arguing against the recognition of marital rape in the law claim that: 
“though the wife may suffer indignity and shock as a result of [her husband’s] 
action, her suffering is comparably less than that of the victim of the typical rape” 
(Morris & Turner, 1953 quoted in Burgess-Jackson, 1996, p. 115). Testimony 
gathered by social scientists called into question this assumption:  
 
[M]any factors cause wife rape to be more traumatic than rape by 
strangers and non-intimates; for example, the sense of betrayal, the 
disillusionment, the fact that it contaminates the entire marriage, and the 
additional fact that wife rape is often repeated, sometimes for years on 
end (Russell, 1990 quoted in Burgess-Jackson, 1996, p. 116).  
 
 
Eventually this concept was expanded upon to include the recognition of marital 
rape, but this was only done as a result of collecting testimony in the real world.  
                                                        
20 Burgess-Jackson is reporting an argumentative position here, not endorsing it.  
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Paying attention to the real world is thus important for hypothesis generation (as 
in Fricker’s case), discovering challenges to existing philosophical theory (as in 
Foot’s case), and for expanding and adapting our concepts (as in the case of 
marital rape).  
 
1.9. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I have argued that real-world cases should be included in 
philosophical methodology. Thought experiments are effective because they 
streamline out extraneous factors and allow one to focus on just that which is 
philosophically relevant. However, the process of streamlining also runs the risk 
of overlooking important support factors, especially because support factors 
might be invisible until the full mechanism driving the intuition is known, or until 
a support factor is removed and the intuition no longer holds. In most cases we 
are producing streamlined cases for philosophical analysis without a good sense 
of which elements are likely to be confounders and which are support factors 
(we are streamlining blind). Cases from fiction are subject to related problems 
because they are produced via similar streamlining processes, and they involve 
the additional risk that the elements that are included and excluded are decided 
by narrative effectiveness, not by philosophical rigour. A supplement to thought 
experiments and fictional cases is thus required. Real-world cases fill this gap, 
because at least we know that all of the required support factors are present in 
the real-world case. Critics might argue that when real-world cases are described 
for the purposes of philosophical analysis, streamlining also occurs and 
important support factors might be inadvertently excluded. However, this 
concern is less warranted for the real-world case than when it is posed to 
thought experiments and fictional cases. At least we can check our descriptions of 
the world against reality, and determining what may or may not be a support 
factor (or a confounder) is not entirely reliant on the imagination of the 
philosopher.  
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Additionally, consulting real-world cases can be beneficial for better translating 
our philosophical responses from specific cases to novel scenarios (i.e. they help 
with external validity). This is because we can subject our assessments of real 
world cases to horizontal and vertical searches. Through the horizontal search 
we figure out what the support factors were that drove the intuition in that 
scenario, and through the vertical search we develop more abstract principles, 
which are then applicable to new cases. We thus have procedure for translating 
the results from particular philosophical cases to new contexts.  
 
Finally, the real world provides us with the context of philosophical discovery. 
Consulting the real world can help to generate philosophical hypotheses in the 
first instance (such as with Fricker’s uncovering of philosophical material at the 
intersection between epistemology and justice). It can challenge existing 
philosophical principles (such as Foot’s realisation that the concentration camps 
of the Holocaust pose a challenge to moral subjectivism). Further, consulting the 
world can help to modify and expand pre-existing philosophical concepts (such 
as the role that social science research played in showing the possibility of 
marital rape).  
 
Given all of the philosophical benefits that accrue from paying attention to the 
world, close study of real-world cases should be a legitimate part of philosophical 
practice.  
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2. The Case of Thabo Mbeki’s AIDS Denialism 
 
2.1. Introduction  
 
Having justified the detailed philosophical study of real-world cases in the 
previous chapter, in this chapter I describe the case that is the focus of this thesis. 
In particular, I provide a chronology of Mbeki’s AIDS denialism. There is 
substantial controversy over the events of this period, and what was motivating 
Mbeki to act as he did (Steinberg, Forthcoming, 2017, p. 4). In this chapter I aim 
to cut through the controversy and provide the reader with as simple a 
description as possible in order to make comprehensible the philosophical 
problems that follow in the course of this thesis. In chapters 4 and 5 I provide 
more detail on what I take to have motivated Mbeki. In chapter 4, I argue that at 
least part of what occurred was that Mbeki (correctly) recognised that there was 
an explanatory gap in the biomedical literature at the time, which made it 
difficult to account for the disproportionate prevalence of AIDS in southern 
Africa, and which led him to (incorrectly) consult non-mainstream AIDS 
scientists. In chapter 5 I argue that his distrust of various sources of 
disagreement with his view, and suppression of disagreement within his political 
party, resulted in him being ignorant on certain key issues, and this also helps to 
explain his motivations.   
 
I divide the discussion into three chronological sections: 1) the period prior to 
Mbeki’s denialism (1980s-1999); 2) the period of Mbeki’s active denialism 
(1999- 2000)21; and 3) the post-denial period (2000-2016).  
 
 
 
                                                        
21 There is some controversy over using 2000 as a cutoff point, because the government only 
began to roll out an ARV programme in 2003, and Mbeki seems to remain committed to his 
denialist views even now. Wang (2007) takes 2003 to be the cut-off point, because this is when 
the government committed itself to providing ARVs. I take October 2000 to be the end of Mbeki’s 
“official” denial period, because this is when he publically stepped back from the AIDs debate, 
even though he continued to influence policies through other members of the party (Posel 2008, 
18).  
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2.2. Pre-Denial (1980s- 1999)  
 
Both the apartheid government and the ANC believed that AIDS would never be a 
problem for South Africa, assuming that it would largely be restricted to white 
homosexual communities, as had been the case in other parts of the world (Vale 
& Barrett, 2009, p. 451; Gumede, 2005, p. 152; Feinstein, 2007, p. 130). 
Homophobia and an unwillingness to discuss sexuality, which united the 
Christian apartheid National Party (NP) and the anti-apartheid liberation groups, 
meant that nothing was done about AIDS until the early 1990s (Butler, 2005, p. 
593). At this point, prevalence of the disease was extremely low, with only 0.76% 
of the population infected by 1990 (Karim & Karim, 2002, p. 39).  
 
In 1992, the National AIDS Convention of South Africa (NACOSA), made up of the 
NP’s health ministry, and representatives from the ANC and the United 
Democratic Front (a coalition of anti-apartheid liberation groups other than the 
ANC), met for the first time to draw up a strategy for tackling AIDS as the country 
underwent democratic transition. Motivation for this meeting seems to have 
been partially due to an awareness of rising infection rates, but also because 
leading members of the anti-apartheid movement had been living outside of 
South Africa in areas that had much harder hit by the epidemic, and they had 
borne witness to the effects of the disease. South Africa had been granted partial 
early protection from the epidemic due to the isolation that came with sanctions, 
but individuals like Chris Hani (a major figure in the ANC at the time, but who 
was assassinated just before democracy was realised) were especially concerned 
that South Africa might suffer a similar fate.  
 
The ANC assumed office in 1994 with an impressive AIDS plan that had been 
drawn up at NACOSA, and it was made a ‘Presidential Lead Project’, with the 
commitment that adequate funding would be allocated to ensure its realisation. 
However, despite this plan, in the early days of democracy AIDS was not a 
priority issue and little progress was made on implementing it (Posel, 2008, p. 
15; Butler, 2005, p. 593; Chikane, 2013, p. 257; Gumede, 2005, p. 152). In one 
description of the ineffectiveness of the Mandela presidency on issues of HIV and 
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AIDS, Marais comments: “Measured minute by minute, during his presidency 
Mandela probably spent more time with the Spice Girls and Michael Jackson than 
he did raising the AIDS issue with the South African public” (Marais 2000 quoted 
in Nattrass 2007, p. 40).  
 
In 1994, an inter-departmental committee was established to discuss AIDS. 
Mbeki, then the deputy president, took responsibility for government oversight 
of all AIDS-related projects, across multiple departments. Both Chikane (2013, 
258) and Butler (2005, 594) describe Mbeki as being a “champion” of the ANC’s 
AIDS policy in the 1994 - 1998 period. Chikane, director-general of the 
presidency at the time, recalls that Mbeki required all senior government officials 
and members of Cabinet to wear the red ribbons that had become emblematic of 
the struggle against AIDS at all times; reprimanding them if he caught them 
without their ribbons, because he wanted to make sure that the message to the 
public was clear: The government is taking AIDS seriously. Chikane notes that at 
“this stage there was no inkling that there would ever be any controversy about 
HIV and AIDS” (Chikane, 2013, p. 258). 
 
Despite Mbeki’s enthusiasm for the ANC’s early AIDS strategy, there were two 
high profile scandals associated with the government’s AIDS intervention during 
this period. The first was the Sarafina II debacle in 1996. The then-Minister of 
Health, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, spent a disproportionate amount of the annual 
AIDS budget (most of which was international donor money) on producing a 
musical that would travel the country educating people about HIV and AIDS. This 
has been overwhelmingly rejected as a waste of scarce resources, which had little 
impact on public awareness about the disease. There were also a number of 
“financial irregularities” associated with the production, which ultimately led to 
the project being scrapped prematurely (Posel, 2008, p. 15; Gumede, 2005, p. 
153). 
 
However, despite being included in most chronologies of the denialist period (see 
Posel (2008), Butler (2005), Gumede (2005) and Nattrass (2007)) the Sarafina II 
scandal was restricted to the Health Ministry, with little connection to Mbeki and 
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nothing to do with the denialism that came later. The second AIDS scandal from 
this period – the “Virodene Scandal” – was far more telling of things to come; 
both in terms of the individuals involved and the content of the incident.  
 
In 1996 a group of researchers from the University of Pretoria claimed that they 
found a cure for AIDS, which they called ‘Virodene’, but the MCC (Medical Control 
Council – the body tasked with overseeing medical research) refused to accept 
the research protocol, effectively shutting down the possibility of a trial 
(Gumede, 2005, pp. 153-154; Posel, 2008, p. 15). The MCC continued to reject 
versions of the protocol over the 1997 – 1998 period, and it was also rejected by 
the University of Pretoria’s own internal research ethics committee (Myburgh, 
2009, pp. 5-6). Faced with the prospect of not being permitted to conduct a trial, 
the researchers made personal contact with the Minister of Health and Mbeki in 
an attempt to bypass the MCC. 
 
 Mbeki found the prospect of Virodene appealing, not just because it was 
substantially cheaper than the alternative antiretroviral therapies available on 
the international market, but because it was produced at a South African 
university, which cohered well with his commitment to “African solutions for 
African problems.” In 1997 the Virodene researchers addressed Cabinet directly, 
on special invitation from Mbeki himself, bringing with them a small number of 
patients who had received the treatment. These patients offered testimony of the 
miraculous effects that the drug had had on their lives (Gumede, 2005, p. 154; 
Myburgh, 2009, p. 4; Posel, 2008, p. 15). But it turned out that Virodene was not 
the cure that everyone had hoped for. In an independent review, it was 
concluded that the Virodene research team had contravened trial procedures, 
having tested it on humans before successfully completing laboratory or animal 
trials. It was also found that the main ingredient was an industrial solvent, which 
was already well-known to cause severe liver damage in humans (Gumede, 2005, 
p. 154). However, Mbeki’s personal support of Virodene and its researchers, and 
his irritation with not being able to overrule the MCC were prescient of his later 
denial. In Posel’s words: 
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Then Deputy President Mbeki’s backing of the Virodene trials was ardent 
and his critique of the MCC pointed and angry, giving perhaps the earliest 
signs of what would grow into his more thoroughgoing distaste for the 
power of the scientific establishment with respect of AIDS. (Posel, 2008, p. 
15) 
 
There were also rumours that members of the MCC were removed due to their 
refusal to accept the Virodene trial protocol, and that the ANC had financial 
stakes in the drug’s success (Posel, 2008, p. 15; Myburgh, 2009, p. 6). Whether or 
not these rumours are true, it is largely accepted that the Virodene incident 
primed Mbeki to consider non-mainstream approaches to AIDS science, and that 
it was the start of his antagonistic relationship with the scientific establishment 
(in this case, antagonism with the MCC). But at this point Mbeki’s approach to 
AIDS was still based on mainstream AIDS science (Gumede, 2005, p. 155).  
 
In June 1999 Thabo Mbeki was elected as South Africa’s second democratic 
president, and his position on AIDS quickly departed from the scientific 
mainstream.  
 
2.3. Denial (1999-2000)  
 
In July 1999 Anita Allen, a science journalist, and Anthony Brink, a lawyer, sent 
dossiers of AIDS denialist material to Mbeki. When Mbeki described these events 
to his biographer, Mark Gevisser, he explicitly cites this as the event that 
“sparked it off” (Gevisser, 2007, p. 729).  
 
By all accounts, Mbeki proceeded to do a considerable amount of independent 
research on HIV and AIDS over the following months, mostly on the Internet 
(Cherry, 2009, p. 18; Gumede, 2005, p. 159). In October he announced at the 
National Council of Provinces meeting that he had uncovered a large literature 
online that questioned the safety of AZT (an antiretroviral) and encouraged other 
members of the Council to read up on this issue (Gumede, 2005, pp. 158-159; 
Chikane, 2013, pp. 261-262). At his end-of-year holiday with his university 
friends from England, he showed them a number of AIDS denialist websites – 
indicating that Mbeki had indeed been reading denialist material online in the 
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intervening months. In January 2000 the sheer volume of Mbeki’s reading on HIV 
and AIDS became clear, when he sent a dossier of over fifteen hundred pages of 
denialist material to Malegapuru Makgoba, a leading South African immunologist 
and president of the Medical Research Council (MRC), who Mbeki was trying to 
win over (Gevisser, 2007, p. 742).  
 
After extensively reading non-mainstream HIV/AIDS material, Mbeki made 
contact with the relevant scientists directly. In January 2000 he wrote to David 
Rasnick, a self-proclaimed “dissident” AIDS scientist at Berkeley, California. Even 
at this point it seems that Mbeki was still mostly committed to the mainstream 
view of HIV and AIDS. His letter to Rasnick consisted of a series of questions, 
along with the answers he had received from his Minister of Health, Manto 
Tshabalala-Msimang. Tshabalala-Msimang’s answers were entirely consistent 
with mainstream AIDS science at this point. The only hint that Mbeki gave that he 
might be sympathetic with Rasnick’s view was putting the word “HIV” in 
quotation marks in his letter (Gevisser, 2007, p. 742; Cherry, 2009, p. 25; 
Gumede, 2005, p. 159). Rasnick’s responses included reference to poverty as a 
cause of AIDS, and shortly after Mbeki began including comments about the 
causal salience of poverty in his speeches (Gevisser, 2007, p. 743). In February he 
gave the State of the Nation Address, in which he explained that government 
would not only be intensifying their public health messaging about AIDS (in line 
with mainstream scientific views), but also stressed the necessity of considering 
poverty in conjunction with AIDS (still permissible within the mainstream 
paradigm, but starting to edge toward what was non-mainstream science at the 
time, and echoing Rasnick’s response letter) (Gevisser, 2007, p. 743). Soon after, 
he made contact with Peter Duesberg, the unofficial leader of the “dissident” 
AIDS movement (more will be said about Duesberg in the following chapter) 
(Gumede, 2005, p. 159). 
 
In March 2000 it was announced that an expert panel was being established to 
“explore” the AIDS issue and to provide advice to the presidency. Amongst the 
items on their brief, panellists were asked to consider issues related to the 
disease’s aetiology (Cherry, 2009, p. 25). Just under half the scientists on the 
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panel represented the denialist view. John Moore, a well-known mainstream 
AIDS scientist commented that: “The panel has pretty well everyone on it who 
believes that HIV is not the cause of AIDS, and about 0.0001 per cent of those 
who oppose this view” (Moore quoted in Cherry 2009, 26). 
 
 The panel had their first meeting at the start of May 2000. In July they met again, 
but the panel had been enlarged from 37 members to 52, with the new members 
representing the mainstream scientific view, placing the denialists firmly in the 
minority. The hope was that the change in composition of the panel was 
indicative of an upcoming shift in government policy (a hope that was 
unfortunately not realised) (Cherry, 2009, pp. 27-30). Unsurprisingly, the panel 
was unable to reach consensus and their final report consisted of contradictory 
recommendations. Mbeki took this to indicate that AIDS science was deeply 
contested, and he used this as justification to delay the provision of antiretroviral 
therapy via the public health system until 2003 (Cherry, 2009, pp. 34-35; 
Nattrass, 2007, p. 91).  
 
Mbeki came under severe pressure from local civil society groups, notably the 
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), and lost credibility in the international press, 
who “widely believed that insofar as his views were sincerely held, he was mad” 
(Steinberg, Forthcoming, 2017, p. 5). This was particularly worrying to Mbeki 
and the ANC because of the local elections that were scheduled for later that year. 
The senior party leadership convinced Mbeki to publicly back down from the 
AIDS issue. Importantly, they did not criticise him directly, but rather expressed 
concern that there had been a breakdown in communication, and that the 
message about AIDS had become confused (that they did not criticise him 
directly will become important in Chapter 5, when suppressed disagreement 
within the ANC will be discussed).  
 
Mbeki eventually agreed that he would abstain from public comment on AIDS, at 
least until after the local elections, but on the understanding that he would not 
recant any of his previous statements (Gumede, 2005, pp. 165-166). On 26 
September 2000 Mbeki publically announced his withdrawal from the AIDS 
  56 
debate (Feinstein, 2007, p. 123; Cherry, 2009, p. 32). Joel Netshitenzhe (the head 
of communications for the ANC) was put in charge of undoing the public relations 
damage that the AIDS issue had created, a task that was all the more difficult 
because of Mbeki’s insistence that he would not back down from any of his 
previous statements. Netshitenzhe embarked on an extremely well-funded 
publicity campaign. In particular, he focussed on arguing that the media had 
intentionally misunderstood the government’s position on AIDS, and that no 
member of the ANC had ever claimed that there was no causal connection 
between HIV and AIDS (Gumede, 2005, p. 166).   
 
2.4. Post-Denial (2000- Present)  
 
Despite Mbeki’s exit from the public debate, in practice he continued to influence 
South African HIV/AIDS policy via other members of the party, most notably 
through Tshabalala-Msimang (the Health Minister), despite the fact that she had 
initially adhered to the mainstream scientific view. Posel refers to Tshabalala-
Msimang’s role in the AIDS controversy as being Mbeki’s ‘chorus’ (i.e. uncritically 
reflecting his views) (Posel, 2008, p. 18). Steinberg makes similar comments 
about Tshabalala-Msimang’s role, describing her as being under Mbeki’s “sway” 
(Steinberg, Forthcoming, 2017, p. 4). Fred Mouton, a popular satirical cartoonist, 
published a cartoon at the time in which he drew Tshabalala-Msimang as a 
puppet and Mbeki as the puppeteer (Nattrass 2007, 74).  
 
That Mbeki had no real intention of exiting the AIDS debate was immediately 
clear. Two days after the public announcement, he addressed the internal ANC 
caucus, and made statements about AIDS that were more extreme than he had 
ever made in public,22 such as questioning whether the virus exists at all 
(Feinstein, 2007, pp. 124-126). There are other occasional instances in which it is 
                                                        
22 The ANC caucus occurs in private. The only reason we know about these events is because 
Andrew Feinstein, a member of the ANC and a Member of Parliament, leaked his notes from the 
caucus meeting to the press, and subsequently included his version of events in his book on this 
period of the ANC’s history, After the Party (2007).  
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clear that despite being (mostly23) quiet about AIDS in public, he continued to 
promote his denialist stance within the privacy of the party.  
 
One particularly noteworthy instance of this occurred in March 2002, when an 
anonymous monograph entitled, Castro Hlongwane, caravans, cats, geese, foot & 
mouth and statistics: HIV/AIDS and the struggle for the humanisation of the 
African, was circulated to Members of Parliament. In this document some of the 
most extreme versions of the denialist stance are endorsed – for instance, that 
HIV might not be causally relevant to AIDS at all, and that pharmaceutical 
companies were deliberately inflating the estimates of the number of HIV 
positive people in southern Africa in order to increase sales (Anonymous, 2002). 
At the time there was widespread speculation that Mbeki had written the Castro 
Hlongwane document, due to the similarity between it and Mbeki’s writing style, 
and because an embedded signature on the document suggested that it had been 
written on Mbeki’s computer (Wang, 2007, p. 16; Barrall, 2002). In a public letter 
this year (2016) Mbeki has finally claimed co-authorship of the document 
(Mbeki, 2016). There is also strong evidence that Mbeki continued to quietly 
work on the document and update it for many years after he exited the public 
debate. While Gevisser was preparing Mbeki’s biography in 2007, Mbeki asked 
him if he had read the Castro Hlongwane document, to which Gevisser responded 
that he had. Shortly after, Mbeki couriered him an updated version, which was 
twice as long as the original and included references up to August 2006. While 
Mbeki did not confess authorship of the document to Gevisser at the time, he did 
admit that the document reflected his views (Gevisser, 2007, p. 736).  
 
While Mbeki continued to work on the denialist project privately, he was losing 
the public battle, especially due to the activities of the TAC. The TAC had been 
established in 1998 to campaign for a comprehensive care package to be 
                                                        
23 Occasionally he slipped up and did make public comments on AIDS that echoed his previous 
denialism. In particular, at a public lecture at the University of Fort Hare in October 2001 he 
commented on the “strange opinions” about disease that South Africans have been forced to 
adopt, and reprimanded civil society groups for what he took to be the implied racism of their 
activism against the state in their efforts to secure anti-retroviral therapy via the public health 
system (Mbeki, 2001). However, it seems as though Mbeki might plausibly have believed he was 
in keeping with his agreement with the ANC because he did not mention AIDS by name in the 
speech (Forrest and Streek 2001).  
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delivered by government. They initially thought that their biggest challenge 
would be battling the high prices charged by the pharmaceutical companies, not 
the government itself, and they even partnered with government in legal 
proceedings against the pharmaceutical industry (Geffen, 2010, pp. 48, 55-56). 
When it became clear that government would continue to block ARV access, even 
once the prices had been brought down, the TAC’s activities turned toward 
government.  
 
The TAC organised a number of large public protests, and ultimately took the 
Department of Health to court in an effort to force them to provide the one-off 
shot of Nevirapine that was required to prevent mother-to-child transmission at 
the time of birth (Nattrass, 2007 , p. 95). In December 2001 the courts found in 
favour of the TAC, compelling government to provide Nevirapine at birth to those 
who required it (Nattrass, 2007 , p. 97). Despite delays created by the decision 
being appealed at the Constitutional Court, the court decision marked the 
beginning of the end of the government policy of withholding ARVs (Gevisser, 
2007, p. 754). The Treatment Action Campaign was once again successful at the 
Constitutional Court. Under compulsion of the court ruling, in 2002 government 
declared that Nevirapine would be made available to all pregnant women. 
Shortly after, it was announced that ARVs would be made freely available to rape 
victims, and shortly after that the government declared that ARVS would be 
provided for all South Africans living with AIDS (Gevisser, 2007, p. 757; 
Steinberg, Forthcoming, 2017, p. 5). The Department of Health began to roll out 
the national ARV programme in 2004 (Gumede 2005, 172). 
 
The era of South African AIDS denialist policy ended in 2004 when ARVs became 
available via the public health system. Mbeki, however, has remained committed 
to his view (Gumede 2005). He commented to Gevisser that he believed it was 
“very unfortunate” that he was made to withdraw from the public debate in 
2000. More recently, in a public letter this year (2016) he reiterated that he does 
not believe that a virus can cause a syndrome (while also claiming that he never 
rejected the position that HIV causes AIDS – it is unclear how these two positions 
can be compatible). In the same letter he also restated that poverty needed to be 
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given as much consideration as the virus, and he quoted (at length) an interview 
from House of Numbers: Anatomy of an Epidemic (2010), a very well-known 
denialist documentary. Mbeki’s denialism persists.  
 
2.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided the reader with a chronology of the development of 
Mbeki’s denialist beliefs in the late 1990s and early 2000s.The next chapter will 
take a chronological step back to examine the state of AIDS science at the point 
when Mbeki entered the debate. In particular, I will make use of Lakatos’s theory 
of scientific research programmes to assess whether it was rational for the 
scientific community to have accepted HIV as the definitive cause of AIDS in 
1984.  
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3. Was it rational to accept the viral account of AIDS?  
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter described the case of South African AIDS denialism in the 
early 2000s, but very little was said normatively about Mbeki’s role in these 
events. Was it a good idea for Mbeki to include non-mainstream scientists on his 
advisory panel? Can he be held morally responsible for the consequences of 
having done so (the subject of chapter 5)? In order to assess the reasonableness 
of Mbeki’s decision about who was included on his advisory panel (a mixture of 
both mainstream and denialist scientists), and, ultimately, to determine whether 
he was morally responsible for the consequences of the resulting policy, we must 
first assess the state of debate about AIDS within the scientific community. This 
chapter provides a picture of that debate; beginning with the scientific 
uncertainty at the start of the 1980s when the first cases of the disease were 
identified, through to the isolation of the HIV virus in 1983, and into the period of 
mainstream science versus denialism.  
 
The overall aim of this chapter is to assess whether it was rational for the 
scientific community to accept HIV as the cause of AIDS in the 1980s, because if it 
was rational to do so, then the denialists were reasonably excluded at that point 
and ought not to have been included on Mbeki’s advisory panel. The assumption 
here is that policy should be based on the ‘best’ science, leaving the scientific 
debates to the scientific community itself (Jones, 2002). If the state of the AIDS 
debate within the scientific community was genuinely contested, or there was 
evidence that debate within the scientific community had been suppressed or 
was biased in some way, then including non-mainstream scientists on the 
Presidential Advisory Committee might have been understandable. If there was 
no such contestation or evidence of suppression, and the viral account of the 
disease became dominant because it was just the better theory, then the decision 
to include non-mainstream scientists in an advisory role is more difficult to 
justify.  
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Contemporary AIDS denialists claim that the HIV hypothesis was adopted 
irrationally and prematurely, thus focussing scientific attention and resources on 
the viral research programme, and neglecting competing (possibly better) 
theories. For example, Treichler, in AIDS, HIV, and the Cultural Construction of 
Reality (1992), argues that the scientists working on viral explanations of AIDS 
were able to:  
... stake out a fairly ambitious territory: By repeatedly citing each other’s 
work a small group of scientists quickly established a dense citation 
network, thus gaining early (if ultimately only partial) control over 
nomenclature, publication, invitation to conferences, and history (p. 76).  
 
She goes on to argue that the concentration of resources in the viral research 
programme stunted the growth of competing theories. Contemporary AIDS 
denialists claim that they were victims of this process, and that as a result they 
were never able to properly pursue their research. Peter Duesberg, the unofficial 
head of the denialist movement (more will be said about him later in this 
chapter), claims the same when he states that: “This fatal assumption [that HIV 
causes AIDS] mostly was the result of a rush to judgment in 1984” (Duesberg, 
1994). He goes on to argue that questioning the causal connection between HIV 
and AIDS cut him out of the scientific debate:  
I had all the students I wanted. I had all the lab space I needed. I got all the 
grants awarded. I was elected to the National Academy. I became 
Californian Scientist of the Year. All my papers were published. I could do 
no wrong. Almost, professionally that is, until I started questioning the 
claim that HIV is the cause of AIDS. Then everything changed (Duesberg, 
1999 quoted in Kalichman 2009,p.32).  
 
If it was the case that the viral theory of AIDS was adopted irrationally and 
prematurely in 1984, resulting in scientists working on non-mainstream views being 
unfairly excluded, then perhaps they are victims of an epistemic injustice.
24
 If so, they 
might have a moral claim to being recognised as credible bearers of knowledge, and 
Mbeki’s inclusion of non-mainstream AIDS scientists would have been the just thing 
to do, making Mbeki a moral hero. It is also worth noting that “Duesberg’s chief 
gripe… is that scientists have simply not taken him seriously” (Kalichman, 2009, p. 
                                                        
24 I am borrowing Miranda Fricker’s term here, specifically her description of a situation in which 
“the hearer makes an unduly deflated judgement of the speaker's credibility, perhaps missing out 
on knowledge as a result; and the hearer does something ethically bad—the speaker is 
wrongfully undermined in her capacity as a knower” (Fricker, 2007, p. 17) 
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54). Further, Nattrass (2010) argues that it is precisely this claim of unfair exclusion 
that has motivated the picture of ‘Duesberg-as-oppressed-hero-scientist’ and has 
contributed to the lasting appeal of the denialist movement; bestowing Duesberg’s 
supporters “with the thrilling identity of being in receipt of  ‘the truth’, and as brave 
whistle-blowers standing up for ‘real’ scientific progress” (Nattrass, 2010, p. 248; 
Nattrass, 2012, p. 5). Duesberg’s supporters strongly endorse the picture of him as a 
‘latter-day Galileo’ (to borrow Nattrass’s (2012, p.5) turn of phrase), and the denialist 
documentary Positively False (2012) starts with a montage that includes both 
Duesberg and Galileo’s images.  
 
Given that claims of unfair exclusion have motivated the persistence of AIDS 
denialism, it important to examine this complaint closely. Mbeki himself is 
obviously drawn to the image of AIDS denialists as oppressed “dissidents” (their 
preferred descriptor), and in his capacity as an anti-apartheid struggle hero in 
South Africa, he sympathises with their apparent experience of oppression:  
 
It is suggested…that there are some scientists who are 'dangerous and 
discredited' with whom nobody, including ourselves, should communicate 
or interact. In an earlier period in human history, these would be heretics 
that would be burnt at the stake! Not long ago, in our own country, people 
were killed, tortured, imprisoned and prohibited from being quoted in 
private and in public because the established authority believed that their 
views were dangerous and discredited. We are now being asked to do 
precisely the same thing that the racist apartheid tyranny we opposed did, 
because, it is said, there exists a scientific view that is supported by the 
majority, against which dissent is prohibited (Mbeki, 2000). 
 
It is also clear that the denialist scientists who were on Mbeki’s advisory panel 
felt that an epistemic injustice had been rectified by their inclusion. David 
Rasnick, an associate of Peter Duesberg’s, and a member of Mbeki’s advisory 
panel reflected on the experience that: “it was a victory from the moment we 
stepped off the plane” (Rasnick quoted in Conlan, 2000).  
 
In this chapter I take seriously the denialist complaint that the viral account of 
AIDS was accepted prematurely, to the exclusion of other promising theories. In 
order to do this, I provide a description of early AIDS science in the 1980s, with 
emphasis on the two most prominent theories of the time: the immune overload 
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theory – the theory that AIDS is the result of immune system collapse due to 
lifestyle factors such as drug use and repeated STD exposure (this theory is the 
precursor to the most plausible AIDS denialist theories) – and the viral theory of 
AIDS – the theory that AIDS is caused by a virus. I will then provide a description 
of how the denialist position emerged after HIV was isolated, and I will use 
Lakatos’s theory of scientific research programmes (with some additions from 
Thagard (1978)) to examine the reasonableness of the shift from multiple 
hypotheses about the cause(s) of AIDS to the acceptance of HIV as the ‘most 
likely cause’. I conclude that it was reasonable to accept that HIV causes AIDS, 
especially by the time effective antiretroviral therapy became available in the 
mid-1990s. However, I will conclude that the application of Lakatos’s approach to 
the AIDS case leaves us with two lingering concerns: first, that Lakatos’s 
approach allows for denialist scientists to continue rationally working on the 
immune overload thesis; and second, that there was some explanatory loss that 
occurred in the transition from multiple theories of the disease’s aetiology (one 
of which was the multi-causal theory) to the viral theory alone. In particular, it is 
difficult to explain the disproportionate prevalence of the disease in southern 
Africa without appealing to factors beyond the virus. Accounting for this 
explanatory loss will be the task of Chapter 4. 
 
Before proceeding, it should be noted that much of the denialists’ work is 
focussed on discrediting the claims of mainstream AIDS science, but not making 
many positive claims of their own (Kalichman, 2009, p. 11; Steinberg, 2009, p. 
34). While the aim of this chapter is to give denialist scientists a fair hearing by 
taking their position seriously, there are often silences from the denialist quarter 
on issues for which it would be good to have some response in order to fully 
assess the position – however, they might argue that they have been deprived of 
the resources to do the research that would be required to resolve these 
questions. This is just an unavoidable problem with the way this debate actually 
unfolded, but it poses some limitations on reconstructing the debate in order to 
assess it.  
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Another challenge for reconstructing this debate is that so little of it has occurred 
within the formal academic sphere: both because mainstream scientists have 
typically ignored the denialists, and because the denialists have found alternative 
non-academic platforms to make their points. Kalichman suggests that the lack of 
engagement from mainstream scientists with the denialist view is because much 
of the scientific establishment is unaware of the persistence of denialism, due to 
the fact that those who have been persuaded by the denialist stance are precisely 
those who no longer engage with the scientific establishment, granting them a 
kind of invisibility (Kalichman, 2009, p. 1). As a result, mainstream AIDS 
scientists often do not publish responses to denialists because it is assumed that 
denialists no longer exist. Further, mainstream AIDS scientists view it as a waste 
of time and resources to continue debating these topics. In 2003 the editor of the 
South African Medical Journal (SAMJ) announced that they would no longer be 
publishing material on this debate, stating that continuing to do so would distract 
from the important work of actually tackling the epidemic (SAMJ, 2003).  
 
With AIDS denialists engaging so little with the mainstream scientific community 
and its publications, much of the denialist stance is articulated in places that are 
not traditionally academic: such as periodicals, self-produced documentaries, and 
most importantly, the Internet (Kalichman, 2009, pp. 59, 93-96; Steinberg, 2009, 
p. 34). John Moore, an immunologist and leading AIDS scientist, has commented 
that: “Denialism has been relegated to the fringes of the internet” (Moore quoted 
in Steinberg, 2009). Given that much of the denialist debate takes place on non-
academic platforms, when mainstream scientists do respond, they tend to do so 
via the same non-academic platforms as the denialists (Nattrass, 2012). This 
poses a challenge for dealing with this debate in an academic way, because it 
means that reconstructing various positions requires drawing on traditionally 
non-academic sources. 
 
3.2. Setting out the Philosophy: Lakatos and the Demarcation Problem 
 
This section describes Lakatos’s theory of progressive and degenerating research 
programmes, which will be used later in this chapter to assess whether it was 
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rational to accept the HIV theory of AIDS over the immune overload theory in the 
1980s. Lakatos’s approach to the demarcation problem – the problem of 
distinguishing between science and non-science (Larvor, 1998, p. 48; Lakatos, 
1978, p. 1) – is favoured for the purposes of this chapter (with some additions 
from Thagard (1978)) over the alternatives provided by Popper and Kuhn. I 
begin by justifying this choice.  
 
The accepted interpretation of Popper’s description of ‘good science’ is that it 
involves developing theories that are susceptible to falsification – that is, the 
structure of the theory should be such that it has the potential to be disconfirmed 
by counterexamples (Popper, 1959/2002). However, this approach would have 
left all competing approaches to AIDS science in the 1980s ‘dead in the water’, 
because each theory had problems which would have (on Popper’s account) 
resulted in their falsification and dismissal, because “for a Popperian, a single 
counterexample kills a theory” (Larvor, 1998, pp. 57, 59). For instance, the early 
inability to detect HIV in the cells of AIDS patients would have acted as a counter-
example to the HIV thesis, while the extension of the AIDS pandemic to non-
traditional risk groups (such women and children) would have resulted in the 
dismissal of the immune-overload thesis. Lakatos articulates the same concern 
about Popper’s approach, when he states that all theories “are born refuted and 
die refuted” (Lakatos, 1978, p. 5). An approach that would have us dismiss all 
early AIDS science as irrational is unhelpful, because it cannot allow for any of 
the theories to have been rationally accepted, and this makes it difficult to 
account for the progress that has been made in AIDS research in the last thirty 
years. Popper’s approach does allow for some initial error, in that he accepts that 
something might look like a counterexample when it is actually not, due to 
problems with the reliability of evidence collection (Popper, 1959/2002, p. 28). 
However, it does not allow for theories being a bit wrong at the start.  
 
Kuhn (1962/1970) is also not particularly useful for the project at hand, because 
his concerns are on a different scale to what would be appropriate for assessing 
the AIDS debate. Kuhn is concerned with ‘scientific revolutions’ – that is, when 
major paradigm shifts occur. Phrased slightly differently, Kuhn is concerned with 
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those scientific periods when the very “rules and standards for scientific 
practice” come under scrutiny (Kuhn, 1962/1970, p. 11). Kuhn argues that the 
rest of the time, ‘normal science’ persists. Normal science occurs in those periods 
when the rules and standards are agreed upon, and scientists are focussed on 
‘puzzle-solving’. During these periods, scientists do not “aim to produce major 
novelties” and focus instead on figuring out manageable problems within the 
existing paradigm (Kuhn, 1962/1970, p. 35). All AIDS science in the 1980s falls 
well within the ambit of Kuhn’s normal science – none of the competing 
aetiological accounts of AIDS in the 1980s were concerned with changing the 
rules and standards of biomedical science. Accounts of disease that appeal to 
infectious microbial agents (such as the aetiological descriptions of the flu, 
Tuberculosis, Ebola, etc.) and accounts of disease that make use of lifestyle 
related factors in their explanations (such as the explanations of diabetes, heart 
disease, etc.) are both acceptable modes of explanation within the biomedical 
sciences (more will be said about this in Chapter 4). The puzzle in the case of 
early AIDS science was to figure out what kind of disease the scientists were 
looking at (infectious or lifestyle-related). The problem fits well within the scope 
of Kuhn’s normal science.  
 
Lakatos is favoured in this chapter, because his account allows for us to specify 
under what conditions the shifts in early AIDS research may have been rational, 
despite all of the available theories at the time having their own problems, and 
without having to appeal to any major paradigm shifts.  
 
The unit of analysis for Lakatos is the ‘scientific research programme’, which 
refers to a set of theories, some of which make up the ‘hard core’ – the central 
claim to be defended – and others which constitute the ‘protective belt’ – 
ancillary theories that can be modified or dismissed in defence of the core 
(Lakatos, 1978, p. 179). Lakatos describes research programmes as being either 
‘progressive’ or ‘degenerating’. Progressive research programmes need to show 
progress in two areas: they need to be theoretically and empirically progressive. 
Theoretical progress requires that “each new modification leads to new 
unexpected predictions” and empirical progress requires that “at least some of 
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these novel predictions are corroborated” (Lakatos, 1978, pp. 178-179). A 
research programme is thus progressive if and only if: 
 
i) it makes predictions 
ii) evidence is discovered that supports those predictions. 
 
Further, the predictions of progressive research programmes should derive from 
the theory itself – they should ‘fall out’ of the theory. This means that the 
prediction should have the following form: if my theory is correct, then we would 
expect to find x (a phenomenon should occur, an entity should be found, etc.), 
and x would be unlikely to occur if my theory were incorrect. It is possible that 
some ‘predictions’ may not temporally succeed the theory, so long as the same 
piece of evidence is not used both in theory construction and in support of the 
theory (Worrall, 1978, pp. 48-49). Those instances in which the ‘predictions’ do 
not temporally succeed the discovery of the corroborating evidence will not be 
strictly ‘predictive’; rather the claim is that this is something that the theory 
would have predicted had the theory preceded the corroborating evidence. What 
Worrall is really precluding here is scenarios in which a new piece of evidence is 
uncovered, that piece of evidence is used in the development of the theory, and 
then that same piece of evidence is used to “corroborate” the theory.  
 
A research programme becomes degenerative when modifications are made to 
the theory in order to explain some unexpected phenomenon and the modified 
theory fails to predict anything novel. (Lakatos, 1978, pp. 179, 185). A theory 
might also degenerate if no evidence is found to corroborate predictions that are 
made, or if evidence is found that contradicts a prediction made by the theory. 
Importantly for the project of this chapter, one research programme supersedes 
another when it “has excess truth content over its rival, in the sense that it 
predicts progressively all that its rival truly predicts and some more besides” 
(Lakatos, 1978, p. 179). The question is therefore whether the HIV research 
programme was able to explain a substantial portion of that which is explained 
by its competitors and whether it has made more true predictions.  
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Lakatos’s approach comes with a catch, which is that it permits scientists 
working on a degenerating research programme to continue to do so, in the hope 
of turning it around. More than Lakatos’s account would be needed to claim that 
scientists should abandon their commitment to a degenerating research 
programme (this becomes an issue later in this chapter). Thagard (1978) 
provides us with the additional conceptual resources to identify research 
programmes that are so far beyond the pale that no rational person should 
continue their commitment to them. He claims that these research programmes 
are not just ‘degenerative’, but that they are also ‘pseudoscientific’, where being 
declared a ‘pseudoscience’ is a more damning criticism. On his account:  
 
A theory or discipline which purports to be scientific is pseudoscientific if 
and only if:  
1) it has been less progressive than alternative theories over a 
long period of time, and faces many unsolved problems; but 
2) the community of practitioners makes little attempt to develop 
the theory towards solutions to the problems, shows no 
concern for attempts to evaluate the theory in relation to 
others, and is selective in considering confirmations and 
disconfirmations (Thagard, 1978, pp. 227-228) 
 
What this amounts to is that a theory is not only degenerative, but is also 
pseudoscientific, if it persists in the face of an alternative progressive theory, and 
those who are committed to the degenerative research programme do not make 
much of an effort to resolve its problems. The idea of there being an alternative 
progressive research programme is included in Thagard’s account to make sense 
of those scenarios in which a research programme is clearly not doing very well, 
and has not been progressive for some time, but there are no better alternative 
theories to work on. It would be unreasonable for us to expect scientists to 
abandon their degenerating research programmes if there is nothing more 
promising to focus on instead (Thagard, 1978, p. 229). Thagard uses his criteria 
to argue that astrology is a pseudoscience, and this is meant as a severe criticism 
(Thagard, 1978, p. 228). Having declared astrology to be a pseudoscience, we 
would think that anyone who continued a commitment to that research 
programme would be irrational in doing so.   
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Now that we have the conceptual tools to assess the competing theories in early 
AIDS science, the next section will provide an introduction to that history.  
 
3.3. Early AIDS Science in the 1980s 
 
In June 1981 five young homosexual men in Los Angeles were admitted to 
hospital with Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP) (The Lancet, 1981). This was 
unusual, because although the microbe that causes PCP is relatively common, it is 
usually dealt with fairly easily by the immune system and is therefore extremely 
rare. PCP is normally only seen in patients who have severely suppressed 
immune systems, typically as the result of some other medical treatment, such as 
chemotherapy or as a result of receiving an organ transplant (Zuniga & Ghaziani, 
2008, p. 7). These men were previously healthy. At the same time, 26 young men 
were admitted with Kaposi’s sarcoma (KS) – a rare form of skin cancer that 
typically presents in elderly male patients, or (like PCP) those suffering from 
immune-suppression, and it is hardly ever fatal. Five of the initial 26 KS patients 
also had other opportunistic infections (Lancet, 1981; Epstein, 1996, p. 46; 
Oppenheimer, 1988, p. 270). At the end of that year the Lancet issued the 
following statement, which represented the state of available knowledge at the 
time about the unusual combination of diseases: 
 
Currently the C.D.C. (Centers for Disease Control) in Atlanta is aware of 
nearly 180 cases, and the numbers are increasing at 7 – 10 a week. The 
epidemic seems to be largely confined to urban areas of New York State 
and California. Most of those patients are young white males (95% aged 
less than 50) and 94% of them are homosexual or bisexual. The case 
fatality rate, due to the effects of tumour or overwhelming infection, has 
been alarming 40% (Lancet, 1981) 
 
It was clear by the end of 1981 that these cases were related. The most important 
unifying factor was that all of the patients exhibited immune suppression 
resulting from a shortage of ‘helper T-cells’– the white blood cells that help to 
fight off infections (Epstein, 1996, p. 47). Already, at this very early stage of the 
epidemic, there was some demarcation between ‘lifestyle’ theories of the disease 
and aetiological accounts that posited an unidentified infectious microbial agent 
as the cause of this cluster of diseases:  
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The CDC report zeroed in on the question of sexuality – “the fact that these 
patients were all homosexual” – to put forward two tentative hypotheses: 
that the PCP outbreak was associated with “some aspect of homosexual 
lifestyle” or with “disease acquired through sexual contact [i.e. there was 
an unknown infectious microbial agent causing the disease].” However, 
“the patients did not know each other and had no known common 
contacts or knowledge of sexual partners who had similar illnesses”[thus 
making the infectious microbe theory seem initially less likely] (Epstein, 
1996, p. 46). (Own commentary in square brackets.) 
 
 In May 1982 the term ‘AIDS’ was used for the first time. The name was selected 
to denote the following aspects of commonality between cases:  
 
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, or AIDS: “acquired” to distinguish 
it from congenital defects of the immune system; “immunodeficiency” to 
describe the underlying problem, the deterioration of immune system 
functioning (and specifically, a decline in the number of the helper T cells, 
causing the body to lose most of its capacity to ward off infection); and 
“syndrome” to indicate that it was not a disease itself, but rather was 
marked by the presence of some other, relatively uncommon disease or 
infection (like PCP or Kaposi’s sarcoma), “occurring in a person with no 
known cause for diminished resistance to that disease.” (Epstein, 1996, p. 
55) 
 
The hunt was on to find the “cause for diminished resistance to that disease”. In 
the early 1980s there were multiple research programmes that attempted to 
explain the aetiology of AIDS. One early hypothesis was that AIDS is caused by 
the use of nitrate inhalants, which were already suspected of being immune-
suppressants and which had become associated with drug use in the urban 
American ‘gay scene’ as ‘poppers’ (Spekowitz, 2001). However, nitrate inhalants 
were already an established treatment for cardiac patients, and had never been 
associated with causing PCP or Kaposi’s sarcoma in those cases, so more would 
need to be said about the difference between the effects of nitrates in cardiac 
patients and the recreational use of nitrates to explain why the latter caused 
damage to helper T cells while the former did not (Epstein, 1996, p. 47).  
 
 Another early hypothesis was that homosexual men’s repeated exposure to 
other men’s semen could result in a condition similar to ‘graft versus host 
disease.’ Graft versus host disease occurs when the white blood cells of 
transplanted tissue identify the host’s body as a foreign threat and attack it. One 
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of the sites of attack can be the host’s immune system. Considering that graft 
versus host disease does sometimes occur as a result of blood transfusions, and is 
therefore possible in instances of fluid transfer, the ‘semen exposure’ hypothesis 
at least had a plausible mechanism (Spekowitz, 2001; Mavligit, Talpaz, Hsia, et al, 
1984). But this theory faced obvious problems; such as why would this only be a 
problem for homosexual men exposed to semen, and not to heterosexual women 
who are similarly exposed? This theory seems to be a product of the disease 
initially being framed as a ‘gay disease’ (more will be said about the initial 
framing of the disease later).  
 
The initial state of AIDS science was typified by multiple disparate hypotheses. 
However, in the 1982- 1983 period, the scientific community began to cluster 
around two main research programmes (which had already been gestured 
towards in the first CDC report in 1981): the immune overload research 
programme and the viral research programme.  
 
At the start of 1982 the immune overload research programme was the favoured 
approach.25 As the name suggests, the immune overload hypothesis proposed 
that AIDS patients were susceptible to opportunistic infections because their 
immune systems had been ‘worn out’ from having to cope with multiple 
infections, mostly in the form of Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STDs). However, 
this alone was insufficient to explain the sudden onset of AIDS. Homosexuality 
was not new – Durack (1981) asks: “were the homosexual contemporaries of 
Plato, Michelangelo, and Oscar Wilde subject to the risk of dying from 
opportunistic infections?” (p. 1466) – and neither was the existence of STDs. Two 
additional hypotheses were thus included to make sense of what was so different 
now to give rise to AIDS. The first was the use of recreational drugs, and the 
second was the ‘sexual revolution’ of the 1970s and 1980s. A little more will be 
said on each of these.  
                                                        
25 However, Epstein (1996) argues that it was never the favoured approach within the 
mainstream scientific community, where the hope had always been to isolate an infectious agent. 
Rather, he suggests, the immune overload theory was favoured by policy makers, the media, and 
members of the public, because it cohered with pre-existing homophobia within those groups. 
That the “gay lifestyle” was making people sick tied in with people’s pre-exising beliefs about the 
American gay community(p.52).  
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The literature that focuses on drugs as the relevant difference-maker most 
commonly refers to the recreational use of nitrate inhalants, but references to 
other drugs, such as heroin and cocaine, are also included (see for instance 
Duesberg, 1992, p. 237). As noted above, nitrates were already suspected to be 
immune-suppressants, so the additional strain that they placed on immune 
systems that had already been stressed by multiple STDs might explain why AIDS 
patients were so much more susceptible to opportunistic infections, and could 
explain what had changed to bring about AIDS over and above pre-existing STDs 
(Epstein, 1996, pp. 45-48; Oppenheimer, 1988, p. 273; Duesberg, Koehnlen, & 
Rasnick, 2003, p. 386). Versions of this hypothesis place varying degrees of 
emphasis on the contributory force of drugs. One example of a hypothesis that 
puts a great deal of emphasis on drug use in its explanation is Artie Felson’s 
research:  
 
[H]e had interviewed between 300 and 400 gay men with ‘AIDS’, and had 
interrogated each of them with regard to sex and drug use. Though none 
of his respondents were virgins, some of them had not been especially 
‘promiscuous.’  However, they were all drug users... And without a single 
exception, they had all used poppers (Shenton, 1998, p. 23).  
 
Felson’s research gave drugs a substantial role in explaining AIDS. Similarly, 
Duesberg claims that “Not even one male homosexual at behavioural risk for 
AIDS or with AIDS was found to be drug-free by the CDC” (2003, p. 387).  
 
 Other versions of the immune overload research programme de-emphasise the 
role of drugs, and focus more on sex and STDs in the development of AIDS. They 
claim that what had changed was not necessarily the use of drugs, but that 
poppers were part of the broader ‘sexual revolution’ of the 1970s and 1980s 
(Shenton, 1998, p. 20). On this account, it is really the unprecedented number of 
sexual partners and associated STDs that are the problem. Regardless of the 
extent to which drugs and STDs are causally weighted, the hard core of this 
research programme is that AIDS is caused by the immune system becoming 
overloaded, which renders it incapable of fighting off opportunistic infections.  
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Even though the very first CDC report on AIDS suggested that an infectious 
microbial agent might be responsible, the possibility of AIDS being virally based 
only become a real alternative to the immune overload research programme in 
July 1982 when the first cases of AIDS in haemophiliacs were reported. In each 
case the patient had received ‘Factor VIII’, a blood product made from the plasma 
of multiple donors, and so it seemed that there was something in the blood 
causing AIDS. Some kind of transmission ‘agent’ was present. The plasma was 
screened before being converted into Factor VIII, so any bacteria and typical 
contaminants would have been noticed. However, it was possible that something 
as small as a virus could have been missed in the screening process (Epstein, 
1996, p. 56). However, without having actually isolated a virus, this suggestion 
was initially treated with scepticism.  
 
In May 1983 the first announcement that such a virus had been isolated was 
made by Luc Montagnier, who was leading a virology research team at the 
Pasteur Institute in Paris. They named the isolated retrovirus 
‘Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus’ (LAV) and shared their samples with the 
American CDC. In April 1984 it was announced that a research team at the 
American National Cancer Institute, led by Robert Gallo, had isolated the viral 
causal agent of AIDS, which they named ‘Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III’ 
or HTLV-III. It was later found that LAV and HTLV-III are the same virus, and that 
Gallo had probably used the samples that Montagnier shared with the American 
CDC.26  In 1986 the name ‘Human Immunodeficiency Virus’ (HIV) was settled on 
to denote the viral causal agent of AIDS, and this ended the dispute over whether 
Montagnier or Gallo’s name would stick (Zuniga & Ghaziani, 2008, p. 11).   
 
From Gallo’s announcement in 1984 onward, the virological research 
programme became dominant and shortly after the immune overload thesis was 
                                                        
26 As an interesting aside, Gallo appeared before the Department of Health and Human Services’ 
Office of Research Integrity on charges that he intentionally suppressed the fact that he had used 
Montagnier’s samples in order to take credit for the research findings. He was initially found 
guilty and the disciplinary committee stated that “his false statement had ‘impeded potential 
AIDS research progress’ by diverting scientists from potentially fruitful work with the French 
researchers.” However, on appeal the charges were dropped because it could not be proven that 
Gallo had ‘intentionally’ suppressed his French sample sources (Shenton, 1998, pp. 29-30).  
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abandoned by mainstream science, only to be taken over by the AIDS denialists 
in 1987.  
  
3.4. Enter the AIDS denialists 
 
In 1984, shortly after the official announcement of the isolation of the virus, the 
first ‘AIDS denialist’ paper was published. This was ‘The Group-Fantasy Origins of 
AIDS’ by Casper Schmidt. In it he argues that AIDS as a disease only exists in so 
far as is a form of “epidemic hysteria”, whereby a vicious group fantasy within 
the population of the United States is so compelling that it gives rise to what 
seems like a physical disease. He argues that it is particularly telling that groups 
who are the most at risk of AIDS are homosexuals and drug-users – the most 
ostracised members of American society in the 1980s. The view did not gain 
much traction, and it is completely unlike the denialist views that follow, but it 
does mark the first instance of a “denialist” paper being published after the 
isolation the HIV virus. Schmidt died of AIDS in 1994 (Kalichman, 2009, p. 26). 
 
In 1987, Peter Duesberg enters the denialist debate, by publishing a paper 
entitled ‘Retroviruses as Carcinogens and Pathogens: Expectations and Reality’ in 
Cancer Research. This is taken to be the starting point of the AIDS denialist 
movement (Steinberg, 2009, p. 33; Shenton, 2011; Lenzer, 2008). In it, he argues 
that retroviruses cannot cause diseases. His direct target at the time was cancer-
causing retroviruses. He had isolated the first cancer-causing gene in a retrovirus 
in 1970 with Peter Vogt, which prompted an enormously fruitful research 
programme isolating further “oncogenes”. In Lenzer’s (2008) profile piece on 
Duesberg in Discovery Magazine she describes this as “a celebrated breakthrough 
that truly put the young German [Duesberg] on the map”. It is unclear why 
Duesberg did an about-turn on his views on cancer, but given that he came to 
hold the belief that retroviruses cannot cause diseases, this applied to AIDS as 
well, because HIV is also a retrovirus.  
 
It should be noted that Duesberg has never done research specifically focussed 
on AIDS, only on cancer (Steinberg, 2009, p. 33). He did submit a grant 
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application to the National Institute of Drug Abuse, a subsidiary body of the NIH 
(National Institute of Health) in 1993, to test his theory that recreational drugs 
could cause AIDS, but it was unsuccessful on the initial application and again on 
resubmission.  
 
Duesberg and his associates claim that his NIH applications were rejected 
because he dared to question mainstream AIDS science (Lange, 1995). On the 
other hand, the review committee claims that a large motivating factor for 
refusing to fund his application was that in the initial application, and again in his 
later resubmission, Duesberg failed to produce evidence that his laboratory had 
conducted any preliminary studies. The NIH takes preliminary studies very 
seriously, because they indicate whether the grant-seeking laboratory has the 
capacity to carry out the research that they propose. In the case of Duesberg, this 
was taken especially seriously, because he “is not a toxicologist or immunologist, 
the specializations that would be most well-equipped to perform studies of drugs 
and the immune system” (Kalichman, 2009, p. 47) and so he would need to be 
able to provide strong evidence that he could perform research so far outside of 
his area of expertise. Further, the committee takes a hard line on those who fail 
to respond to criticism from reviewers in the first round of applications:  
 
Revised grant applications that are not responsive to the first-round 
comments are extremely unlikely to move forward. The reviewers were 
very clear that Duesberg would need to do preliminary studies to 
demonstrate the promise of his ideas, a requirement of all grants like the 
type he applied for (Kalichman, 2009, p. 47).  
 
He showed no evidence that he had paid attention to the first round of criticism 
from reviewers, or that he had attempted to conduct the required preliminary 
studies, and so his application was dismissed, and he was asked not to re-apply 
for the same topic (Kalichman, 2009, p. 48).  
 
In Duesberg’s book Inventing the AIDS Virus (1996) he provides a list of things 
that do cause AIDS, given that he believes that HIV cannot. These include: 
recreational drugs (especially poppers – i.e. nitrate inhalants) (p.260-284); blood 
transfusions in the case of haemophiliacs (p.259); and AZT (the earliest 
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antiretroviral therapy) (p. 299-339). When it comes to Africa, he argues that the 
African AIDS epidemic does not exist, and that there are not appropriate 
numbers of graves in Africa for all of the people who have apparently died of the 
disease (which is eerily reminiscent of the Holocaust denialists (Kalichman, 
2009, p. 9)), and that there are financial incentives for medical authorities in 
African countries to fake an epidemic (Duesberg, 1996, pp. 290-291). He also 
suggests that in African countries there are other pre-existing diseases that 
simply get misdiagnosed: where the African AIDS epidemic is not faked, it is 
merely a product of misidentification (Duesberg, 1996, pp. 293-297). He later 
amends his view on Africa, arguing not that the epidemic is fake, or merely a 
matter of incorrectly diagnosing pre-existing diseases, but that malnutrition 
diminishes immune function and that is what causes AIDS (Duesberg, Koehnlen, 
& Rasnick, 2003).  
 
Overall, Duesberg’s position is that where AIDS exists at all, it is the product of 
aspects of poor lifestyle that place strain on the immune system, the one 
exception being haemophiliacs who receive blood transfusions. He accepts that 
HIV exists, but argues that it is just another opportunistic infection that AIDS 
patients are susceptible to as a result of already diminished immune function. On 
Duesberg’s account, HIV is a harmless passenger virus (Duesberg, interviewed in 
Shenton, 2011).  
 
Duesberg is the most credible scientist associated with the denialist community, 
given his outstanding track record in cancer research prior to his about-turn on 
the role of retroviruses in causing disease (Larvor, 1998; Steinberg, 2009). But 
the denialist community is large and diverse. For instance, the Perth Group, led 
by Eleni Papadopulos-Eleopulos (whose highest qualification is an 
undergraduate degree in nuclear physics), is a group in Australia who argue that 
the virus does not exist at all (Steinberg, 2009, p. 36; Shenton, 2011). The Perth 
Group is so committed to this position that they have offered a $20, 000 cash 
prize to anyone who can prove the existence of HIV. In a strange twist of irony, 
Duesberg came forward claiming that he has evidence that the virus exists 
(which is consistent with his position that HIV is an actual virus, but that it is an 
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effect of AIDS rather than its cause). He was not awarded the prize money 
(Kalichman, 2009, p. 61). The Perth’s Group position will not be considered 
further in this chapter, because their views are so fringe and their leadership so 
under-qualified that is not worth taking their position seriously.  
 
Also in the diverse camp of AIDS denialists is Henry Bauer – who initially looks 
like a promising candidate as a serious scientist committed to the denialist 
movement, due to his position as Professor Emeritus of Chemistry and Science 
Studies and Dean Emeritus of Arts and Sciences at the Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute and State University. But on closer inspection, he begins to looks more 
suspicious. He is also a leading authority on the Loch Ness Monster, and editor of 
the Journal of Scientific Exploration – “the major outlet for studies on UFOlogy, 
paranormal activity, extrasensory powers, alien abductions, etc.” (Kalichman, 
2009, p. 71). Even if we bracket our concerns about his non-AIDS related 
research activities, his position in the AIDS denialist debate is not promising. His 
stance is that HIV does not cause AIDS, and he attempts to use statistical methods 
to disprove the causal connection. There are two immediate problems with 
Bauer’s approach. The first is that he bases his analysis on testing data from US 
military recruits from the 1980s – the idea being that this is a representative 
sample of young Americans at the time. But US military recruits could not be less 
representative of the sub-groups who were most affected by AIDS in the 1980s, 
especially because gay men and injection drug users (the two groups who were 
most at risk of the disease at that point) were explicitly excluded from the 
military. The other immediate problem is that he runs his analysis of HIV in 
comparison to gonorrhoea and syphilis. The rationale is that if HIV were 
contagious its spread pattern would look like that of gonorrhoea and/or syphilis, 
both of which are known to be infectious and sexually transmitted. HIV’s 
epidemic pattern looks nothing like these diseases and so it cannot be a sexually 
transmitted infection (on his account). However, both gonorrhoea and syphilis 
are bacterial, not viral, and so it is expected that they will have entirely different 
spread profiles to HIV (Kalichman, 2009, pp. 72-73). His position will also not be 
given any further consideration in this chapter, because his methods are so 
obviously incorrect.  
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Having excluded the Perth Group’s position that there is no virus, and Bauer’s 
particular version of the claim that “HIV does not cause AIDS”, on the grounds 
that neither is credible, the rest of this chapter focuses on Duesberg’s approach 
to AIDS denialism. Largely because of Duesberg’s track-record as an extremely 
well-respected scientist: 
 
[He] was part of the team that first mapped the genetic structure of 
retroviruses, [he was] codiscoverer of the first viral cancer gene in 1970…  
In 1986, at age 49, he was elected to the National Academy of Sciences. 
That same year he was given a National Institutes of Health Outstanding 
Investigator Award, one of the most prestigious and coveted grants. 
Robert Gallo, codiscoverer of HIV and a former friend of Duesberg’s, 
praised him in 1985 (sic) as a “man of extraordinary energy, unusual 
honesty, enormous sense of humor, and a rare critical sense.” He added, 
“This critical sense often makes us look twice, then a third time, at a 
conclusion many of us believed to be foregone.” (Lenzer, 2008) 
 
Lenzer gets the year wrong when quoting Gallo, who made these comments 
about Duesberg in 1984 at the National Cancer Institute in Maryland, not in 1985 
(this is due to a mix up between the year in which the speech was given, and the 
year when the speech was published). The year is relevant because Gallo’s 
lengthy speech in praise of Duesberg was made shortly before the discovery of 
HIV was announced in the US, and thus just before Gallo and Duesberg’s collegial 
relationship began to break down. Lenzer also cuts Gallo’s quote off short, 
leaving out much that is prescient, given the role that Duesberg would shortly 
play in the AIDS debate. Gallo’s speech goes on as follows:  
 
However, his [Duesberg’s] critiques are sometimes a major problem for 
the casual observer. When is he truly debating? When is he being the devil 
himself? The casual observer is also often at a loss to determine which of 
the many weapons he possesses he is using. Peter, it is hard for us to 
know when you are using your machine gun or your slingshot, or simply 
exercising your vocal cord (Gallo, 1985, p. 8). 
 
 
The first page of Gallo’s introduction for Duesberg is nothing but glowing praise 
for his outstanding research career. If we should pay attention to anyone in the 
denialist camp, it should be Duesberg, even if based on his credentials alone. 
Additionally, his view should be taken more seriously than the others because it 
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is continuous with immune overload thesis, which was a leading contender to 
explain the aetiology of AIDS in the early 1980s, and so it has not always been a 
fringe view – it is not inconceivable that there is something we missed when 
shifting to the strictly viral account. Although Duesberg was not one of the 
scientists working on the immune overload theory of AIDS in the 1980s, it is clear 
that he intends for his position to be an extension of that approach. In the 
abstract of his paper, ‘The chemical bases of the various AIDS epidemics’ 
(Duesberg, Koehnlen, & Rasnick, 2003), he explicitly states that he intends for his 
own approach to be a continuation of the immune overload theory, which he 
believes was abandoned too early in the wake of premature enthusiasm for the 
viral account. The rest of this chapter will therefore compare the immune 
overload theory with the viral account.  
 
3.5. Assessing the Immune Overload and Viral Research Programmes 
 
This section assesses the immune overload theory of AIDS in comparison to the 
viral account, using Lakatos’s theory of scientific research programmes, as 
outlined earlier in this chapter. The aim is to determine whether the viral 
research programme was accepted rationally over the immune overload account 
in 1984, when the formal announcement was made in the United States that HIV 
had been isolated, and when the immune overload theory was abandoned by 
mainstream science. I begin by assessing the viral account, because elements of 
that account are relevant to addressing questions that are later posed by 
Duesberg.  
 
3.5.1 Appraising the Viral Account of AIDS 
 
Lakatos’s theory requires that a research programme generate novel predictions, 
and that at least some of those predictions be corroborated in order for it to be 
considered progressive. This section will look at two such predictions generated 
by the viral account of AIDS: 1) that the virus would be found in the T-cells of all 
AIDS patients; and 2) that treatment targeted at various parts of the virus 
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(antiretroviral therapy) would be effective. It will be found that both predictions 
were eventually corroborated, but that process took some time.  
 
3.5.1.1. If HIV causes AIDS then the virus will be in the T-cells of AIDS patients 
 
The viral theory of AIDS operates on the premise that the virus kills off helper T-
cells, which are necessary for the immune system to function. The immune 
system is thus weakened and the patient becomes susceptible to opportunistic 
infections. It would therefore be reasonable for the viral account to predict that 
the HIV virus will be found in the T-cells of AIDS patients.  
 
It initially seemed as though this prediction would not be corroborated, and this 
was one of the core concerns raised about the theory at the Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences in 1985. When T-cell samples taken from AIDS 
patients were tested, very few were found to contain the virus, “sometimes as 
few as one in one hundred thousand cells” (Epstein, 1996, p. 90). This was a real 
worry to the scientific community at the time and opponents to the viral research 
programme used this as their ‘killer argument’. However, on Lakatos’s account it 
is permissible for there to be problems at the start of a research programme 
(Lakatos, 1978, p. 5). Eventually this concern was resolved as the tests become 
more sophisticated, and the virus was found to be present in a significant number 
of the T-cells in AIDS patients. The change came with the development of 
polymerase chain reactions (PCR), a procedure that allowed for DNA to be 
manipulated, thus making it easier to spot the virus (Epstein, 1996, p. 120). In 
1993 an even more refined version of PCR was developed and using this method 
it was shown that 10% -30% of the T-cells had the virus, and within those cells 
the viral concentration was high (Epstein, 1996, p. 163). So the mystery of T-cells 
was eventually resolved. However, this corroboration only came in 1993 – almost 
a decade after the viral research programme was actually accepted by the 
scientific community. This might add credibility to the denialists’ claim that the 
viral account was accepted prematurely.   
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Related to the prediction that the HIV virus would be found in the T-cells of AIDS 
patients, is the prediction that if more of the virus is found in any particular 
patient then we would expect the disease to be more severe in that patient (this 
is typically referred to as the ‘dose-response relationship’). Again, this prediction 
was corroborated (albeit somewhat later than we might like). In 1996 it was 
shown that higher concentrations of the virus in the patient’s plasma (i.e. higher 
‘viral loads’) are correlated with more rapid onset of the disease and more rapid 
progression to death (Mellors, Rinaldo, Gupta, White, & Todd, 1996). This 
supported the prediction that increased levels of the virus in patients would 
result in the illness being more severe. However, again, this confirmation only 
became available a significant period of time after the viral account was accepted 
in 1984 (roughly 12 years later).  
 
3.5.1.2 If HIV causes AIDS then ARV treatment will be effective 
 
The second main prediction to come out of the viral account of AIDS is that if HIV 
causes AIDS, then antiretrovirals (which target specific viral processes) would be 
effective, and we would see AIDS patients developing fewer opportunistic 
infections, and living longer and healthier lives.  
 
Prior to the isolation of the virus, treatment had focussed on targeting the 
opportunistic infections that AIDS patients developed as a result of their 
diminished immune function. For instance, if the patient developed a fungal 
infection as a result of AIDS, they would receive a standard anti-fungal treatment. 
This approach allowed for specific opportunistic infections to be dealt with, but it 
did not prevent subsequent infections from taking hold, and physicians were 
only able to extend the lives of AIDS patients by short periods of time this way 
(Zuniga & Ghaziani, 2008, p. 18). Ultimately, the patient’s immune system would 
collapse, and the opportunistic infections would become too many and too severe 
to treat. It was recognised that little could be done to help patients in a significant 
way until the underlying immune dysfunction was targeted directly, but at that 
point the cause of the underlying immune dysfunction was unknown. When the 
HIV virus was isolated, the possibility was opened up that manipulations could 
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be made on the virus directly and that the underlying immune suppression could 
thus be remedied (Epstein, 1996, pp. 181-182).  
 
Initially, very little was known about the isolated virus, and so it was difficult to 
target the treatment at specific viral processes. But there was some evidence that 
HIV was a retrovirus, as opposed to a standard virus. Standard viruses are 
composed of DNA; and via the process of infection they enter the nucleus of a 
new cell and make that cell replicate the virus as per the instructions coded in its 
DNA. A retrovirus is composed of RNA, rather than DNA, and so before it can 
integrate itself into the newly infected cell, it needs to convert its RNA into DNA 
by rewriting its genetic code backwards, which it does through a process called 
‘reverse transcription’. In order for reverse transcription to take place, an 
enzyme called ‘reverse transcriptase’ needs to be present. The first thought that 
scientists had about how to treat the disease was to find a way of inhibiting 
reverse transcriptase, thus preventing the reverse transcription process from 
occurring, and saving further cells from being infected (Epstein, 1996, p. 183; 
Pomerantz & Horn, 2003, p. 867).  
 
The first generation of ARV treatments were thus transcriptase inhibitors – also 
known as NRTI’s (dideoxynucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors) (Vella, 
Schwartlander, Sow, Eholie, & Murphy, 2012). In 1985, trials were underway for 
a transcriptase inhibitor called ‘suramin’, and while it did seem to inhibit the 
reverse transcription process, its side effects were severe. Some of the patients 
suffered adrenal failure and died more quickly than they would have been 
expected to without treatment (Epstein, 1996, p. 191).  
 
Those who were suspicious of the early acceptance of the viral theory 
interpreted the initial problems with ARVs as evidence that HIV does not cause 
AIDS. Sonnabend, for instance, commented:  
 
If we have agents that effectively inhibit the replication of this virus but 
[those agents] make no impact on the course of this disease, I think it will 
make apparent, for some people, the actual role of HLTV-III [HIV prior to 
the name was officially settled] in causing this disease. (Sonnabend, 1985 
quoted in Epstein, 1996, p. 191) 
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That is, according to Sonnabend, HLTV-III has no role in causing the disease. 
Criticisms, such as Sonnabend’s were not entirely fair, given that transcriptase 
inhibitors were actually dampening the reverse transcription process, and were 
thus inhibiting the replication of the virus (as predicted). Their side effects were 
just so overwhelmingly bad that they could not yet be used as an effective 
treatment.  
 
Things began to look more promising in July 1985, when azidothymidine (AZT), a 
new generation of reverse transcription inhibitors, was tested in a small Phase I 
trial. AZT is a ‘nucleoside mimic’, where nucleosides are the building blocks of 
DNA:  
AZT “fooled” the reverse transcriptase enzyme into using it, in place of the 
nucleoside it imitated, when transcribing the virus’s RNA into DNA. Then, 
once AZT was added to the growing DNA chain, AZT’s structure prevented 
any additional nucleosides from being added on: reverse transcription 
simply came to a halt at that point, and the virus stopped replicating 
(Epstein, 1996, p. 193).  
 
Nineteen patients were included in the initial Phase I trial. After six weeks it was 
found that AZT had prevented the virus from replicating in fifteen of the nineteen 
patients, and that as such they had improved immune function and they 
experienced fewer opportunistic infections (Epstein, 1996, p. 193).   
 
In 1986 a Phase II trial for AZT began. It involved 282 AIDS patients. 145 patients 
were given AZT and the remaining 137 received a placebo. Six months into the 
trial the results were that: “only one patient who had received AZT had died, 
compared with 19 patients in the control group. Twenty-four patients in the AZT 
experimental arm had developed OIs [Opportunistic Infections], compared to 45 
placebo recipients” (Zuniga & Ghaziani, 2008, p. 19; Fischi, et al., 1987). The trial 
was shut down prematurely because regulators had ethical concerns about 
continuing to administer placebos to the control group, given the early success of 
the treatment (Zuniga & Ghaziani, 2008, p. 19; Gazzard, 2005; Epstein, 1996, p. 
198). There has been speculation from the denialist community over the ‘real 
reasons’ for the study’s closure. Celia Faber, a journalist and AIDS denialist, 
published an article in 2006 in which she claimed that the trial ended because 
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the double-blinding process had been compromised due to drug sharing between 
study participants. However, this conclusion is not supported by the FDA (Food 
and Drug Administration) report on the issue (Geffen, 2010, pp. 33-34). In 1987 
the FDA approved AZT as safe for use (Pomerantz & Horn, 2003, p. 867).   
 
Shortly after the FDA accepted AZT, three further transcriptase inhibitors were 
approved. However, the initial enthusiasm over transcriptase inhibitors was 
short-lived, because “each had its particular toxicities”, thus making the side 
effects of these drugs severe (Vella, Schwartlander, Sow, Eholie, & Murphy, 2012, 
p. 1231). The side effects of these early drugs were so bad that many argued that 
they were making patients more ill than if they had not received any treatment 
(Epstein, 1996, p. 149).  
 
Part of what was going wrong with the early use of ARVs was that it was unclear 
how they should be administered: What should the dosage be? How often should 
it be administered? At what point in the disease’s progression should the 
treatment begin? These were all questions that had yet to be resolved, and very 
often practitioners opted for precautionary over-dosing, leading to even more 
severe side effects. A doctor working at the ‘frontlines’ of AIDS treatment in New 
York in the mid-1980s describes the situation at the time as follows:  
 
[It was] really scary. We had no clue what we were doing, and in 
retrospect we made a lot of mistakes… We used medication in the wrong 
doses… We didn’t anticipate things… You just didn’t know what the heck 
was going on (Wafaa El-Sadar quoted in Zuniga & Ghaziani, 2008, p. 23).  
 
So some of what was going wrong with early ARV treatment was down to dosage 
problems – particularly overdosing leading to more severe side effects. It also 
quickly became clear that ‘mono-therapies’ – that is, administering only one drug 
– are only effective for short periods of time before the virus adapts and the 
treatment no longer works (Pomerantz & Horn, 2003, p. 867). Attempts were 
made to combine the various approved reverse transcriptase inhibiters, and to 
administer them sequentially, but this only bought patients marginally more time 
(Vella, Schwartlander, Sow, Eholie, & Murphy, 2012, p. 1232). Despite these 
problems, it was always clear that even early transcriptase inhibiters were 
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blocking the reverse transcription process, thus corroborating the viral account 
of AIDS. Their positive effects were just being swamped by the extremely bad 
negative side effects. Some AIDS denialists claim that ARVs cause AIDS and when 
they do, they always make reference to how ‘toxic’ AZT in particular is (Shenton, 
2011; Duesberg, 1996, pp. 300-301; Duesberg, Koehnlen, & Rasnick, 2003, p. 
393). This may be a reference to the severe side effects that were associated with 
early treatment, but note that AZT is no longer in use today.  
 
In 1996 everything changed for ARV therapy. The FDA approved two additional 
ARV classes. The first of these were nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors 
(NNRTIs), which were also focussed on inhibiting reverse transcription, but did 
so at a different point in the process to what had been the target of previous 
treatments. The second were protease inhibitors, which suppressed the enzyme 
that was required for the virus to reach maturation (Pomerantz & Horn, 2003, p. 
867; Vella, Schwartlander, Sow, Eholie, & Murphy, 2012, p. 1232). These 
treatments were offered to patients as a combination therapy (that is, multiple 
treatments were mixed together into a ‘cocktail’ – mono-therapies, which were 
known to lead to drug resistance, were no longer in use). This became known as 
‘HAART’ – Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy – and it was extremely effective. 
Steinberg describes HAART as having a ‘Lazarus effect’, whereby “AIDS patients 
who had been mortally ill were rising from their beds, putting on their jackets 
and ties, and reporting for work” (Steinberg, 2009, p. 34).  In the US and Western 
Europe there was a “60-80% reduction in new AIDS-defining conditions 
[opportunistic infections], hospitalizations and deaths” (Zuniga & Ghaziani, 2008, 
p. 24). From 1996 onward, ARV treatment was an unequivocal success.  
 
The effectiveness of ARV therapy marks the viral research programme as 
progressive in Lakatos’s terms. The theory predicted the effectiveness of the 
treatment, based on the virus being a retrovirus that operates in very particular 
ways (making use of a reverse transcription process, and the enzyme protease 
being required for the virus to reach full maturity). ARV therapy targeted these 
very specific processes by disrupting the function of particular mechanisms and 
enzymes. Had those mechanisms and enzymes not been present, the treatment 
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would not have been effective. However, again, this only took place in 1996 when 
HAART became available, and so it took some time before this aspect of the 
theory was corroborated.  
 
The response from AIDS denialists to the resounding success of ARVs shows that 
their engagement with the debate may be somewhat disingenuous. Duesberg’s 
explanation for the seeming success of ARV therapy is that he claims that ARVs 
have an antibiotic effect that treats opportunistic infections and so makes it 
appear as though the patient is getting better, even though the long-term damage 
to the immune system persists. However, as just noted, the mechanisms by which 
ARVs operate are very specifically targeted to processes of the HIV virus, and so 
it would only be effective if the cause of disease were HIV.  
 
The viral research programme is thus progressive. It predicted that the virus 
would be found in the T-cells of AIDS patients, that greater levels of the virus 
would be associated with more severe cases of the disease, and that ARV therapy 
(which targeted very particular aspects of the HIV mechanism) would be 
effective. All of these predictions were corroborated. However, they were only 
corroborated in the early to mid-1990s. The AIDS denialists might thus be right 
that the viral theory of AIDS superseded other competing theories prematurely 
in the 1980s, but it was definitely a progressive research programme by the time 
Mbeki was elected President of South Africa in 1999, which is what really matters 
for the overall project of this thesis. The following section will assess the immune 
overload theory.  
 
3.5.2. Appraising the Immune Overload Account 
 
The immune overload theory was introduced with the first reported AIDS cases 
of the early 1980s. All of the initially reported cases were of gay men in the US, 
and it was assumed that there was something about their “lifestyle” that was 
making them ill. None of the early patients knew each other, and so it seemed 
unlikely that they were all experiencing a single underlying infection, because it 
was assumed that they would need to have come into contact with each other to 
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pass on an infectious microbial agent. Epstein explains that the immune overload 
theory: “represented the initial frame for understanding the epidemic: the 
syndrome was essentially linked to gay men, specifically to the ‘excesses’ of the 
‘homosexual lifestyle.’” (Epstein, 1996, p. 48). Fee and Krieger agree with Epstein 
as follows:  
Epidemiologists, the first scientists to lay claim to understanding the 
mysterious new ailment, were struck by its seemingly exotic preference 
for young, homosexual men; they therefore searched for causes in the 
behaviors or "life-styles" common to gay men. In the process, they looked 
for risk factors prevalent in this "risk group" and indicted life in the fast 
lane, including "promiscuity," "poppers" (amyl nitrate), and anal sex (Fee 
& Krieger, 1993, p. 1478) 
 
Framing the disease in this way also cohered with the social stigma attached to 
the group at the time. So strong was the early commitment that the disease must 
be linked to ‘homosexual lifestyle’, that initial counter-examples were dismissed 
as either lies on the part of patients, or as instances of an entirely different 
disease. Male patients who presented with AIDS but claimed not to be gay were 
accused of lying about their sexuality – “He says he is not homosexual, but he 
must be” (Epstein, 1996, p. 50). Further, when a New York paediatrician reported 
that he was seeing cases of AIDS amongst children in 1981, he was mocked for 
thinking that the disease observed in children could possibly be the same as that 
being reported by gay men (Epstein, 1996, p. 50). The initial version of the 
immune overload theory was deeply committed to the idea that it was a 
combination of extreme exposure to STDs and drugs that caused the immune 
system to break down and increased individuals’ sensitivity to opportunistic 
infections (Shenton, 1998). 
 
As early as August 1981, AIDS cases were reported in heterosexual patients 
(including women) and in some children (Oppenheimer, 1988, p. 279; Epstein, 
1996, pp. 49-50). In 1982, cases of AIDS were discovered in haemophiliacs and 
Haitians living in the United States, and both were added to the list of ‘risk 
groups’ (Epstein, 1996, p. 59). The way that the immune overload theory coped 
with the disease appearing in additional groups was to expand the list of 
‘lifestyle’ factors that could cause the disease to include blood transfusions, 
poverty, and even taking antiretrovirals (especially AZT). Cases of children 
  88 
developing AIDS, once it was accepted that this was a possibility, were explained 
by poor lifestyle choices on the part of their mothers while pregnant. For every 
new group of people who presented with the disease, a new cause of AIDS was 
added to the ever-increasing list. The ad hoc way in which this list of AIDS 
causing factors was expanded is illustrated well by the following quote by 
Kalichman: 
 
[I]llicit drugs cause the immune dysfunction labelled AIDS. What about 
the people with AIDS who do not use illicit drugs? His [Duesberg’s] reply 
is that AZT and other chemicals used to treat HIV actually cause AIDS. And 
what of those people who had AIDS before AZT was approved and had 
never used drugs? He says there are no such people. What about 
haemophiliacs and blood transfusion recipients who have never used 
drugs or been treated with AZT? Duesberg claims that haemophiliacs 
develop AIDS from contaminated blood clotting factors. What about 
Africa, where AIDS kills millions and there is no widespread drug use or 
AZT? Duesberg claims that AIDS in Africa has existed long before there 
was an HIV test, and that many old diseases result from malnutrition, 
contaminated drinking water, and poor sanitation; in a word, poverty… 
What cause of AIDS we are talking about depends on where you live as 
well as your lifestyle? For Gay men, drug use causes AIDS. For Gay men 
who do not use drugs, HIV medications cause AIDS. In Africa, malnutrition 
causes AIDS. If you are a wealthy African, AZT causes AIDS. If you are a 
Haemophiliac, treatments for haemophilia cause AIDS. No research has 
ever suggested the Duesbergian view of AIDS is true (Kalichman, 2009, pp. 
38-39). 
 
This shows that the immune overload theory adapted to account for new 
anomalous evidence (the expansion of the disease into new groups). This is 
permissible on Lakatos’s account, so long as the adjustments yield novel 
predictions, and the predictions are corroborated. But we do not see such 
predictions and corroborations developing out of the adjustments to the immune 
overload thesis. One prediction that we might expect to come out of the immune 
overload thesis is that as ARVs become increasingly available, so we should 
witness more AIDS deaths, given that the account claims that one of the causes of 
AIDS are ARVs. However, “AIDS declines everywhere in the world when 
antiretroviral medications become available” (Kalichman, 2009, p. 43).  
 
The immune overload research programme also failed to ‘predict’ the cases of 
gay men with AIDS who do not conform to the ‘risk profile’ suggested by the 
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research programme. For instance, not particularly ‘promiscuous’ (and so less 
likely to have significant medical histories of repeated STD infections), non-drug 
using homosexual men were also found to have AIDS and these cases were 
reported by doctors right from the outset of the disease (Epstein, 1996, p. 49).  
These are anomalous cases that the theory cannot account for, except perhaps to 
tell us that these individuals are lying when reporting on their lifestyles – which 
is one of those ad hoc moves that Lakatos warns against (adapting the theory to 
account for anomalous evidence, and that adaptation not leading to any novel 
predictions).  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, much of the project of those who remain 
committed to the immune overload theory of AIDS is about raising questions of 
mainstream AIDS science, as opposed to putting forward a substantial positive 
theory of the disease. Having covered the positive account that is on offer, I now 
move on to assessing two of the main questions that they pose to those who 
endorse the viral account of AIDS. First, if HIV causes AIDS, why is there still no 
vaccine? Second, if HIV causes AIDS, why is there such a long latency period 
between contracting the virus and the onset of illness? 
 
In various places, Duesberg claims that if the viral account of AIDS were correct, 
then a vaccine would have been found by now, given how much time and money 
has been devoted to studying HIV (Duesberg, 1996, p. 438; Duesberg, Koehnlen, 
& Rasnick, 2003, p. 389; Duesberg interviewed in Shenton, 2011). However, 
while it is true that there is no vaccine, we know why this is the case, and it is 
consistent with the viral account being true. The idea behind vaccination is that if 
you expose the immune system to the infectious agent, under controlled 
conditions, it will learn to recognise that agent and develop defences against it. 
The major challenge is that HIV mutates rapidly (which the reader will recall was 
a major problem for the effectiveness of early ARV mono-therapies):  
 
The most salient characteristic of HIV, is its remarkable capacity for 
generating 109 - 1010 virions every day coupled with a high mutation rate 
of approximately 3 × 10−5 per nucleotide base per cycle… In fact, after 10 
to 20 years of infection, the HIV in a patient’s body will have mutated at a 
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rate equal to the average mutation rate of human beings over the course 
of the past few million years (Zuniga & Ghaziani, 2008, p. 18).  
 
This means that even if an individual were ‘vaccinated’ against the disease, the 
version of HIV that the patient would come into contact with later would be so 
different to the virus that they were initially inoculated with, that their immune 
system would not recognise it as the same virus, and would thus not identify it as 
a threat. Developing an HIV vaccine is therefore an extremely difficult task, 
perhaps impossible. That there is no HIV vaccine does not tell us anything about 
the plausibility of the viral account of AIDS (Zuniga & Ghaziani, 2008, p. 18).  
 
The second criticism levelled against the viral AIDS account by denialists is that 
the delay between infection and disease onset is so long that HIV cannot possibly 
be the cause of AIDS. In Duesberg’s own words: 
 
I believe AIDS is not, or cannot be an infectious disease. An infectious 
disease, believe it or not, has a certain criteria [sic] to it. How it happens, 
when it happens. For example, if you get infected by a bug or by a virus, 
within weeks or months after contact or after that infection you will have 
symptoms of a disease. In HIV and AIDS, however, we are told you get sick 
ten years later, ten years after infection. That is not how viruses or 
bacteria work. They work fast or never. They are a very simple 
mechanism like a little clock that can do only one thing – go around the 
dial once and that takes 24 to 48 hours with a virus. There is no way a 
virus could possibly slow down or wait a week or wait ten years. That is 
totally absurd (Duesberg, 1990 quoted in Shenton, 1998, p. 88).   
 
However, this contradicts the position accepted by mainstream virology. Note the 
following extract taken from an introductory epidemiology text:  
 
Epidemiologic studies of kuru, the first spongioencephalopathy to be 
identified in humans, were initiated in the late 1950s…In 1959, the 
veterinarian William Haddow had spelled out the clinical and pathological 
similarities of kuru to scrapie, an infectious disease of sheep with a very 
long incubation period. Awareness of this zoonosis moved Gajdusek's 
team to consider the possibility of an infection rather than a genetic 
condition. With monumental patience in the laboratory, after many 
attempts Gajdusek and his colleagues eventually succeeded in 
transmitting the disease to primates; upon exposure, the disease became 
manifest only several years thereafter. Gajdusek's unique discovery led to 
the recognition of what was then called a slow virus…  In 1976, Gajdusek's 
persistence was rewarded by the Nobel Prize (Susser & Stein, 2009, p. 
206).   
  91 
 
 
From this extract it is clear that the scientific community had accepted the 
existence of viral diseases with long incubation periods (also known as ‘slow 
viruses’) since at least the 1970s. The long incubation period in the case of AIDS 
therefore might be unusual, but it is not unheard of in medical science. Duesberg 
responds to being presented with this mainstream scientific view about scrapie 
and the existence of slow viruses by arguing that the scrapie virus does not exist. 
He argues that all cases of the disease can be explained by exposure to toxins, and 
that no slow viruses exist at all (Duesberg, 1996, pp. 76-80). It is ignoring this 
piece of mainstream science that makes Kalichman speculate that perhaps 
Duesberg is intentionally misrepresenting the mainstream scientific facts (2009, 
p. 50).  
 
The immune overload theory quite clearly looks degenerative. Adaptions were 
made to the theory to accommodate each new group who presented with AIDS, 
and novel predictions did not flow from those adjustments. Further, those 
predictions that we might have expected from the theory were not corroborated 
– such as the case of ARVs. It was noted that a large portion of the AIDS denialists’ 
project involves questioning aspects of the mainstream account of AIDS, and two 
of the main questions that they pose were addressed: if AIDS is viral then why is 
there no vaccine, and how can HIV cause AIDS after such a long latency period? It 
was argued that those who endorse the viral account of AIDS have the resources 
to respond to both of these criticisms: there is no vaccine because the virus 
mutates too quickly; and mainstream virology and epidemiology have accepted 
the existence of viruses with long latency periods since the 1970s. Duesberg 
resists the latter claim by arguing that this is just another piece of mainstream 
science that is wrong (1996, pp. 76-80). Thagard (1978), as previously discussed, 
argues that one of the factors that nudges a research programme toward 
pseudoscience is an unwillingness to engage with the available alternative 
theories. Deusberg’s dismissal of large swathes of mainstream science seems to 
be indicative of the research programme not just being degenerative, but also 
being pseudo-scientific (more will be said about this below).  
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3.6. What motivates the denialists?  
 
Given the overwhelming evidence that has been presented in favour of the viral 
account of AIDS, and the obvious problems with the immune overload view, why 
would anyone still stick with the latter?  
 
Some portions of the denialist camp are obviously motivated by financial gain, 
and they have used their commitment to the immune overload theory to sell 
various ‘immune enhancing remedies’ (Kalichman, 2009, p. 21; Thom, 2009; 
Geffen, 2010). However, Duesberg is clearly not financially driven in this regard, 
and has arguably lost money as a result of his commitment to the denialist 
programme (Lenzer 2008). 
 
Kalichman makes various speculations about what might be motivating 
Duesberg. One speculation is that he remains committed to the denialist stance 
because he something of a rock star within the denialist community (Kalichman 
quoted in Steinberg, 2009, p. 35). Another might be his peculiar rivalry with 
Robert Gallo (the co-discoverer of AIDS) – they were on friendly collegial terms 
until Duesberg began to backtrack on his views about cancer, and then Duesberg 
found himself increasingly excluded from the research community, even before 
he entered the AIDS debate. That Duesberg’s animosity is linked to Gallo in 
particular seems likely – in the original 1987 AIDS denialist paper, Duesberg 
thanks Gallo in the acknowledgements for having prompted the paper 
(Kalichman, 2009, pp. 35-37; Lenzer, 2008). In another speculation, Kalichman 
wonders whether Duesberg might just be contrarian in character:  
 
Contrarian may be an understatement. You almost get the feeling that if 
suddenly it were discovered that AIDS is caused by toxic drugs Duesberg 
would refute the evidence and pose an alternative theory (p.48)  
 
Kalichman goes on with his speculation that Duesberg might just be contrarian 
when he states that:  
 
Is it possible that Peter Duesberg himself did not seriously question 
whether HIV causes AIDS? In a position paper that he wrote for a South 
African meeting, he referred to the classic novel The Plague by Albert 
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Camus as the most readable modern depiction of an epidemic. Addressing 
a country where hundreds of people die of AIDS each day, Duesberg’s 
reference to a work of fiction seems quite telling. Was he signalling that 
we should not take him too seriously? Perhaps he pushes on his academic 
rivals only because he enjoys the argument – as a kind of sport, debate for 
the sake of debate. (p.49).  
 
It is unlikely that we will get a definitive answer to the question of what is 
motivating the AIDS denialists to hold on to their views. When Duesberg is asked 
directly why he maintains his stance, he says “I don’t want to be a ‘good German” 
(Duesberg quoted in Lenzer, 2008), referring to his childhood in Nazi Germany 
and the disdain he feels for those Germans who stood back and did nothing while 
evil was allowed to continue around them.  
 
3.7. Where does this leave us? 
 
It seems clear that the HIV research programme should be accepted over the 
immune overload thesis, by at least the mid-1990s. The success of ARVs makes 
the HIV research programme both theoretically progressive (it predicted that the 
ARVs would work) and empirically progressive (that prediction was 
corroborated). It is also extremely unlikely that ARVs would have been effective, 
had the viral account not been true. In contrast, the immune overload account 
adjusted the theory to accommodate new evidence (individuals from new risk 
groups getting the disease), without novel predictions being made and 
corroborated. The immune overload theory was degenerating. Further, much of 
the AIDS denialist project involves asking questions of the viral account that can 
easily be addressed. But, we know that individuals have stuck with the immune 
overload theory despite all of this, what can we say about that?  
 
The catch of making use of Lakatos’s methodology is that it allows for those who 
support the immune overload thesis to continue being so committed, because 
Lakatos argues that it is permissible “to stick to a degenerating research 
programme and try to turn it into a progressive one” (Lakatos, 1978, p. 6). This 
echoes Popper’s idea that “the scientific future is essentially unknowable” 
(Urbach, 1978, p. 100) and so it is plausible that a currently degenerating 
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research programme may become progressive in the future, and it is not possible 
to know in advance whether or not this will be the case. After all, one of the 
appealing characteristics of Lakatos’s approach is that it allows for substantial 
problems to exist within a scientific research programme without requiring that 
it be dismissed outright, and it permits scientists to work through those issues. 
We cannot insist that scientists involved in degenerating research programmes 
should give up on them, while also maintaining the idea that the scientific 
community should be given time to resolve the problems with their theories. But 
this is an unsettling conclusion, given the obvious problems highlighted with the 
immune overload approach above, and the harms that have been associated with 
the persistence of this particular position (most notably, South African AIDS 
denialism).  
 
Worrall highlights an aspect of Lakatos’s theory that may provide a more 
nuanced way of addressing this problem. He describes Lakatos’s position as 
follows:  
Of course the methodology does not predict that, whenever some new 
programme comes along which it appraises as more progressive than the 
old one, all scientists will switch to work on the progressive programme. 
Nor does the methodology pronounce ‘irrational’ those scientists who, in 
such circumstances, stick to the old programme. Such a scientist may, in 
perfect conformity with this methodology, agree that the new programme 
is, at the moment, superior, but nevertheless declare his intention to work 
on the old programme in an attempt to improve it so that it becomes even 
better than the new programme (Worrall, 1978, p. 61).  
 
Initially, this just seems to be a restatement of the part of Lakatos’s theory that 
creates the problem. However, in the note for this section, Worrall continues:  
A scientist would be pronounced ‘irrational’ (or rather mistaken) by the 
methodology if he stuck to the old programme denying that his own 
programme needed improvement in order to catch up with the new one. It 
is in such circumstances that we shall begin to suspect the operation of 
extra-rational motives (Worrall, 1978, p. 70).  
 
And it is the latter behaviour that we see in AIDS denialism. It is not just that 
scientists continue to be committed to the immune overload research 
programme, despite recognising that their research programme may currently be 
in a rocky patch. Rather, they deny the truth of certain crucial pieces of evidence 
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that support the HIV thesis and ignore evidence that places their own position in 
an unfavourable light. For instance, the denial of evidence that suggests that 
ARVs are effective, or the denial that viruses can have long incubation periods. It 
is this kind of denial that leads to the suspicion that ‘extra-rational motives’ 
might be at play.   
 
Thagard’s (1978) contribution, as explicated earlier in this chapter, is also 
relevant here. His position is that a theory can be declared not just degenerative 
(which although undesirable, is not pejorative) but also ‘pseudoscientific’, if: “the 
community of practitioners makes little attempt to develop the theory towards 
solutions to the problems, shows no concern for attempts to evaluate the theory 
in relation to others, and is selective in considering confirmations and 
disconfirmations” (Thagard, 1978, pp. 227-228) 
 
All of these factors are present in the case of the AIDS denialism. There is an 
alternative progressive research programme available in the form of the viral 
account of AIDS, which has not been seriously engaged with by those who remain 
committed to the immune overload theory. There has not been much of an effort 
to resolve the problems of the immune overload account – the one exception 
being Duesberg’s application for a NIH grant in the early 1990s to study the 
effects of nitrates on immune suppression, but he failed to do the required 
preliminary studies and did not respond to the reviewers’ questions from his 
first attempt at the application, so it is unclear how seriously he really took this 
application. Mostly, what we see from the denialist camp are restatements of 
very early AIDS science (Steinberg, 2009), which is indicative of the selective way 
in which they consider confirmations and disconfirmations (they only consider 
the early AIDS science supports their view, neglecting the scientific 
developments that followed).  
 
We can thus conclude that the continued commitment to the immune overload 
theory not just degenerative, but also pseudoscientific. As such, it would be 
irrational for anyone to continue research in this domain.  
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3.8. A final worry: loss of explanatory content 
 
A final concern one might have is that some explanatory content has been lost in 
HIV’s acceptance as the mainstream view. Explanatory losses can occur when one 
research programme supersedes another, because it has excessive truth content 
over its rivals, but there are aspects of the phenomenon that the alternative 
research programme explains and the accepted view cannot (Worrall, 1978, pp. 
61-62).   
 
In the AIDS case, having access only to the viral account of AIDS, makes it more 
difficult to explain the disproportionate prevalence of AIDS in southern Africa, 
without resorting to problematic assumptions about Africans and their sexuality 
(which would require evidence to make convincing – more will be said about this 
assumption in the following chapter). When the immune overload theory, and its 
explanatory tools, were still available, one could appeal to factors such as poverty 
to explain the AIDS epidemic in southern Africa. The next chapter will try and 
account for this explanatory gap that was created by the shift to the strictly viral 
view. 
 
3.9. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter was to gain a better understanding of the state of the 
scientific debate surrounding AIDS, and to take seriously the claim of 
contemporary AIDS denialists that they were unfairly and prematurely cut out of 
the debate in 1984 when HIV was declared to be the cause of AIDS.  
 
This was done using Lakatos’s theory of scientific research programmes, which 
requires that a theory make novel predictions, and that at least some of those 
predictions be corroborated in order for it to be progressive. When a theory 
starts to make ad hoc adjustments to accommodate unexpected evidence, and no 
novel predictions and corroborations follow from those adjustments, then the 
theory starts to degenerate. Further, Thagard tells us that a theory is not just 
degenerative, but also pseudoscientific, when its devotees fail to engage with 
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promising progressive alternative research programmes; they make little effort 
to solve the theory’s problems; and they are selective in the way they deal with 
confirmations and disconfirmations.  
 
The viral account of AIDS comes out as progressive on Lakatos’s terms. It 
predicted that HIV would be found in the T-Cells of AIDS patients, that higher 
viral loads would be correlated with more severe cases of the disease and more 
rapid progression toward death, and that ARVs would be effective. All of these 
predictions had been corroborated by the mid-1990s (although this 
corroboration came somewhat later than we might have liked). By contrast, the 
immune overload theory made ad hoc adjustments to accommodate the 
extension of the disease into new groups. These adjustments did not make novel 
predictions, and those elements of the theory that we might expect to be 
predictive did not yield corroborations – if, for instance, ARVs causes AIDS (as 
those committed to the immune overload theory claim), then we would expect 
there to be an increase in the number of AIDS cases as ARVs become more readily 
available, and this has not been the case (quite the opposite has been true). The 
immune overload theory is thus degenerative on Lakatos’s account. Further, 
using Thagard’s criteria, we can say that the immune overload theory has 
become pseudo-scientific. It fails to recognise the existence of an alternative 
progressive AIDS research programme in the form of the viral theory; it is 
unclear that an effort has been made by those who are committed to the immune 
overload theory to resolve its problems; and the AIDS denialists continual 
restatement of very out-of-date science is indicative of the selective way that they 
deal with confirmations and disconfirmations. The viral account was thus 
rationally accepted over the immune overload theory, at least by 1996.  
 
However, it was also noted shifting to the strictly viral account of AIDS created an 
explanatory gap, in that it became more difficult to explain aspects of the disease 
(specifically the disproportionate prevalence of AIDS in southern Africa) without 
reference to aspects of the immune overload theory. The following chapter will 
argue that this explanatory gap might help to explain Mbeki’s denialism, and I 
will attempt to remedy this problem by thinking more carefully about how 
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causation is understood in explanations of disease in epidemiology and 
biomedicine. 
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4. Thinking mono-causally and multi-causally about disease in 
the case of AIDS 
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
In 1984 the scientific community moved from multiple theories of the possible 
aetiology of AIDS to accepting HIV as the cause of AIDS. While this move was 
rational (the subject of the previous chapter), it resulted in the loss of some 
explanatory power – there were aspects of the disease that could not easily be 
explained in strictly viral terms, but which seemed to require reference to 
elements of the now discarded ‘immune overload’ theory; the theory that AIDS is 
due to diminished immune function resulting from various ‘lifestyle related’ 
factors, such as multiple STD infections, drug use, and malnutrition. For instance, 
on one plausible theory, at least part of the disproportionate prevalence of AIDS 
in southern Africa could be partially explained by drawing on the idea that 
malnutrition and already having been exposed to multiple other infections places 
strain on the immune system, making individuals more susceptible to 
opportunistic infections. Mosley makes the point as follows:  
 
It has been estimated that in America, the odds of contracting AIDS from an 
infected heterosexual partner is 1 in 500. But in many parts of Africa, the 
odds are 1 in 10. This difference in susceptibility to infection is explained, not 
by reference to HIV, nor to commensurably higher rates of unprotected sex 
that can be corrected by a focus on sex education. People suffering from 
malnutrition, parasites, and other forms of illness have compromised immune 
systems that make them more susceptible to infection by HIV than 
comparable healthy, well-nourished individuals in industrialised countries 
(Mosley, 2004, p. 409).27 
 
While Mosley’s point is controversial (more will be said about this later), it does 
seem straightforward that one should be able to hold the commitment that a 
disease is viral and still be able to draw on various socio-economic factors to 
explain aspects of that disease. 
 
                                                        
27 Gray et al (2001), Sanders & Sambo (1991) and UNAIDS (1999) make similar points.  
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In this chapter I argue that being committed to a disease being both microbially-
caused and subject to socio-economic factors became difficult because of an 
ambiguity about the relationship between mono- and multi-causal accounts of 
disease in biomedicine and epidemiology – where mono-causal accounts of 
disease require that there be only one, often microbial, source of illness for the 
purposes of explanation, and multi-causal accounts allow for a range of 
behavioural and socio-economic causal factors to be included in the explanation 
of disease. These two approaches are often taken to explain different types of 
disease, where mono-causal accounts are used to explain infectious diseases, 
while multi-causal accounts are used to explain chronic non-communicable 
disease (diabetes, hypertension, heart disease, certain forms of cancer, etc.). This 
becomes a problem in cases like that of AIDS, because the available conceptual 
framework for understanding disease requires that one focus on either viral or 
socio-economic factors, but not on both.  
 
Once I have spelled out the distinction between mono-causal and multi-causal 
approaches to disease, I will argue that this division might help to explain Thabo 
Mbeki’s AIDS denialism in the early 2000s. On this description, Mbeki wanted an 
explanation for why issues, such as poverty, seemed to be so intertwined with 
AIDS in southern Africa. The mainstream viral research programme at the time (a 
strictly mono-causal account) failed to provide an adequate explanation, which 
led Mbeki to consult non-mainstream AIDS scientists (who were very multi-
causal in their approach). The non-mainstream scientists were able to provide a 
plausible-sounding account of the link between poverty and AIDS, but also 
incorrectly rejected the causal role of the virus in the process.  
 
If I am correct about the role that these conceptual frameworks played in Mbeki’s 
AIDS denialism, then this should put pressure on the mono-causal/multi-causal 
divide, motivating us to find an integrated approach that allows for multiple 
causal factors while still maintaining the causal salience of the virus for the 
purposes of explaining AIDS. Susser’s (1973) layered multi-causal model seems 
to solve this problem. However, Susser’s approach raises a number of 
philosophical issues in the process. In particular, it creates problems related to 
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the ontological status of the levels in his account, and the relationship between 
those levels (Russo, 2011, p. 77). It also fails to account for causal factors that are 
not the most proximal to the disease, but which are the most salient for 
explaining that particular disease. I will argue that instead of Susser’s account, 
the best way to think about this problem is as one of ‘causal selection’ – that is, 
how one should distinguish between ‘causes’ and so-called ‘enabling conditions’. 
Further, I will suggest that Woodward (2011) offers a more objective approach 
to solving the causal selection problem than the available philosophical 
alternatives, and that this provides a promising way to think about the 
relationship between mono-causal and multi-causal accounts of disease.  
 
A caveat should be noted before proceeding. No attempt will be made in this 
chapter to assess the metaphysical status of causation in the medical and health 
sciences. There is already a vast literature on this topic, and the focus in this 
chapter is on a different set of issues. Specifically, the focus here is on the models 
and metaphors that underpin thinking about disease, and their implications for 
policy and health practice. For the purposes of this chapter, I assume that 
causation is a matter of probabilistic association, underpinned by actual 
mechanisms (Russo & Williamson, 2007).  
 
It should also be noted that in some ways this is not a debate about HIV/AIDS at 
all – this is an issue for all infectious diseases that are subject to ‘social drivers’. 
Stillwaggon’s comments on the outbreak of the plague in Europe are particularly 
instructive in this regard:  
 
Throughout history it has been clear that the epidemic spread of disease 
requires favorable conditions. Rats (or soldiers) aboard a ship from an 
eastern port carried plague-infected fleas into Italy in 1348 and sparked 
the epidemic spread of plague in Europe, wiping out one-third of the 
population in most of the continent. This introduction was a random 
event, but it was certainly not Western Europe’s only exposure to rats or 
plague. In 1348, plague entered a continent weakened by 30 years of 
failing per capita food consumption and increasing immiseration of the 
peasantry due to increased feudal demands. The population of Europe had 
already been falling in the decades leading up to 1348, and a series of 
disastrous harvests exacerbated the effects of war… Even though many 
nobles and townspeople perished in the Black Death, the ecologic context 
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for the epidemic was the worsening economic situation of the peasantry 
(Stillwaggon, 2006, p. 8).  
 
As Stillwaggon’s example makes clear, there are some ways in which this is all 
old news. Practitioners of epidemiology and the biomedical sciences have been 
aware for a long while that both infectious agents and socio-economic factors 
need to be considered simultaneously in order to make sense of disease. 
However, the AIDS case makes it clear that this historical lesson has not been 
taken to heart and attention needs to be paid to this theoretical concern. We need 
a more sophisticated conceptual framework for discussing multiple causes of an 
effect – here, disease. That is the focus of this chapter.  
 
4.2. Mono-causal and multi-causal approaches to disease  
 
The mono-causal account of disease came into existence in the nineteenth 
century. Prior to that, the miasma theory (the theory that diseases, such as 
cholera, arose due to poor air quality) and the humour theory (that disease came 
about when the four fluids of the body – black bile, yellow bile, blood and phlegm 
– became unbalanced) dominated (Lee, 2012, p.117; Codell Carter, 2003, p.10). 
Granted, both the humour theory and the miasma theory also appear to be 
‘mono-causal’, in the sense that one can appeal to a single cause to explain the 
onset of disease (“it was the bad air”), but the standard nomenclature takes 
mono-causalism about disease to be almost synonymous with the ‘germ theory of 
disease’ (the idea that microbes are causally responsible for diseases). For the 
purposes of this chapter, mono-causalism will be taken to refer to the germ 
theory of disease, unless otherwise specified.  
 
The germ theory of disease came into being in the 1860s, when Louis Pasteur 
identified the microbes involved in fermentation. The realisation that something 
microbial could cause fermentation, and the ability to identify microbial agents 
for the first time, opened up the conceptual space in which it became conceivable 
that microbes could be necessary for all kinds of biological processes (this is 
often referred to as the “age of bacterial discovery”) (Evans, 1993, p.8-10). This 
heralded in the mono-causal account of disease, as it is typically understood 
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(Thagard, 1999, p. 24- 25). In its broadest construal, the mono-causal account is 
just the insistence “that every disease has one cause that is necessary and, in 
limited circumstances, sufficient for disease” (Broadbent, 2009, p. 302).28 But, of 
course, nobody thinks that any disease is literally mono-causal (Lee, 2012, p. 
134). Broadbent makes this point as follows:  
 
… [B]ut no disease - and no other event we ever encounter – is mono-
causal in the literal sense of being the operation of just one cause. The 
ingestion of Vibrio cholerae bacteria is a cause of cholera, but so too – in 
different ways – are the presence of human waste in the drinking supply, 
the lack of fuel to boil the water, the continued presence of oxygen in the 
atmosphere while the bacteria multiply inside the breathing host, the 
operation of the host, and so on. This observation suggests that the way to 
understand “monocausal” is as asserting a restriction, not on the number 
of causes, but on the number of causes that meet a certain restriction.  
(Broadbent, 2013: 149).  
 
Broadbent goes on to claim that this ‘certain restriction’ is provided by Koch’s 
Postulates (Broadbent, 2013: 149). Although there have been many versions and 
interpretations of the postulates, they can be outlined as requiring that an 
identified microbial agent, which is suspected of causing a particular disease, 
should satisfy the following criteria: 
 
1). The microbe must be found in every instance of the disease. 
2). It must be possible to grow the microbe in pure culture.29  
3). It must be the case that when the pure culture of the microbe is 
injected (or otherwise introduced)30 into a healthy animal it develops 
the disease. 
4). It must be possible to find the microbe in the animal that was 
experimentally infected (Lee, 2012, p. 121).  
                                                        
28 It should be noted that Lee (2012) and Broadbent (2013) both point out that the germ theory 
of disease and the mono-causal account are conceptually distinct. One can be committed to the 
mono-causal account without being committed to the single cause of any particular disease being 
microbial. Diseases of deficiency provide good examples of this. For instance, scurvy can be 
explained mono-causally by reference to a Vitamin C deficiency. However, historically, those 
endorsing the mono-causal account of disease have largely focussed on microbial agents. 
29 It is accepted that viruses are never able to fulfil this requirement, because they require cells to 
‘survive’ and so it is not possible to grow a virus in pure culture.  
30 In an interesting side example, Barry Marshall drank a petri dish of the cultured bacterium 
Helicobaterpyloris, in an attempt to satisfy this postulate and establish the causal link between the 
bacterium and the development of ulcers (Lee, 2012, p. 123). Hence the need to specify that there 
are other ways of introducing the purported causal agent into the animal model. 
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Criteria 1) and 3) are the most important for establishing causal claims; with 1) 
establishing the necessity of the microbe for the disease and 3) providing 
evidence for the microbe being ‘sufficient’ for the onset of disease under a range 
of normal background conditions (underpinned by an interventionist picture of 
causation). 2) and 4) are more practical laboratory guides. 2), the requirement 
that the microbe be grown in pure culture, is included in order to isolate the 
particular microbe under investigation from potential sources of contamination. 
Incidentally, this is why it is not much of a worry that viruses fail to satisfy this 
criterion, because so long as precautions have been taken to isolate the virus 
from potential sources of contamination, then the function of the criterion 2) has 
been fulfilled. Again, 4) is an attempt to isolate the microbe under investigation 
and to provide evidence that it is really responsible for producing the disease (i.e. 
to rule out ‘confounders’, to use the common talk). We can imagine a scenario in 
which the microbe is injected into an animal, but its immune system successfully 
fights off the infection, and yet the animal still becomes sick, but not as a direct 
result of the microbe that was injected into it (perhaps it is allergic to the 
material that the syringe is made of) – the fourth postulate is meant to rule out 
that possibility. 
 
From the start it was recognised that no microbe was likely to satisfy all four 
postulates. However, the postulates provide an ideal to be emulated when a 
researcher identifies a microbe as a plausible cause of a disease, even though 
these criteria might never be perfectly realised in practice. The aim of Koch’s 
Postulates is to provide a guide for what one (ideally) ought to do when 
attempting to establish causation between an identified microbe and the disease 
it is suspected of causing. It sets high standards for the causes to look for – that is, 
causes that are necessary and sufficient under the range of normal background 
conditions. 
 
In practice, the mono-causal approach proved to be a very fruitful research 
programme. On discovering a new disease, the practical task became one of 
identifying a plausible microbial causal agent, and then using Koch’s postulates to 
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establish that the microbe is necessary and sufficient for the effect under the 
range of normal background conditions (as opposed to the microbe being 
coincidentally present or the secondary by-product of an underlying common 
cause). This approach allowed for the identification of the microbes responsible 
for a wide range of diseases (Koch himself, in the nineteenth century, identified 
the microbial agents responsible for Cholera, Tuberculosis and Anthrax), and the 
discovery of pasteurisation and immunisation (Lee, 2012, p. 117; Evans, 1993, p. 
10). There was nothing about ‘mono-causalism’ per se that made this research 
programme so successful – that is, it was not the commitment that there should 
be only one cause for every disease that drove innovation during this time period. 
Rather, what allowed progress to occur was the thought that for every disease 
there was an underlying responsible microbial agent, because it meant that 
whenever a new disease was encountered the task became one of identifying the 
relevant microbe; thus providing a practical research strategy to scientists 
encountering new or unexplained diseases. This proved to be a very successful 
strategy for a large number of diseases that had previously been aetiologically 
mysterious. In those cases in which it was unsuccessful, it was just assumed that 
more time was needed to discover the relevant microbe, and that eventually the 
infectious agent would be found.  
 
Despite the early successes of the mono-causal approach, the multi-causal 
account arose in the mid-twentieth century as a reaction against it. This was 
because the growing incidence of chronic non-communicable diseases (CNCDs) 
(diabetes, heart disease, certain forms of cancer, hypertension – diseases 
typically associated with lifestyle) could not be explained by reference to a single 
salient causal factor (Susser, 1985, p.150; Broadbent, 2009, p. 305). The multi-
causal model came to be identified with the central metaphor of the ‘web of 
causation’, which Krieger describes as follows:  
 
Conceptually, the metaphor evoked the powerful image of a spider’s web, an 
elegantly linked network of delicate strands, the multiple intersections 
representing specific risk factors or outcomes, and the strands symbolizing 
diverse causal pathways. It encouraged epidemiologists to look for multiple 
causes and multiple effects, and to identify the many – as opposed to singular 
– routes by which disease could be prevented. (Krieger, 1994, p.891).  
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Again, this is a piece of practical methodological advice for epidemiologists (“look 
for multiple causal pathways”) and not a shift in thinking about ontology of 
disease causation, especially given that nobody had ever actually thought that 
diseases were literally mono-causal to begin with. 
 
At this point there are two plausible theories of disease explanation on the table: 
the mono-causal account, which was developed to explain infectious diseases, 
and the multi-causal ‘web’ which came about in the middle of the twentieth 
century to explain CNCDs. It is not immediately clear what the relationship 
between these accounts of disease explanation is, or should be. The normative 
question of what the relationship between these two accounts should be will be 
addressed later in this chapter. At this point, it should just be noted that in the 
case of HIV/AIDS, practicing scientists working on the disease appear to have 
been strongly methodologically committed to mono-causalism. For instance, 
Robert Gallo, one of the scientists credited with the discovery of the HIV virus (as 
discussed in the previous chapter), explicitly states that he is committed to the 
position that “… multifactorial is multi-ignorance. Most of the factors go away 
when we learn the real cause of a disease” (Gallo, 1991, p. 148). This quote is 
taken from his autobiography, in a chapter entitled “A Single Disease with a 
Single Cause” – a title that further emphasises Gallo’s commitment to mono-
causalism. Further, Oppenheimer (1992) argues that the isolation of the HIV 
virus resulted in a substantial decrease in the number of epidemiological AIDS 
studies that were undertaken in the 1990s (p. 49-50). Given that epidemiology is 
the multi-causal health science par excellence, this is another indicator that the 
mono-causal account had taken centre-stage in AIDS research as the viral 
research programme grew in the late 1980s and 1990s, to the exclusion of multi-
causal factors in the explanation of the disease. Oppenheimer makes this point as 
follows:  
 
With the isolation of the HIV, the relative importance of epidemiology in 
the definition of the disease lessened… Increasingly, the “bench” scientists 
– virologists, immunologists, cancer researchers – determined the 
definition of HIV infection. In effect, they redefined AIDS as a set of 
biomedical problems open to a chemical resolution in the form of drugs 
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and vaccines… The change in the types of professionals studying infection 
and in their defined fields of observation and analysis affected a subtle 
shift in the characterisation of the disorder. The disease was increasingly 
conceptualized in terms of the infectious agent, the virus. Interest in 
cofactors or a multifactorial model diminished. (Oppenheimer, 1992, p. 
63). 
 
Fee and Krieger (1993) agree with Oppenheimer:  
 
Once the virus was identified, scientists tended to lose interest in the 
social factors accompanying transmission. They instead turned to 
laboratory studies of the virus and its action within the body… (Fee & 
Krieger, 1993, p. 1478) 
 
This strong commitment to mono-causalism in the case of AIDS (as seen in Gallo, 
Oppenheimer, and Fee and Krieger) meant that it was not permissible to draw on 
socio-economic explanations of disease (because the mono-causal account allows 
only for a single, typically microbial, source of disease to be included in the 
explanation). Without being able to draw on factors, such as poverty, in the 
explanation of disease, this rendered the disproportionate prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS in southern Africa somewhat mysterious.  
 
4.3. Was there really an explanatory gap in the HIV/AIDS case?  
 
This chapter started with the concern that the transition from multiple theories 
of AIDS’s aetiology (some of which accommodated socio-economic factors) to the 
strictly viral account may have resulted in a loss of some explanatory power. In 
particular, the concern was that some of the disproportionate prevalence of AIDS 
in southern Africa could not be explained in strictly viral terms, but that it might 
be explicable by appealing to socio-economic factors. However, if one is 
committed to strict mono-causalism about disease, as the AIDS research 
community in the 1990s appears to have been, then it is not permissible to draw 
on non-viral factors to explain any aspect of any particular infectious disease.  
 
In this section, I will look more closely at whether it was reasonable to be 
concerned about an explanatory gap created by strict adherence to mono-
causalism in the case of AIDS. In particular, I assess whether we can explain the 
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disproportionate prevalence of AIDS in southern African in strictly viral terms – 
either in terms of differences in the viral strains themselves or differences 
related to individuals’ exposure to the virus31 – or whether we need to make use 
multi-causalism to draw socio-economic factors into the explanation. I will look 
at three mono-causal explanations of the disproportionate prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS in southern Africa (in increasing order of plausibility): 1) that there is 
a more virulent (or infectious) strain of HIV in southern Africa; 2) that southern 
Africans participate in riskier sexual practices (broadly construed); and 3) that 
southern Africans are more likely to have concurrent sexual relationships, and 
that this explains the variation (a narrower version or the explanation presented 
in 2).32 
 
One way of explaining the disproportionate prevalence of HIV in southern Africa 
might be to appeal to how virulent or infectious different strains of the virus are 
– if strains of HIV that are typically found in southern Africa are worse than 
strains found in western Europe and the United States, then this would explain 
the difference without reference to any socio-economic factors. It is well known 
that HIV-1 is a more virulent strain of the virus than HIV-2 (Flint et al, 2009, p. 
167). If the regional variation of prevalence tracks the variation in the strains of 
the virus, then a strictly viral explanation of the disease’s distribution could be 
produced. However, this is just empirically not the case. HIV-2 is most prevalent 
in West Africa and does not really extend beyond that region (Flint et al, 2009, p. 
167). This means that all of the areas we are trying to account for (western 
Europe, the United States, and southern Africa) are affected by HIV-1. Limited 
research is available on how virulent various sub-strains of HIV-1 are, but the 
research that does exist suggests that there is no difference (Gray et al, 2001). No 
mainstream accounts suggest that differences in strains of the virus have 
                                                        
31 Whether this would count as a strictly mono-causal explanation is debateable, because it makes 
reference to population behaviour in the explanation and hence something other than the virus is 
being appealed to. However, population level behaviour could be compressed into something 
approximating a mono-causal explanation by describing this as merely amounting to increased 
instances of exposure to the virus. This is how those who are committed to mono-causal 
explanations conceive of the issue.  
32 Again, it is somewhat controversial to describe 2) and 3) as strictly mono-causal accounts, 
given that they both appeal to behavior in their explanations. But again, one might claim that this 
just amounts to differences in exposure to the virus, and so all that really matters to the 
explanation is the virus itself.  
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anything to do with the increased prevalence in southern Africa (Epstein, 2007, 
p.52).  
 
If there is nothing about the strains of the virus itself that makes them more or 
less virulent, then perhaps the differences in prevalence between southern Africa 
and the rest of the world could be explained in terms of variations of sexual 
practices, which would leave the viral theory intact – the only difference in the 
case of southern Africa being a greater number of instances of possible 
transmission (Iliffe, 2007 , p. 63).33 
 
It seems like common sense that sexual practices might make a difference to the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic, given that most instances AIDS in southern Africa are 
sexually transmitted (as opposed to transmitted via injection drug use, or blood 
transfusions) (Epstein, 2007, p. 50). Additionally, the migrant labour system that 
supports the South African mining industry is put forward as an obvious example 
of how sexual practices increased instances of exposure to the virus and thus 
drove the epidemic. Quoting Steinberg (2011):  
 
[T]he mining system was structured in such a way that it could potentially 
disperse the virus to all four corners of the region. South Africa’s quarter-
of-a-million migrant mineworkers lived two lives, many with at least two 
long-term lovers, one at work and the other at home in the countryside.  
 
However, the evidence on sexual practices being the only difference-maker to 
HIV prevalence is patchy. A report issued by UNAIDS in 1999 highlights this. In 
this report, four African cities (two high prevalence and two low prevalence) 
were studied in an effort to isolate the causal factors that lead to higher 
prevalence – these cities were Kisumu (Kenya), Ndola (Zambia), Cotonou (Benin) 
                                                        
33 Note that Iliffe is presenting this as an explanatory stance that one might adopt toward the 
southern African AIDS epidemic. He does not endorse this position himself. His own explanation 
for the disproportionate prevalence of HIV/AIDS in southern Africa is that the disease has just 
been in Africa for longer than in other places, giving it more time to spread unidentified than had 
been the case in other parts of the world – again, this would be another mono-causal account 
because it just has to do with instances of transmission over time (2007, p. 58). However, while 
Iliffe’s description might be true in some parts of Africa, it cannot explain the South African 
HIV/AIDS epidemic, where prevalence was at less that 0.1% in 1986 (Steinberg, 2011) at least 
partially because international sanctions during apartheid meant that South Africa was very 
isolated and was only exposed to the virus quite late. 
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and Yaoundé (Cameroon).34 Various aspects of sexual practice (such as number 
of sexual partners, and contact with sex workers) and potential co-factors 
(incidence of additional sexually transmitted diseases, and male circumcision) 
were included as potential drivers of prevalence. The study concluded that there 
was insufficient evidence to put differences in prevalence solely down to 
differences in sexual behaviour. They also exclude the possibility that different 
sub-types of the virus were responsible for differences in prevalence:  
 
From these data, it would be difficult to argue that the divergence in the 
rate of HIV spread between the East African and West African sites can be 
explained solely by differences in sexual behaviour. Nor was there evidence 
that differences in circulating strains of HIV-1 are a major factor in the 
rate of spread of HIV. Subtype A was the most prevalent subtype in both of 
the low-prevalence sites as well as in one high-prevalence site…Finally, 
how can one explain the dramatically high prevalence of HIV infection 
(15%-23%) in girls under 20 in Kisumu and Ndola? Unmarried girls in 
these cities reported a median of 1 to 1.5 lifetime sex partners, an 
estimated 10-12% of whom were HIV infected… it is hard to explain the 
high HIV prevalence in female teenagers. For the girls to have become 
infected so soon after their sexual debut as a result of relatively few 
exposures to an infected partner, HIV transmission co-factors must be part 
of the explanation… In conclusion, differences in the rate of HIV spread 
between the East African and West African cities studied cannot be 
explained away by differences in sexual behaviour alone. In fact, 
behavioural differences seem to be outweighed by differences in HIV 
transmission probability. (UNAIDS, 1999)[own emphasis added].  
 
Stillwaggon comments on this UNAIDS report that it “provided a clear empirical 
challenge to the behavioural assumption. Unfortunately, UNAIDS has not 
followed up on unanswered questions…” (Stillwaggon, 2006 , p. 19). So while this 
study provides some empirical reason to doubt the view that differences in 
prevalence are solely due to differences in numbers of sexual partners, this study 
has not been appropriately followed up.  
 
The broad theory that differences in “sexual practices” (which is presumably 
encompasses things like increased numbers of sexual partners, more visits to 
                                                        
34 It is recognised that not all of these locations are in southern Africa, but this study offers 
general evidence that ‘differences in sexual practices’ (broadly construed) are not the sole or 
primary difference maker in these areas, and so it is unlikely that they will be the sole difference 
maker in southern Africa.  
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sex-workers, and the like, but is very non-specific) drives the AIDS epidemic in 
southern Africa, does not seem well-supported by the evidence. For instance, it 
seems that prevalence could be higher in a location without individuals having a 
higher number sexual partners. That is not to say that those individuals were 
having no sex, or that they were strictly monogamous, just that they had no more 
partners than the contrast case, but that the contrast case maintained a lower 
prevalence rate. This suggests that the number of partners alone cannot explain 
divergent prevalence rates.  
 
The alternative theory that was offered to the very broad ‘sexual practices’ 
account is the ‘concurrency theory’ (Sawers & Stillwaggon, 2010). The idea is that 
there is more of a norm of southern Africans having a small number of 
concurrent sexual relationships, which can last for long periods of time, as 
opposed to the “serial monogamy that is more common in Western cultures” and 
that this explains the differences in rates of  prevalence (Epstein, 2007, p. 55). 
There is a plausible mechanism on offer for this account. Individuals have a high 
concentration of the virus in their blood in the period just after they have been 
infected, which makes them more infectious during this period than later on: 
 
This means that sexual networks in which people sleep with two or three 
partners at intervals of days or weeks are probably [very dangerous] 
…The existence of a “viremic window” early in infection, when 
transmission is especially likely, also sheds light on why HIV spreads so 
slowly in populations practicing serial monogamy. By the time the serial 
monogamist has moved on to a new partner, his viral load will have fallen, 
so he is unlikely to infect her (Epstein, 2007, p. 61)  
 
In addition to the plausible mechanism, mathematical models have been 
produced that show increased HIV prevalence when concurrency is modelled as 
opposed to serial monogamy (Kretzschmar & Morrus, 1996 ; Morris & 
Kretzschmar, 1997 ; Morris & Kretzschmar, 2000). A combination of the 
plausible mechanism and mathematical modelling made the concurrency theory 
the mainstream view for explaining the disproportionate prevalence of HIV in 
southern Africa (Allais & Venter, 2012; Sawers & Stillwaggon, 2010). However, 
on closer examination, the theory is less convincing than hoped.  
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A major problem with the evidence for the concurrency theory is that much of its 
plausibility rests on the mathematical models, but the models themselves are 
based on implausible assumptions. Most implausibly, the models “assume that 
everyone in a partnership has sexual contact with every one of their partners 
every day” (Sawers & Stillwaggon, 2010, p. 3). Furthermore, it assumes a very 
high rate of infection and that concurrency is gender symmetric (that both men 
and women have multiple partners),35 neither of which is supported by the 
evidence. Once these assumptions are corrected to more closely align with the 
data from the areas being studied, the model fails to generate any difference in 
HIV prevalence between concurrency and serial monogamy (Sawers & 
Stillwaggon, 2010).  
 
None of the strictly mono-causal accounts of the disproportionate prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS in southern Africa have been particularly convincing. Lurie and 
Rosenthal (2010) argue that we should not be very surprised that no single 
mono-causal account of HIV/AIDS completely explains the geographical variation 
of the disease, arguing instead that: 
 
In reality, HIV epidemic dynamics are complex and unlikely to be 
explained by a single variable. Instead, a combination of factors likely 
drives the epidemic – with some factors playing a more important role in 
some geographic areas than others (Lurie & Rosenthal, 2010, p. 18).   
 
A non-viral factor that may play an explanatory role in the geographical variation 
is poverty. As noted before, the likelihood of contracting the virus in any 
particular sexual encounter is substantially higher in southern Africa than in the 
United States or Western Europe (Mosley, 2004; Gray et al, 2001; Sanders & 
Sambo, 1991). The mechanism for this is not mysterious – note that we are 
happy to accept that the poor are more susceptible to all sorts of other diseases 
because of poverty-induced diminished immune function (remember the 
example from Stillwagon about the introduction of the Plague into Europe in the 
                                                        
35 Gender symmetry is an important assumption for the model to work, because it allows for a 
whole network of infectiousness to be created. This is clear in the case of the South African mine 
worker who has a long-term partner at home and a long-term partner at the mine. If neither of 
the miner’s long-terms partners have additional partners of their own, then the virus remains 
trapped within the two concurrent relationships, and the virus is not distributed any further.  
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1300s). In the case of HIV/AIDS, the increased susceptibility of the poor to the 
disease operates as follows. HIV positive individuals are more infectious when 
they have a high ‘viral load’.36 Individuals who already have diminished immune 
function – due to malnutrition, concurrent exposure to other infections, etc. – 
spend more of the time at higher viral loads, thus meaning that they are more 
infectious for more of the time (Nattrass, 2007 , pp. 18-22). It thus seems as 
though our explanation for the disproportionate prevalence of HIV in southern 
Africa should include some reference to the role of poverty and malnutrition in 
the spread of the epidemic.37 
 
A question that remains at this point is why the mainstream HIV/AIDS research 
community at the time was so wedded to a mono-causal account of AIDS, given 
how little credibility the various mono-causal theories of the epidemic have 
when they are scrutinised.38 My own suspicion for why this occurred is that non-
viral causal factors had lost credibility when HIV was accepted as the cause of 
AIDS, and had become too closely associated with the AIDS denialists – who 
continued to argue that diminished immune function is the result of malnutrition, 
STDs and drug use, and that it is not viral. To draw on non-viral causal factors in 
an explanation of AIDS was to place oneself too closely in the territory of the 
AIDS denialists, and was thus a risk to one’s credibility. However, this is more of a 
question for social scientists than for philosophers. Krieger (1994), for instance, 
would argue that the overall dominance of the viral research programme, 
relative to other forms of research in the medical and health sciences, would 
explain why the research community lost interest in non-viral issues once HIV 
had been identified, because viral accounts of disease are just taken more 
seriously than others. Alternatively, Sawers and Stillwaggon (2010) argue that 
                                                        
36 This is a good explanation for why ‘treatment as prevention’ is successful. Being on 
antiretrovirals lowers the viral load, making one less infectious. Thus having an effective national 
antiretroviral programme lowers overall prevalence (Attia, Egger, Zwahlen, & Low, 2009 ).  
37 None of this is to say that sex plays no role in AIDS transmission rates, just that sexual practices 
alone do not always explain differences in prevalence at the population level, and so conceptual 
space needs to be opened up to include additional drivers of disease.  
38 In the early days of mono-causalism, this kind of commitment made sense, because it was 
thought that every disease literally had a single microbial cause. But the advent of multi-
causalism in the wake of chronic non-communicable diseases (hypertension, heart disease, 
diabetes, etc.) makes such a strong commitment to a mono-causal explanation less sensible, and 
the continued commitment to a strictly mono-causal account of disease in the face of counter-
evidence less sensible.  
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resistance to a more multi-causal account was the result of a commitment to the 
idea that the explanation must be sexual (Mbeki would argue that the 
commitment to the idea that the sole difference maker must be sexual is due to 
racist attitudes towards African sexuality); so much so that when the evidence 
showed that sexual behaviour could not be the only difference maker (such as 
the evidence offered by the UNAIDS report cited above), the concurrency theory 
was offered as a last-resort attempt to explain the disproportionate prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS in sexual terms (p. 13). Regardless of why the mono-causal account 
was so dominant in scientific HIV/AIDS research in the 1990s, this was the state 
of the debate when Mbeki became president of South Africa in June 1999.  
 
4.4. Explaining the South African case in terms of mono- and multi-causal 
accounts of disease  
 
In this section I argue that Mbeki’s AIDS denialism can plausibly be explained as a 
result of the scientific community’s strict commitment to mono-causalism about 
AIDS in the 1990s, to the exclusion of socio-economic factors (i.e. to the exclusion 
of factors that would typically be associated with a multi-causal account). If I am 
correct about this, then the tragedy of the case should motivate us to think more 
carefully about how to better understand the relationship between mono-causal 
and multi-causal accounts of disease.  
 
One plausible (but charitable) reading of the Mbeki case is that he noted that 
there were aspects of the disease that the viral account did not seem able to 
explain on its own. In particular, that the viral account of AIDS seemed incapable 
of explaining the disproportionate prevalence of the disease in southern Africa, 
when compared to the United States or western Europe and this led Mbeki to 
consult scientists who strayed from the viral orthodoxy. 
 
On this description of the Mbeki case, he began consulting non-mainstream AIDS 
scientists in order to find answers to the unresolved questions that he had 
identified, especially related to the regional variation of the disease, and the 
apparent connection between poverty and AIDS (even within southern Africa, 
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HIV/AIDS prevalence is highest amongst the poor). Phrased slightly differently, 
the strictly mono-causal account of AIDS did not resolve issues that a more multi-
causal account might have been able to, because a more multi-causal approach 
would have been able to draw on socio-economic factors in its explanation.  
 
Mbeki’s speeches from this period add plausibility to the idea that this was 
motivating his action. His opening speech at the 13th International AIDS 
conference in Durban, on 9 July 2000, is particularly instructive in this regard. 
Much of this speech focuses on the impact of poverty on health in Africa. 
Concluding the discussion on poverty he states:  
 
One of the consequences of this crisis [poverty] is the deeply disturbing 
phenomenon of the collapse of the immune system among millions of our 
people, such that their bodies have no natural defence against attack by many 
viruses and bacteria (Mbeki, 2000).  
 
This seems like an obvious reference to the immune overload theory of AIDS: 
poverty causes the immune system to collapse, which makes individuals 
vulnerable to opportunistic infections. Further, the idea that Mbeki turned to 
non-mainstream AIDS scientists because there were gaps in the mainstream viral 
research programme is alluded to again in the same speech when he states:  
 
Some in our common world consider the questions I and the rest of our 
government have raised around the HIV-AIDS issue, the subject of the 
conference that you are attending, as akin to grave criminal and genocidal 
misconduct. What I hear being said repeatedly, stridently, angrily, is – do not 
ask questions!... As I listened to the whole story being told about our country, 
it seemed to me that we could not blame everything on a single virus (Mbeki, 
2000) [italics added]. 
 
The above quote, particularly the portion in italics, suggests that Mbeki was 
consulting non-mainstream scientists because he believed that there were 
aspects of the disease that required reference to concepts beyond the virus. 
Further support is added to this explanation of Mbeki’s action by comments in 
his welcome address to the members of the Presidential Advisory Panel. This 
speech begins with Mbeki quoting AIDS prevalence statistics from a then recent 
WHO (World Health Organisation) report, particularly that sub-Saharan Africans 
make up “85% of the global total [of people diagnosed with AIDS], even though 
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only one-tenth of the world population lives in sub-Saharan Africa” (Mbeki, 
2000a). This is the first suggestion that Mbeki was suspicious about the 
distribution of the disease. He then goes on to note that both the prevalence and 
the distribution of AIDS have changed in Sub-Saharan Africa, but not in the US or 
Europe. He takes this to be a strange outcome, and one that requires further 
investigation, which had not at that point been undertaken within the viral 
research programme. In Mbeki’s words:  
 
The situation has not changed in the United States up to today, nor in Western 
Europe with regard to homosexual transmission. But here [in southern 
Africa] it changed radically in a short period of time and increased radically in 
a short period of time. Why? This is obviously not an idle question for us 
because it bears very directly on this question: How should we respond? 
(Mbeki, 2000a).  
 
In this speech he also explicitly states that the reason the Presidential Panel had 
been assembled (and presumably the reason why non-mainstream AIDS 
scientists had been included on the panel) was to resolve these concerns. In this 
regard, Mbeki states that:   
 
It is truly our hope that this process will help us to get to some of the answers, 
so that as public representatives we are able to elaborate and help implement 
policies that are properly focused, and that actually have an effect. I'm quite 
certain that given the people who are participating in this panel, we will get to 
these answers (Mbeki, 2000a) [italics added]. 
 
These excerpts from Mbeki’s speeches indicate that it is plausible that Mbeki’s 
behaviour might be at least partially explained by reference to the divide 
between mono-causal and multi-causal accounts of disease, and the resultant 
emphasis that this placed on viral aspects of AIDS research, to the exclusion of 
socio-economic factors.  
 
Mark Gevisser (2007), Mbeki’s biographer, suggests that Mbeki himself viewed 
the problem in this way. Gevisser describes Mbeki’s thinking on this as follows:  
 
And then that word again: ‘paradigm’. Scientists and doctors are 
‘committed to a particular paradigm,’ he [Mbeki] told me [Gevisser], 
which is that a retrovirus is the sole cause of AIDS, and therefore that 
AIDS is best combated by antiretrovirals (ARVS), the exorbitant drugs 
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marketed by pharmaceutical companies rather than more cost-effective 
nutritional solutions. It is not, as he has repeatedly said, that he denies the 
existence of AIDS. But the question he insisted on asking – the question 
asked by the small group of AIDS-dissident scientists – was this: ‘What 
causes the collapse of these immune systems? Now the answer 
[commonly given] is a virus, but… if you look at the literature you can see 
that it’s actually wrong, to attribute collapse of immune systems which 
might be happening to millions in South Africa and elsewhere on the 
continent, to attribute it just to a virus.’ Scientists were ‘jumpy’ about the 
questions he was asking, Mbeki told me, because ‘what happens if this 
entire paradigm gets changed?’ (Gevisser, 2007 , pp. 727-728) 
 
Other writers on Mbeki’s denialism have made similar suggestions. Butler (2005) 
and Mosley (2004) both argue that the mono-causal/multi-causal divide might 
have underpinned Mbeki’s denialism (although they each use slightly different 
terminology to make this point). Butler (2005) remains neutral about the relative 
merits of these perspectives, and focuses instead on describing the context that 
allowed for the ascendancy of the multi-causal approach within the South African 
government at the time (amongst Mbeki and his supporters – more will be said 
on this in following chapter). Mosley (2004) argues that the mono-causal and 
multi-causal approaches are both legitimate perspectives to adopt toward 
disease, depending on what one is interested in – if you are interested in 
individual cases of the disease then you should focus on mono-causal viral 
descriptions of disease, but if you are interested in population level distributions 
of disease then you should go with a multi-causal epidemiological approach. As 
such, Mosley concludes that Mbeki’s decision to go with a more multi-causal 
approach might have been justified, because he made use of a legitimate 
alternative approach to thinking about disease.  
 
Van Rijn (2006) makes a similar point to Mosley, suggesting that ‘virological’ 
(mono-causal) and ‘epidemiological’ (multi-causal) perspectives both provide 
legitimate ways of viewing disease, and that Mbeki just happened to favour a 
more epidemiological approach. Further, Van Rijn seems to approve of Mbeki’s 
decision, because he argues that Mbeki moved the discussion about AIDS beyond 
purely viral concerns, which is taken to be a good thing. Van Rijn is unclear about 
what aspect of Mbeki’s behaviour he supports – presumably he means the 
inclusion of non-mainstream scientists on his advisory panel (given that this 
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would have shifted the debate) and not the policy decision of not making ARVs 
available (given that this was due to a rejection of the causal role the virus 
played, and didn’t just make the debate more inclusive of non-viral accounts of 
disease). Note that, even if Mbeki did not deny the causal role of the virus, he may 
nonetheless have made the mistake of focussing on the wrong cause when it 
came to intervening to prevent transmission in South Africa. Even if ‘immune 
overload’ is the relevant difference maker when it comes to explaining regional 
trends, it does not necessarily mean that this is the relevant cause to focus on 
when it comes to developing a policy to stop HIV transmission in South Africa, as 
the quote above from Mbeki suggests. 
 
Fassin (2007) similarly suggests that Mbeki’s behaviour might be explained by 
reference to the division between ‘viral’ (mono-causal) and ‘sociological’ (multi-
causal)39 accounts of the disease (p.15). However, he does not adopt Bulter’s 
value-neutral perspective on the division. Nor does he agree with Mosley that 
either approach is legitimate. He also does not follow Van Rijn’s suggestion that 
Mbeki productively advanced the discussion about AIDS beyond its purely viral 
elements. Instead, Fassin argues that the Mbeki case should put pressure on 
these underlying accounts of disease, such that an attempt should be made to 
unify the mono- and multi-causal approaches, stating that “one seeks a kind of 
third way, a means of making biological and social theories compatible” (p.15). I 
am sympathetic to Fassin’s position here, and much of the rest of this chapter will 
focus on trying to figure out what unifying these accounts would amount to.  
 
4.5. An attempt to resolve the mono-causal/multi-causal divide  
 
At this point we have seen that there are two prominent accounts of disease 
explanation on offer. The mono-causal account, which emphasises infectious 
                                                        
39 I am aware that “multi-causal” and “sociological” are not synonymous. However, given the 
emphasis on microbial sources of disease in the mono-causal account, and the idea that any 
account of disease that is not mono-causal (in the standard sense of being concerned with 
microbes) is multi-causal, it seems that Fassin is pointing to a multi-causal approach to thinking 
about HIV/AIDS when he uses the term “sociological”. His overall point here is just that we need 
to think about HIV/AIDS in a way that takes account of viral and non-viral drivers of disease at 
the same time.  
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microbially-based diseases, and the multi-causal account, as typified by the ‘web 
of causation’. We have also seen that it is unclear what the relationship between 
the mono-causal and multi-causal account of disease is or should be, and that this 
is a source of theoretical as well as practical concern (as illustrated by the Mbeki 
case). Although some cursory points have already been made about this issue, in 
this section I will look more closely at this relationship.  
 
There are at least three plausible descriptions of this relationship on offer: 1) the 
mono-causal and multi-causal accounts are just different approaches to explain 
different sorts of diseases; 2) the multi-causal approach subsumed the mono-
causal approach, and the microbial sources of disease were placed on the causal 
web as one type of cause amongst many; 3) the multi-causal account of disease 
subsumed the mono-causal account, but the causal salience of microbial causes 
was preserved. Each of these will be discussed in turn. 
 
4.5.1) Different accounts for different diseases  
 
One way of dealing with the fact that there two different available accounts of 
disease is to argue that they are just different approaches for explaining different 
sorts of diseases – the mono-causal approach is used to explain infectious, 
typically microbial diseases and is restricted to the realm of the biomedical bench 
sciences (virology, immunology, microbiology, etc.), and the multi-causal 
account, which explains CNCDs and is most closely linked to epidemiology. Russo 
suggests this as a possible interpretation when she states that: “[D]isease 
causation may be properly described by the mono-causal or the multi-causal 
model, but that depends on the disease at hand …” (Russo, 2011, p. 75-76). I 
suspect that this way of thinking about the relationship between these accounts 
of disease is the most descriptively accurate, or at least the one that best captures 
the way scientists were thinking in the HIV/AIDS case in the late 1980s and the 
1990s (see Gallo (1991), Oppenheimer (1992), and Fee and Krieger (1993) 
above). There are, however, a number of problems that result from adopting this 
approach, making it an undesirable way to think about this relationship. 
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 Given the preceding discussion, the most obvious problem is that it is unclear 
how one should deal with diseases that are clearly infectious, but for which 
socio-economic factors are causally relevant. This is an issue for the AIDS case, 
but it would also be a concern for dealing with any disease that involves both 
microbial and social components, such as cholera or TB. Indeed, for any disease, 
some details about behaviour and context are going to be causally relevant. Given 
the historical dominance of the mono-causal approach (Krieger, 1994), the 
microbial aspects of disease are likely to take priority, and maybe rightly so. 
However, if one is committed to the mono-causal and multi-causal accounts of 
disease being strictly distinct, then this results in the exclusion of potentially 
relevant socio-economic factors. 
 
Russo (2011) alludes to a related issue. A large part of the problem of ignoring 
socio-economic factors in order to be fully mono-causal about disease is that this 
results in non-microbial causes being ignored for the purposes of health policy 
development (Russo, 2011,p.90-91).40 It is, however, obviously not the case that 
being mono-causal about disease will result in socio-economic factors being 
ignored completely in policy. But then socio-economic concerns would need to be 
pursued in policy for reasons external to the disease in question.41 If one is really 
committed to mono-causalism about disease, then one cannot appeal to the role 
that socio-economic factors play in any particular disease in order to pursue 
policies to improve socio-economic conditions.  
 
One might be concerned that adopting a strictly mono-causal approach toward 
infectious diseases, especially in cases where it seems that socio-economic 
factors are actually at play, would leave one with an incomplete picture of the 
disease at hand. And this is conceptually unsatisfying.  
 
                                                        
40 See Fee and Krieger’s “Thinking and Rethinking AIDS: Implications for Health Policy” (1993) 
for a fascinating account of how thinking about AIDS through different paradigms in early AIDS 
science resulted in radically different policy approaches. 
41 It is likely that poor socio-economic conditions will be bad for people in lots of ways that have 
nothing to do with disease, and so there will be lots of non-disease related reasons that policy 
makers can appeal to in order to pursue policies that will improve these conditions. 
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4.5.2) The multi-causal account of disease subsumes the mono-causal 
account  
 
Broadbent (2009; 2013) suggests that the multi-causal account of disease 
subsumed the mono-causal account. This provides a second way of thinking 
about the relationship between mono-causal and multi-causal accounts of 
disease.  
 
On this description, the multi-causal account replaced the mono-causal account, 
such that the previously mono-causal sources of disease were placed on the web 
of causation as one cause amongst many. That is, the restrictions on the mono-
causal account were merely removed, leaving us with just the multi-causal 
model. Broadbent describes this as follows:  
 
A multifactorial approach could simply reject the strictures of the 
monocausal model, asserting that diseases have many causes... This is 
the bare multifactorial model: it consists of no positive assertions about 
disease causation, and places no restrictions on what causal structures are 
specific to disease (Broadbent, 2009, p. 306). 
 
This resolves the concern that was present when the mono-causal and multi-
causal accounts were strictly divided. That was, because (on that account) the 
mono-causal and multi-casual accounts were different descriptions of different 
types of disease, if one classed a disease as infectious and thus mono-causal, then 
one was unable to appeal to aspects of the multi-causal approach (such as socio-
economic drivers of disease). By removing the ‘one cause’ restriction from the 
mono-causal account and placing infectious agents on the ‘web of causation’, this 
problem no longer exists, because one is able to appeal to microbial and socio-
economic sources of disease within the same model.  
 
However, this is an obviously unsatisfying view of disease, because it fails to pick 
out the causal salience of microbial agents. Broadbent describes this problem as: 
“There is no discrimination and no hierarchy among causes, no ‘primarily caused 
by’ – just a ‘constellation’  of causes which may come together in one or more 
than one way to give rise to a case of a disease.” (Broadbent, 2013, pp. 154-155). 
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In the case of AIDS, this would mean that HIV is placed on the causal web along 
with all the other factors associated with the disease, such as poverty, 
malnutrition and migrant labour paths. However, this does not pick out the fact 
that HIV is more causally important to AIDS than the socio-economic drivers of 
the disease. We do not think that poverty is connected to AIDS in quite the same 
way as HIV (eliminating HIV would end AIDS, but eliminating poverty would 
not). Our model of disease should make this distinction clear.  
 
4.5.3) Joining mono-causal and multi-causal accounts. Preserving causal 
salience.  
 
Given the preceding discussion, what we want is an account of disease that 
unifies the mono-causal and multi-causal accounts (so that we can draw on 
explanatory tools from both), but which preserves the causal salience of certain 
factors (in the case of AIDS, HIV). There are two ways to attempt this resolution. 
The first is the epidemiological textbook approach, offered by Susser’s (1973) 
multi-level multi-causal model, which initially seems to be successful on both of 
these counts. However, it introduces philosophical problems related to levels, 
and it fails to account for how one ought to deal with causes that are the most 
salient to a particular disease but not the most proximal. The second way of 
attempting to join the two accounts is by treating this as a causal selection 
problem – i.e. how do we pick out the ‘causes’ from the ‘supporting factors’? Once 
it has been agreed that we are dealing with a causal selection problem, there are 
two approaches for selecting the salient causes. First, there is the standard 
philosophical approach, whereby salient causes are identified on the basis of the 
interests and perspective of the individual doing the selection, but this process 
lacks rigour. Second, there is Woodward’s (2011) approach, whereby causes are 
distinguished from so-called enabling conditions based on the ‘stability’ and 
‘specificity’ of the relevant factors, and on the basis of contrast cases. I will argue 
that Woodward’s approach is the most promising. 
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4.5.3.1 Susser’s multi-level multi-causal model 
 
I start by discussing Susser’s textbook epidemiological approach to the problem. 
Susser maintains that our account of disease should be multi-causal, but suggests 
that the central metaphor of the ‘web of causation’ be replaced with one of 
nested levels. The levels are determined by “systems”, where a system is:  
 
… [A] set or assembly of factors connected with each other in some form 
of coherent relationship. A system is an abstraction. It allows a set of 
related factors to be described in terms of coherent structure or coherent 
function (Susser, 1973, p. 48).  
 
Examples of systems include the cardiovascular system, made up of the heart and 
blood vessels; the body made up of many subsidiary biological systems; or a 
society made of many bodies. Part of what defines a system, on this account, is 
that coherent analysis can occur within its structural limits. For instance, a 
cardiologist might (hypothetically) be able to study the cardiovascular system by 
restricting her analysis to just its component parts, without recourse to other 
systems (such as the external political system) (Susser, 1973, p. 48).  
 
Despite the fact that each system is a conceptually self-contained unit, they are 
layered in a nested fashion and different systems interact. For example, smoke in 
the environmental system might damage the blood vessels in the cardiovascular 
system. Studies can therefore be conducted on either one of two axes – they can 
be horizontal, when analysis occurs entirely within a single system (the 
cardiologist conducts a horizontal study when she studies just the components of 
the cardiovascular system), or they can focus on the vertical axis, in which case 
the analysis cuts across multiple systems (an epidemiologist conducting a study 
on AIDS might pursue a vertical study looking at multiple systems at once– the 
immune system, the social system, etc.). Importantly, whether a study is 
horizontal or vertical, and which systems are assessed, depends on the subject of 
study (Susser, 1973, pp. 49-50).  
 
The distinction between horizontal and vertical studies becomes relevant for 
Susser’s view of causation. On his account, causation can either be ‘direct’ or 
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‘indirect’. Direct causation occurs when cause and effect operate within the same 
system level (Susser, 1973, p. 51). For instance, the calcified artery caused the 
heart to fail – the artery and the heart failure both occur within the 
cardiovascular system. Indirect causation occurs when cause and effect operate 
at different system levels. For instance, prolonged smoking causes the artery to 
calcify, which in turn causes the heart to fail. Smoking is an indirect cause of the 
heart failure, because the smoking and the heart failure occur within different 
system levels (smoking might occur at the behavioural level, while heart failure 
occurs at the level of the cardiovascular system).42 This latches on to the familiar 
idea in philosophy of chains of causation, where a cause is more indirect the 
further it is mediated by other causes in the chain. Reiss (2015) usefully borrows 
a quote from the television show Frasier to illustrate this point: 
 
Frasier: I cut myself because I was shaving without water. And why was 
there no water? Because I had to move your chair, which gouged the floor, 
which made me call Joe, who found bad pipes, who called for Cecil, who 
ate the cat that killed the rat that lived in the house that Frasier built! 
(Reiss, 2015, pp. 16-17) 
 
Frasier wants to claim that what caused him to cut himself was that he had to 
move the chair. But this would be a very indirect cause, given the number of 
intervening causes that are required to connect the chair to the cut (Reiss, 2015, 
p. 17).  
 
Susser’s layered account allows one to appeal to both microbial sources of 
disease and socio-economic factors within a single account, because both are 
included in the same model. Further, in the case of HIV, it picks out the causal 
salience of the virus, because both the virus and the T-Cells that are targeted by 
the virus exist at the same system level, and so the virus is the direct cause of the 
disease, thus making it the most salient cause in the explanation of the disease. 
This produces the correct result, because if we were able to remove the virus, we 
would also remove the disease and so the virus must actually be the most salient 
cause. However, socio-economic factors are still included in this aetiological 
                                                        
42 This is just an example to illustrate the point. It is not mean to be an accurate description of 
cardiology or the causes of heart attacks. 
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picture of the disease, as indirect causes. Perhaps malnutrition diminishes 
immune function, such that the individual is more susceptible to infection when 
they are exposed to the virus: malnutrition is thus an indirect cause of AIDS, and 
gets included in the causal explanation on Susser’s view.  
 
Susser’s account therefore seems to resolve both of the problems that had 
previously been identified. It unifies the mono-causal and multi-causal accounts 
of disease, and it allows for certain causes to be picked out as salient. As Russo 
(2011) points out, Susser’s account is a definite improvement on the ‘bare-
multifactoralism’ of the web of causation, but it also creates some philosophical 
concerns by introducing the notion of levels (Russo, 2011, p.68).  
 
Drawing on “levels” to resolve the divide between mono-causal and multi-causal 
accounts of disease introduces its own problems, because, as Craver (2007) 
points out, “the term ‘level’ is multiply ambiguous” (p. 163). In the special 
sciences, one can mean a number of different things when talking about levels:  
 
[T]here are levels of abstraction, analysis, behavior, complexity, 
description, explanation, function, generality, organization, science, and 
theory. Consequently, scientific and philosophical disputes about levels 
cannot be addressed, let alone resolved, without first sorting out which of 
the various senses of “level” is under discussion (Craver, 2007, p. 164).  
 
Given that Susser specifies that the content of his levels are “systems”, where a 
system is defined by a number of component parts operating together to fulfil a 
specific function (1973, p.48), it might seem clear that he takes levels to be 
functional. However, he goes on to state that “a system is an abstraction” (1973, 
p.48), which makes it seem as though he considers the levels in his account to be 
levels of abstraction. He later goes on to argue that different systems/levels are 
the subject of different academic disciplines, which makes it seem as though his 
levels are organised around (what Craver terms) the ‘products of science’ 
(Craver, 2007, p. 171). There is, therefore, some ambiguity surrounding the 
ontological status of Susser’s levels. It is also unclear what the nature of the 
relationship between the levels on this account is. Susser tells us that different 
levels can interact with each other, but not much else. As Russo (2011) suggests, 
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Susser offers an improvement on “bare multi-factoralism”, but this account 
comes with its own problems.  
 
Further, even if we were able to sort out the ontological problems with Susser’s 
account (which seems conceivable if some more effort were directed at 
precision), his account suffers from a more difficult problem, which is that it 
cannot account for causes that are indirect, yet salient. For instance, look at the 
role of smoking in the causal picture of lung cancer. Smoking damages the cells 
that line the lungs, and the damaged cells cause lung cancer. On Susser’s account, 
smoking would only be an indirect (and thus less salient) cause of lung cancer, 
because it operates on a different system level to the effect. The direct cause of 
lung cancer would be the damaged cells in the lung lining. But smoking is a more 
salient cause of cancer than the damaged cells, but Susser’s account cannot pick 
out causes that are indirect yet salient. 
 
4.5.3.2 Causes and enabling conditions 
 
An alternative way of trying to unify the mono-causal and multi-causal accounts 
of disease, while still preserving the causal salience of microbial sources of illness 
might be to distinguish between causes and enabling conditions/background 
conditions. Cheng and Novick explain this distinction by way of example as 
follows:  
 
Consider a particular plane crash for which the malfunctioning of a 
component and gravity were necessary factors. These two factors hold the 
same logical relationship to the effect in terms of necessity and 
sufficiency: the crash would not have occurred either if the component 
had not malfunctioned or if there had been no gravity; moreover, the 
malfunctioning of the component and gravity, along with other necessary 
factors such as the failure of a backup system, were jointly sufficient to 
have produced the crash (Cheng & Novick, 1991, p. 84).  
 
The idea is that if an aeronautical engineer were asked what caused the crash, 
they would say the malfunctioning part did, not that gravity caused the crash. 
The malfunctioning part is the ‘cause’ of the crash, while gravity is just an 
enabling condition.   
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However, it is unclear how one ought to pick out ‘causes’ from the enabling 
conditions. The standard philosophical position has been that we pick out the 
‘causes’ pragmatically, based on our viewpoint and our aims. Mosley (2004) in 
his discussion of the Mbeki case represents the standard philosophical approach 
as follows:  
 
What is considered the cause may also be relative to the point of view of 
the inquirer. From the point of view of the peasant farmer, the cause of his 
crop failure might be identified with God causing the river to flood his 
farmland because of the farmer’s sinfulness; from the point of view of the 
agricultural planner, the cause might be the government’s refusal to 
construct the dam he had recommended. The peasant may view the 
government’s incompetence as normal, a “mere condition” of his social 
existence. While for the planner, the recurrent floods are normal, and the 
government’s failure to act accounts for the farmer’s misfortune (Mosley, 
2004, p. 403).  
 
Additionally, Woodward (2011) describes the mainstream philosophical 
approach to the problem thus:  
 
[M]any philosophers have claimed that there is no “objective” basis for the 
distinction between causes and conditions, and that distinction instead 
has to do with what the speakers or their audiences find the most salient, 
interesting, important, or satisfying (Woodward, 2011, p. 247).  
 
However, the view that what counts as the causes relative to the enabling 
conditions is entirely dependent on the perspective of the individual making the 
decision is also problematic. Lurie and Rosenthal (2010) in their discussion of 
the HIV/AIDS case note that “understanding the main drivers of the epidemic is 
important in shaping future outreach programs, prioritizing interventions, and 
determining appropriate resource allocation” (p. 18). Deciding which factors are 
the causes and which are merely enabling conditions has a real impact on which 
policies are adopted and how resources are allocated. It would be preferable if 
there were a more rigorous way of making this distinction than merely leaving it 
up to the sole discretion of the person who is deciding. Indeed, Mosley (2004) 
uses the standard philosophical approach to this problem to argue that Mbeki 
was adopting just one permissible viewpoint amongst many. 
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Woodward (2011) offers a suggestion for how we might approach the problem of 
causal selection more objectively. He suggests that when trying to differentiate 
between ‘the cause’ and its enabling conditions, we might consider issues of 
stability and specificity; where stable causal relations are those that hold across 
changes to various background conditions, and a specific cause is one where 
there is a systematic dependence between it and its effect. The notion of 
specificity might be less clear than that of stability, and Woodward provides a 
useful illustration to clarify. The example is of a copier and the specific print outs 
that it produces; the idea is that although the machine must be on in order for 
any copies to be made (a background condition), the specific copies that will be 
produced are systematically dependent on the text that is input – the input text is 
the specific cause of the resulting copies (Woodward, 2011, pp. 251-252). 
Woodward is careful to point out that he does not intend for these to be 
necessary and sufficient conditions for selecting causes from enabling conditions, 
but rather he takes these to be considerations that one might refer to when 
making this assessment. Additionally, Woodward notes that what counts as a 
cause rather than enabling condition is often due to the relative contrast case 
that is chosen: “C’s being in state 𝑐1rather than state 𝑐2 causes E’s being in state 
𝑒1 rather than state 𝑒2” (Woodward, 2011, p. 254). However, unlike the standard 
position on selecting contrastive cases, which again argues that this is entirely a 
subjective and pragmatic process (Reiss, 2015, p. 140), Woodward argues that 
the contrast case itself is selected by keeping in mind the considerations of 
stability and specificity (Woodward, 2011, p. 255). 
 
Does this help us to better understand the relative importance of various causally 
relevant factors in the southern African AIDS epidemic? Importantly, does it 
allow us to pick out the causal salience of microbial sources of illness? 
Woodward’s considerations do seem to help in this regard. Importantly, all of the 
factors that epidemiologists typically argue for as the ‘drivers’ of the epidemic in 
southern Africa (poverty, migrant labour routes, etc.) can be included in the 
causal picture as ‘causally relevant factors’ – where causal relevance is 
understood thus:  
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 C [the purported causally relevant factor] is causally relevant to E [the 
effect] if, were the value of C to be different in some appropriate way, then 
the value of E would be different”(Woodward, 2011, p. 248).   
 
Further, it seems as though we are able to use the considerations of stability and 
specificity to pick out the relative causal salience of HIV in the aetiological 
account of AIDS. HIV is a stable cause of AIDS, in that we could alter many of the 
other causally relevant factors to the epidemic (alleviate poverty, cut off the 
migrant labour paths, etc.) and still have HIV producing AIDS. Additionally, HIV is 
a very specific cause of AIDS – while poverty might produce general ill-health, 
HIV produces AIDS in particular. Woodward’s account of causal selection 
therefore offers a promising way to understand the relationship between mono-
causal and multi-causal accounts of disease, in that it allows us to include socio-
economic causal factors in our explanation, while still maintaining the relative 
causal salience of microbes to explaining infectious diseases. 
 
Additionally, Woodward’s comments on contrast cases are also relevant. He 
emphasises that what we are interested in is the differences in the variables 
values: why is E (the effect) in state 𝑒1 rather than state 𝑒2? When trying to 
explain the disproportionate prevalence of AIDS in southern Africa we might be 
interested in at least two relevant contrast cases: the case of AIDS in 
contemporary South Africa versus the case of AIDS in the contemporary United 
States and western Europe; and the case of AIDS in contemporary South Africa 
versus the case of AIDS in South Africa in 1986 (when prevalence was at less than 
0.1% (Steinberg, 2011)). Mbeki seems to be gesturing toward this point himself 
in a quote cited earlier in this chapter when he states that:  
 
The situation has not changed in the United States up to today, nor in Western 
Europe with regard to homosexual transmission. But here [in southern 
Africa] it changed radically in a short period of time and increased radically in 
a short period of time. Why? This is obviously not an idle question for us 
because it bears very directly on this question: How should we respond? 
(Mbeki, 2000a).  
 
Note that he highlights both the contrast between South Africa and the United 
States and western Europe on the one side, and the contrast between 
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contemporary South Africa and South Africa of the recent past (by emphasising 
the short time period over which the change occurred) on the other. He is also 
clearly aware that identifying the correct contrast is important for pursuing the 
correct policy (“This is obviously not an idle question for us because it bears very 
directly on this question: How should we respond?” (Mbeki, 2000a))  
 
When we compare the case of AIDS in contemporary South Africa to its relevant 
contrast cases, particular causes stand out as more important than others. What 
differs between the case of AIDS in South Africa in 2000 when compared to AIDS 
in South Africa in 1986? South Africa in 1986 was subject to sanctions and so 
relatively isolated from HIV, when the sanctions were lifted the country became 
more exposed to the virus. Poverty in South Africa was a constant factor from 
1986 through to 2000, while the virus was new. HIV is the salient difference-
maker. What differs between the case of AIDS in South Africa in 2000 versus the 
case of AIDS in the United States or Western Europe in 2000? Based on the 
discussion above, one plausible difference maker between those cases is likely to 
be poverty. HIV is going to remain the most salient cause due to specificity and 
stability (which do not apply to poverty in the case of AIDS), but the contrast 
between South Africa and the United States and western Europe highlights that 
paying attention to poverty would be relevant to dealing with AIDS in South 
Africa in terms of policy interventions.  
 
Woodward’s account therefore helps us both to unify the mono-causal and multi-
causal accounts, while still allowing us to pick out some causal factors as more 
salient than others. It also allows us to do so in a more rigorous way than the 
philosophical alternatives, in which causal selection is completely up to the 
interests and aims of the individual doing the choosing. Woodward, despite not 
providing us with a completely objective set of criteria for making the selection, 
does at least offer us guiding principles that should be taken into account – 
stability, specificity, and the difference makers when a particular case is 
compared to its contrasts – thus making this process more rigorous.  
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4.6. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have argued that there is some ambiguity surrounding the 
relationship between mono-causal and multi-causal accounts of disease (in both 
the descriptive and the normative sense). Further, that this confusion helps us to 
better understand Thabo Mbeki’s HIV/AIDS denialism in South Africa the early 
2000s. On this description, Mbeki noted that there were aspects of AIDS that 
could not be explained on the strictly mono-causal account of the disease, and so 
he turned to non-mainstream scientists, who were more multi-causal in their 
approach, but who ultimately rejected the causal role of the virus in the 
development of AIDS. If this is the correct description of the Mbeki case, then this 
should put pressure on the mono-causal and multi-causal accounts of disease, 
such that an effort ought to be made to integrate the two approaches. Various 
ways of doing this were discussed, and it was concluded that Susser’s multi-level 
multi-causal account is promising; because it allows us to unify the mono-causal 
and multi-causal accounts, while still preserving the causal salience of microbial 
sources of disease. However, Susser’s model creates some philosophical 
problems, because it is unclear what the ontological status of the levels is or what 
the relationship between the levels might be, and it does not allow for causes to 
be both salient and not proximal. Rather, it was suggested that this is better 
thought of as a causal selection problem – that is, the problem is one of how to 
select the ‘causes’ from the ‘enabling conditions’. The standard philosophical 
response to the problem has been that the choice is a pragmatic one, based 
entirely on the viewpoint and interests of whoever happens to be doing the 
choosing. This is not particularly rigorous. Woodward provides a more promising 
account of how we should select the salient causes, which is that we should keep 
in mind the criteria of stability and specificity, and that we should consider the 
relevant contrast cases. This is not perfectly rigorous, but at least he provides us 
with some elements to consider, rather than leaving it entirely to the discretion 
of the individual doing the selection process. This also helps us with the problem 
of trying to develop a multi-causal account of disease explanation that still 
maintains the salience of microbial causes. On Woodward’s picture, the social 
drivers of disease would all be included as ‘enabling factors’, and microbial 
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causes would be picked out as salient because of their stable and specific 
relationship to disease.  
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5. Moral Responsibility, Culpable Ignorance and Suppressed 
Disagreement  
 
“Thabo Mbeki is a prophet-in-the-wilderness. This is what gets him up in the 
morning. This is what gets him through the day. He was the one who said, when 
nobody else believed it, that the ANC had to embrace the market and the West if it 
was to survive. He was deeply unpopular for it, but he was proven right. He was the 
one who said, at the height of the conflict, ‘Lay down your guns and talk to the 
enemy.’ He was called a traitor, an impimpi, a black Englishman in tweeds. But he 
was right, again. Now, in the era of the dream deferred, in the difficult transition, he 
found himself once more in a tiny minority of free thinking dissidents. Once more, he 
might be overwhelmed by conventional thinking. But once more, in the long run – 
he believes, with absolute conviction – that he will be proven correct.”  (Gevisser, 
2007 , p. 735) 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
In the previous two chapters I have focussed on taking Mbeki’s position 
seriously, and assessing whether it was reasonable for him to have adopted it. In 
this chapter I shift emphasis and focus on blameworthiness. In particular, I 
explore the problem of suppressed disagreement in the context of culpable 
ignorance.   
 
The puzzle is as follows. Expressed disagreements place an obligation on the 
agent to pay attention to the dissenting interlocutor, or risk culpable ignorance 
for which they might later be found blameworthy. Silence, on the other hand, is 
typically taken as assent. However, in cases of suppressed disagreement, the 
silenced interlocutor has information that could save the agent from ignorance in 
scenarios where that ignorance might lead to harmful action, and silence does 
not actually indicate assent. The problem is further complicated because the 
agent might not be aware of the fact that a silenced interlocutor has information 
that could prevent ignorance, and consequent harmful action. This chapter will 
provide an account of the obligations on agents in cases of suppressed 
disagreement. This is particularly relevant to the Mbeki case, because members 
of his political party had information that could have prevented his ignorance, 
but their disagreement was suppressed.  
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This chapter is structured as follows. I begin by explaining the relationship 
between moral responsibility, culpable ignorance and disagreement, and I 
introduce the problem of suppressed disagreements. I then look at the standard 
philosophical response to examples of suppressed disagreement, which has been 
to distinguish between cases of actual disagreement (disagreement that someone 
has actually expressed) and merely possible disagreement (disagreement that 
has not been expressed by anybody, but is possible in the modal sense – there is a 
possible world in which an interlocutor disagrees). However, as has been 
correctly pointed out in the literature, giving epistemic weight to merely possible 
disagreement leads to strange consequences and should be avoided. Instead, I 
propose distinguishing between expressed disagreements, and suppressed actual 
disagreements (instances in which someone does actually disagree with the 
agent, but has been unable to express that disagreement due to suppression). I 
will argue that in certain circumstances there will be markers that suppression 
has occurred (such as silence when one would expect there to be debate). 
Depending on the context, and the role of the agent in that context, the agent 
might have an obligation to be on the lookout for the markers of suppression. I 
also argue that the agent will be additionally blameworthy if they created the 
conditions under which suppression occurred. I conclude by applying the lessons 
from the rest of the chapter to the Mbeki case; assessing whether he actually 
suppressed disagreement, and the implications for his blameworthiness.  
 
5.2. Moral Responsibility, Culpable Ignorance and Disagreement 
 
When you undertake an action with harmful consequences you might be found 
blameworthy for it (Smith, 1983, p. 543). Being blameworthy, on at least one 
popular account, means that we can legitimately adopt certain negative reactive 
attitudes toward you – such as anger, resentment, and disappointment 
(Strawson, 1962/2008) – and that it would be appropriate for you to adopt 
negative reactive attitudes toward yourself – such as regret, guilt, and remorse 
(Williams, 1981 ; Fischer & Ravizza, 1998, pp. 5-7; Levy, 2005, p. 2).43 
                                                        
43 However, it should be noted that Williams thought it would be appropriate to adopt negative 
reactive attitudes toward oneself even if one is not blameworthy for the action. On Williams’s 
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Blameworthiness is distinct from merely being accountable for your actions. 
Accountability tracks whether the harmful action can be causally attributed to 
the agent, while blameworthiness tracks the appropriateness of adopting 
negative reactive attitudes towards them. If you put arsenic in my tea and it kills 
me, then you are accountable. However, ignorance frequently excuses in moral 
cases (Rosen, 2004, p. 298; Smith, 1983; Zimmerman, 1997; Strawson, 2008, p. 3; 
Alvarez & Littlejohn, Forthcoming; Aristotle, NE1113b24-16). For instance, if the 
sugar in your sugar bowl underwent a freak chemical transformation that 
created the arsenic, and you did not know that this had occurred when you put it 
into my tea, then you would not be blameworthy for my death. However, 
ignorance only excuses if it is itself blameless. If you had been storing arsenic in 
your sugar bowl and had just forgotten about it when preparing my tea, then 
your ignorance is blameworthy (because it is the result of negligence) and so it 
does not provide an excuse for your action. It does not get you off the hook 
morally.44  
 
One can avoid culpable ignorance45 by satisfying one’s ‘procedural epistemic 
obligations’. This is the requirement that one should take due care when forming 
beliefs that inform actions with potentially harmful consequences  (Rosen, 2004, 
p. 301). In Rosen’s words:  
 
Now among the required precautions against negligent harm are certain 
epistemic precautions. As you move through the world you are required to 
take certain steps to inform yourself about matters that might bear on the 
permissibility of your conduct.  You are obliged to keep your eyes on the 
road while driving, to seek advice before launching a war and to think 
seriously about the advice you’re given; to see to it that dangerous 
substances are clearly labelled, and so on. These obligations are your 
procedural epistemic obligations… As I understand them, these 
procedural obligations are always obligations to do (or to refrain from 
doing) certain things: to ask certain questions, to take careful notes, to 
stop and think, to focus one’s attention in certain directions, etc. The 
procedural obligation is not itself an obligation to know or believe this or 
                                                                                                                                                               
account, so long as the agent is causally responsible for the outcome, even if they aren’t 
blameworthy for it, they should feel ‘agent regret’.  
44 The arsenic case is taken from Rosen (2004, p. 399-400). 
45 Note that the term “culpable ignorance” will be used throughout. This has the same meaning as 
“blameworthy ignorance”, but better tracks the standard use in the literature.  
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that. It is an obligation to take steps to ensure that when the time comes to 
act, one will know what one ought to know (2004, p. 301). 
 
One way to take care when forming beliefs is to pay attention when an epistemic 
peer – someone with similar levels of reasoning ability and access to evidence as 
you  (Kelly, 2005, pp. 173-174) – disagrees. For instance, imagine that you are a 
high-ranking member of the army trying to decide whether to bomb a site and 
you have a thermo-imaging map to help you make the decision. You notice that 
there is a warm spot to the side of the map and conclude that the heat pattern is 
consistent with there being a weapons manufacturing plant in that location. Your 
colleague, who has the same training as you and is looking at the same map, 
disagrees and suggests that the heat pattern is also consistent with the site being 
a hospital. You should pay attention to what your disagreeing colleague has to 
say.46 Otherwise, you risk being culpably ignorant and morally blameworthy if 
things go very badly wrong (in this case, if it turns out that it was really a hospital 
and not a weapons factory).  
 
Now consider a completely different case. A tyrannical dictator kills off any 
would-be dissenters before they have a chance to disagree with him. On some 
particular issue there would have been considerable disagreement, but because 
everyone who would have disagreed is now dead, there is nobody to give 
expression to that disagreement (Kelly, 2005, pp. 181-182). We can imagine that 
the dictator undertakes some harmful action (completely independently of his 
initial killing of the would-be dissidents) on the basis of a belief that went 
uncontested. However, as noted above, ignorance can provide an excuse for 
seemingly blameworthy action – perhaps he did not know that the action would 
have the harmful consequences that it did. In which case, we need to assess 
whether the ignorance itself was blameworthy, and the dictator might argue in 
response that he satisfied his procedural epistemic obligations by looking out for 
disagreeing interlocutors, but that no disagreement was forthcoming (because 
                                                        
46 For a defense of the position that one should pay attention when an epistemic peer disagrees, 
see Christensen (2007). There is considerable disagreement about what one ought to do in the 
face of peer disagreement, but almost everyone agrees that one should at least pay attention to 
one’s diagreeing interlocutors (assuming they are your epistemic peers or superiors) (Worsnip, 
2014, p.1).  
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everyone who would have disagreed is dead). Would we be convinced by his 
excuse from ignorance? It seems unlikely that we would (or that we should). 
 
Cases of suppressed disagreement, like this, are puzzling. Expressed 
disagreement from one’s epistemic peers creates an obligation to pay attention 
to that disagreement (Christensen, 2007 ; Feldman, 2006 ; Elga, 2007). Silence, 
on the other hand, is often taken as agreement with what has been asserted 
(Goldberg, Forthcoming; Goldberg, 2010; Goldberg, 2010a). But taking silence as 
agreement in cases of suppressed disagreement would be a troubling outcome. 
The implication would be that if we were able to silence potentially disagreeing 
interlocutors before they have a chance to actually express disagreement that 
would make our ignorance less culpable and our resulting actions less 
blameworthy. Or as Lammenranta phrases the problem:“[t]his would mean that 
we could gain knowledge by killing our opponents” (Lammenranta, 2011, p. 211) 
– presumably, he means so long as we manage to kill off our opponents before 
they have a chance to express their disagreement. This is clearly the wrong 
outcome, so we need to think more carefully about how to formulate the 
requirement to take account of epistemic peers.   
 
The problem of suppressed disagreement is an issue in the Mbeki case. Part of 
what seems to have gone wrong in this case is that he failed to be appropriately 
receptive to disagreement with his view (as indicated by the opening quote of 
this chapter). If correct, this would make his ignorance culpable and his resulting 
actions blameworthy. The most obvious form of disagreement that he should 
have paid attention to came from the scientific community in the form of the 
Durban Declaration – a petition signed by over 5,000 scientists affirming the 
mainstream view on HIV and AIDS (Durban Declaration, 2000). But, on a 
charitable reading of the Mbeki case, he was confused about who the experts 
were, thinking that the denialists had a genuine claim to scientific expertise, and 
that they had been unfairly marginalised by the scientific community. The 
petition would have done nothing more than restate one position in the AIDS 
debate as far as Mbeki was concerned. Thus, when he looked to his epistemic 
superiors for guidance on what to do (which he did when he assembled the 
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Presidential Advisory Panel) he got what looked like contradictory advice. The 
debate thus shifts a level, and instead of being directly about the issues of 
scientific fact, it becomes a debate about which scientists to trust. As Coady  
(2006 ) argues, being able to assess who the experts are is a task which itself 
requires expertise (p. 71). In assessing which scientists to trust, Mbeki should 
have turned to his epistemic peers for guidance. 
 
But why pay attention to epistemic peers in what is essentially an expert debate? 
Suppose that I am a philosopher and I don’t know anything about cars. My 
epistemic peers are all philosophers too and they also don’t know anything about 
cars. I think I need a new car battery. My epistemic peers disagree, but my 
mechanic agrees with me. Disagreement from my epistemic peers in this case is 
irrelevant. The reason why disagreement from my epistemic peers is irrelevant is 
because there is a clear epistemic superior (someone with more/better evidence, 
or better reasoning skills than me) to whom I ought to defer.  
 
Imagine a slightly different case. I am a philosopher who knows nothing about 
cars. This is the first time that something has gone wrong with my car. I think it 
needs a new battery, but because my car has always run well, I don’t have the 
details of a reliable mechanic that I can contact for advice. In this case it seems 
like a completely appropriate epistemic strategy for me to ask around the 
philosophy department tearoom to see if anyone has the number for a good 
mechanic. When there is no obvious epistemic superior to defer to, then 
consulting one’s epistemic peers on which experts to trust is a good strategy.  
 
In the Mbeki case, his epistemic peers on the question of which scientists to trust 
would plausibly have been other members of his political party (the ANC) – it is 
reasonable to assume that they had similar levels of reasoning ability to Mbeki 
and access to similar evidence, thus making them his epistemic peers on this 
topic. However, when we look at state of disagreement from within the party, 
there is eerie silence from within the ANC caucus. Commentators on the case 
argue that the silence was the result of members of the party fearing Mbeki, even 
though they did actually disagree with him (Steinberg, 2017, forthcoming, p.5; 
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Feinstein, 2009).47 But why single out members of his political party as the 
interlocutors to pay attention to, when there was substantial and actually 
expressed disagreement from other groups?  
 
Let us briefly have a look at the state of disagreement with Mbeki’s view, in order 
focus in on why the state of debate within the ANC was so important, and thus 
why the issue of suppressed disagreement is relevant for understanding this 
case.  As already noted, there was disagreement from the scientific community in 
the form of the Durban Declaration, but from Mbeki’s perspective this was just a 
restatement of one side of a contested debate, with the Declaration merely 
endorsing the more popular view. There was substantial disagreement from the 
international press with his view (see Herbst (2005) and Johnson (2007) for 
examples of this), but Mbeki might plausibly have dismissed the press as being 
his epistemic inferiors in this case – they did not have access to the same 
evidence he had in the form of the expert testimony he received from the 
Presidential Panel (the Panel’s meetings were closed to the press, except for the 
opening and closing events (Cherry, 2009)). There was also disagreement from 
civil society groups, most notably the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) – the 
activist group who won the court case against the Department of Health that 
eventually made ARVs publically available (see Chapter 2)  (Geffen, 2010; 
Nattrass, 2007 ), but again he might have dismissed them as his epistemic 
inferiors, because they did not have access to the evidence that he had.48 
 
Mbeki also believed that the international community and local civil society 
groups were biased, and that their views on AIDS were motivated by racism 
(Fassin & Schneider, 2003, p. 496). The concern about racism being attached to 
beliefs about AIDS was not without historical precedent. The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in the early days of South African democracy 
                                                        
47 There is some controversy over whether this is the correct way to understand what happened 
in the case. This will be pursued later in this chapter.  
48 I am sceptical of characterising civil society groups in this way, given the compelling case that 
Epstein gives for how AIDS-orientated civil society groups gained substantial expertise in the 
United States (Epstein, 1996), and the evidence that a very similar process took place in the TAC 
(Geffen, 2010; Stephen, 2009 p.174). But for the sake of a charitable interpretation, I will take this 
to have been the case.  
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uncovered that experiments had been conducted by the apartheid state in an 
effort to create biological weapons to target the black majority (with particular 
emphasis on sexually transmitted diseases, and with the aim of causing sterility). 
When that project failed, HIV positive prostitutes were allegedly planted on the 
mines, with the intention that this would facilitate the transmission of the virus 
throughout the migrant labour paths associated with the industry. Senior 
members of the apartheid state also expressed approval of HIV, hoping that it 
would “eliminate” the black majority (Fassin & Schneider, 2003, p. 496; Van der 
Vliet, 2001, p. 156). 
 
While it seems like a stretch to link the apartheid state’s racist attitudes about 
AIDS to the views of the international community and to civil society groups, it is 
clear that Mbeki felt that these groups were biased in similar ways.49 In the 
Castro Hlongwane document (the anonymous AIDS denialist monograph that was 
circulated in parliament in 2002, and for which Mbeki finally claimed authorship 
in 2016) it is argued that there are large financial gains for the “global north” if 
HIV causes AIDS and if there is an AIDS crisis in southern Africa, not just for the 
pharmaceutical industry (and their associated governments) who would make 
large profits from the sale of drugs; but also for the global health “industry” of 
NGOs and international organisations, who receive grant money and salaries on 
the back of the African AIDS crisis. From Mbeki’s perspective, pharmaceutical 
companies, their governments, international health organisations, NGOS and the 
press from global north were all untrustworthy because of their vested interests 
in the existence of the disease, and it being treatable via antiretroviral therapy. 
Further, these financial incentives had a racialised component. The following 
section taken from the Castro Hlongwane document shows how Mbeki saw the 
connection between the financial incentives attached to the African AIDS 
epidemic and the racist beliefs about African sexuality that helped to support the 
financial bias:  
 
                                                        
49 Fassin (2007) provides an extensive account of how apartheid era racism surrounding AIDS 
later became connected to suspicion surrounding AIDS during the denialism year in his book, 
When Bodies Remember. 
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[T]he conviction has taken firm hold that sub-Saharan Africa will surely be 
wiped out by an HIV/AIDS pandemic unless, most important of all, we 
must access anti-retroviral drugs. This urgent and insistent call is made by 
some of the friends of the Africans, who are intent that the Africans must 
be saved from a plague worse than the Black Death of many centuries ago. 
For their part, the Africans believe this story, as told by their friends. They 
too shout the message that – yes, indeed, we are as you say we are! Yes, 
we are sex-crazy! Yes, we are diseased! Yes, we spread the deadly HI [sic] 
Virus through our uncontrolled heterosexual sex! In this regard, yes we 
are different from the US and Western Europe! Yes, we, the men, abuse 
women and the girl-child with gay abandon! Yes, among us rape is 
endemic because of our culture! Yes, we do believe that sleeping with 
young virgins will cure us of AIDS! Yes, as a result of all this, we are 
threatened with destruction by the HIV/AIDS pandemic! Yes, what we 
need, and cannot afford, because we are poor, are condoms and anti-
retroviral drugs! Help!  (Anonymous, 2002) 
 
He was similarly distrustful of local civil society groups. In a public lecture at the 
University of Fort Hare in 2001 he made the following statement (clearly about 
the TAC):  
 
And thus does it happen that others who consider themselves to be our 
leaders take to the streets carrying their placards, to demand that because 
we are germ carriers, and human beings of a lower order that cannot 
subject its passions to reason, we must perforce adopt strange opinions, 
to save a depraved and diseased people from perishing from self-inflicted 
disease (Mbeki, 2001). 
 
It is clear from the above statement that Mbeki took the TAC’s stance on AIDS to 
be motivated by racist views of African sexuality. Steinberg points out that this 
was not helped by the fact that most of the senior leadership of the TAC were 
white, thus making the clash between a black government and a white-led civil 
society group seem especially liable to interpretations of racism (Steinberg, 
2017, forthcoming). 
 
While there was substantial disagreement from a variety of groups with Mbeki at 
the time, we can see that he might dismiss them as his epistemic inferiors due to 
their not having access to as much evidence as he had, and he suspected that 
racist and financial biases motivated their disagreement. Goldman (2001) argues 
that if you have evidence that a purported expert is biased, then it is legitimate to 
downgrade your trust in their testimony (p. 93). Presumably the same 
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considerations would also apply to those further down the epistemic food chain – 
we should place less trust in anyone who we have reason to suspect of being 
biased. So while Mbeki might have thought there was reason to doubt various 
forms of disagreement with his view, he could not dismiss other senior members 
of the ANC as easily. They would have had access to the same (or very similar) 
evidence, and there was also no reason for him to suspect them of being racially 
biased – they were his “comrades” in the struggle against apartheid, and they 
were now leading the newly democratic South Africa. Members of Mbeki’s 
political party thus occupy a unique position in the South African AIDS debate in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, in that they are the one group of individuals who 
could have disagreed with Mbeki with unquestionable moral legitimacy (from 
Mbeki’s perspective). However, singling out Mbeki’s fellow ANC members as the 
ones to pay attention to makes things complicated, because disagreement from 
within the party was suppressed. 
 
This looks remarkably similar to Kelly’s tyrannical dictator, in that both are cases 
of suppressed disagreement. The following section will outline the philosophical 
reactions to Kelly’s dictator case to see if they provide any useful advice on how 
to handle the Mbeki case, given the striking similarity between the two cases. 
 
5.3. Is there a distinction between actual and merely possible 
disagreement?  
 
In this section I provide an outline of the debate that has arisen in response to 
Kelly’s example of the tyrannical dictator – in particular, the question of whether 
‘merely possible disagreement’ should be afforded the same epistemic status as 
‘actual disagreement’. This is relevant to the broader project of this chapter 
because if it is the case that possible disagreement is as epistemically weighty as 
actual disagreement, then this would solve the challenge posed by the cases of 
the tyrannical dictator and Mbeki. In both cases, if merely possible disagreement 
were as epistemically important as actual disagreement, then they should have 
been on the lookout for possible disagreements with their view; they were not, 
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and so their ignorance is culpable and they are blameworthy. However, as will be 
seen, this route out of the problem is not available. 
 
Kelly takes his example of the tyrant to indicate that there is no distinction 
between actually articulated disagreement and merely possible disagreement.  
What matters for determining whether a disagreement should threaten one’s 
existing beliefs, he argues, is the strength of the arguments and the evidence put 
forward in support of that disagreement – regardless of whether the 
disagreement is actual or merely possible. As such, the disagreement itself is 
irrelevant and one should focus on the arguments and evidence that could be 
levelled against a particular belief, not the disagreements themselves (Kelly, 
2005, pp. 181-182). Kelly:  
 
Whether we find the possibility of disagreement intellectually 
threatening, I suggest, will and should ultimately depend on our 
considered judgments about how rational the merely possible dissenters 
might be in so dissenting. And our assessment of whether rational dissent 
is possible with respect to some question (or our assessment of the extent 
to which such dissent might be rational) will depend in turn on our 
assessment of the strength of the evidence and arguments that might be 
put forward on behalf of such dissent. But if this is correct, then the extent 
to which merely possible dissent should be seen as intellectually 
threatening effectively reduces to questions about the strength of the 
reasons that might be put forward on behalf of such dissent… The role of 
disagreement, whether possible or actual, ultimately proves superfluous 
or inessential with respect to the case of scepticism (Kelly, 2005, pp. 181-
182).  
 
The way that Kelly sets up the argument leaves us with something of a dilemma. 
Kelly uses the case of the tyrannical dictator to argue that there is no difference 
between merely possible disagreement and actual disagreement, which in turn 
he uses to cast doubt on testimony as a form of evidence – it is not the testimony 
that matters, it is the underlying arguments and evidence that matter. If we side 
with Kelly, then it is unclear why an agent would have any obligation to pay 
attention to disagreeing interlocutors, because testimony (in general) is not a 
form of evidence, and disagreement (a particular type of testimony) does not 
matter. At first glance, this leaves us at a loss for how to deal with a large portion 
of cases that seem like they should be cases of culpable ignorance. Kelly might 
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argue that in these cases the agent should have thought about whether someone 
would have good reasons for dissent, but he places a lot of faith in the abilities of 
ordinary epistemic agents to anticipate all the possible reasons for dissent and 
treat them with appropriate weight. If we want to resist Kelly (and hang on to the 
position that neglecting peer disagreement is a route to culpable ignorance), then 
it seems as though we need to reject the claim that actual disagreement and 
merely possible disagreement are on par. But then we lack the resources to deal 
with the tyrannical dictator case. Even though Kelly’s position is plausible – it is 
the arguments and the evidence that matter, not the testimony itself50 – Kelly 
asks too much of reasoners that they anticipate all counter-examples – testimony 
continues to have an important role to play. In this section I will focus on the 
other horn of the dilemma. I argue that actual disagreement and merely possible 
disagreement should not be put on a par, but I will also show that this does not 
actually strip us of the intellectual resources to deal with the tyrannical dictator 
and Mbeki cases.  
 
In the rest of this section I will consider two arguments that have been put 
forward in the literature in response to Kelly’s argument regarding the tyrannical 
dictator case: 1) accepting the position that actual disagreement and merely 
possible disagreement are as epistemically weighty as each other results in 
unacceptable scepticism (the Sceptical Argument); 2) actual disagreements 
provide a signal that an error may have occurred and merely possible 
disagreements cannot do this (the Signalling Argument), and so Kelly is wrong to 
put them on a par.  
 
The Sceptical Argument tells us that if actual disagreement and merely possible 
disagreement were on par, this would put us in an untenable philosophical 
position, because for any belief that one might have, there is always a possible 
disagreeing interlocutor. This would require that we suspend (or substantially 
revise, or diminish our confidence in) all of our beliefs, resulting in widespread 
                                                        
50 Goldberg (2006) also argues that testimony should not be taken as a form of evidence. 
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scepticism  (Kornblith, 2010, p. 34; Carey, 2011 , pp. 374-377).51 It should be 
noted that Kelly’s position does not commit him to the sceptical conclusion. As 
explained above, Kelly argues that disagreement is irrelevant, which means that 
no one is required to alter their beliefs in the face of actual disagreement or 
merely possible disagreement, so he avoids the sceptical conclusion. But 
regardless of what Kelly himself is actually committed to, it still seems worth 
considering the implications of taking merely possible disagreement as seriously 
as actual disagreement, because if this were the case then this would provide a 
solution to the suppressed disagreement problem.  
 
One way of taking merely possible disagreement seriously, without falling into 
the trap of scepticism, would be to consider possible disagreements only in 
nearby possible worlds. This would amount to engaging in some abstraction 
from the actual world, but not considering disagreement from all possible 
worlds. This would evade the problem that there is always some possible world 
in which an interlocutor disagrees. This approach is appealing, and coheres with 
some common sense views about what one ought to do when considering 
potentially harmful action. Dryzek and Niemeyer  (2008) advocate for something 
similar when they argue that that deliberative democracy requires that all 
relevant viewpoints be considered when making a decision, not just those that 
are actually represented:  
 
Rationality may even benefit from the presence of a vantage point to 
which nobody subscribes; such was presumably the rationale for the use 
of a “Devil’s Advocate” when evaluating cases for sainthood in the Catholic 
Church (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2008, p. 482) 
 
Considering disagreement from nearby possible worlds amounts to taking into 
account viewpoints that may not actually be represented at the decision making 
                                                        
51 Kornblith quickly moves on from the sceptical argument to suggest that Kelly should be 
understood as arguing that we should consider all the arguments that are on the table, even if 
nobody actively endorses them – i.e. we should consider arguments which have no actual 
champions. This is standard practice in philosophy – we entertain certain arguments even if 
nobody actively endorses them (Kornblith, 2010, pp. 35-37). But this cannot be the correct way of 
interpreting Kelly’s tyrannical dictator case. In the dictator case, the potential dissenters were 
executed before their arguments even made it onto the table, and so it is unlikely that their 
arguments are available for consideration in their absence, unless we can reason to their 
arguments from our own vantage point, which is presumably what Kelly has in mind.  
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table, but which bear on the issue under consideration, and this looks like very 
sensible advice. For instance, we can imagine that a committee needs to make a 
decision that will affect the homeless community in the city. A proposed policy is 
being discussed, but there are no homeless people in the room to express their 
disagreement with a proposed policy, and the homeless community has no one to 
represent their views to the committee. In these circumstances, it would be good 
for the committee members to imagine what disagreements the homeless 
community might have with the proposal, even though there are no actual 
homeless people in the room to give expression to their viewpoint. This is the 
same as (or very close to) considering a nearby possible world in which there is a 
homeless person in the room to give expression to the dissenting view. While this 
would be a good thing to do, we now seem to have strayed from the realm of 
disagreements.  
 
What is going on when you consider disagreements from nearby possible 
worlds? Given that you are acting as your own disagreeing epistemic peer in this 
scenario – you have the same reasoning ability and the same evidence as you 
actually have – considering disagreements from nearby possible worlds amounts 
to carefully thinking through the evidence that you already have. It therefore 
looks like taking account of disagreements from nearby possible worlds just 
means that you should think really hard before engaging in actions with 
potentially harmful consequences, and this was already covered by the advice 
provided by Rosen earlier in this chapter, when his stance on procedural 
epistemic obligations was described. He advises that satisfying one’s procedural 
epistemic obligations requires that one ought “to stop and think, to focus one’s 
attention in certain directions…” before engaging in an activity that could have 
harmful consequences (Rosen, 2004, p. 301), and so advising that one should 
consider disagreements from nearby possible worlds does not seem to add 
anything useful. Considering only nearby possible worlds does not provide us 
with a route out of the Sceptical Argument, because we have changed the case too 
much – we are no longer really dealing with actual/possible peer disagreement. 
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Another way of dealing with the Sceptical Argument would be to bite the bullet 
and accept the sceptical conclusion. Ballantyne (2015 ) does something similar 
when he suggests that we should be epistemically modest about almost all of our 
beliefs, due to existing, but un-possessed, evidence that runs counter to our 
views. Ballantyne’s argument goes like this. We live in an era of information glut. 
As such, it is very likely that for any belief that you hold, someone has made a 
good argument with good evidence against that view. Even if you don’t yet know 
the content of the dissenting argument, you know that it is likely to exist and that 
it is likely that at least some of the dissenting arguments are compelling. He 
suggests that all you need to do is walk through your nearest university library to 
see that for many of your most interesting beliefs there are a wide variety of 
books that have been written on the topic, many of which go against your view. 
This problem is augmented if you do a Google Scholar search. His suggestion is 
that the appropriate reaction to this realisation is that you should be 
epistemically modest about nearly all of your beliefs, and he thus accepts a 
weaker version of the sceptical conclusion.  
 
Ballantyne’s argument still does not help us very much with the cases that have 
motivated this chapter – that of the tyrannical dictator, or with the Mbeki case – 
because his hypothetical agent is in a very different epistemic position to the 
kinds of agents under consideration. In Ballantyne’s cases, the disagreements 
have been actually expressed (people have written books and articles on the 
relevant topics, those books have been published and put in the library, the 
articles have been catalogued and put on Google Scholar), and the agent knows 
that they have been expressed (they have browsed the university library, and 
they have done a Google Scholar search); she just doesn’t yet know what the 
content of the disagreement is. This is different from the Dictator and Mbeki 
cases, in that disagreement from epistemic peers did not have a chance to be 
actually expressed in either of these cases. It is also unclear whether the Dictator 
and Mbeki are even aware that there is a disagreement that has been suppressed. 
So while Ballantyne offers us a plausible way of accepting something akin to the 
Sceptical Argument – that we should be epistemically modest about most of our 
beliefs – he does not offer us a way out of the Sceptical Argument.  
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Another argument for why actual disagreement should not be put on an 
epistemic par with merely possible disagreement is that actual disagreements 
give us information that merely possible disagreements do not – this is the 
Signalling Argument  (Tersman, 2013 ; Carey, 2011 ).52 To see how this argument 
works it is helpful to take a step back and note that the reason conciliationists – 
those who think that we are required to revise or reconsider our beliefs when we 
discover that an epistemic peer disagrees with our view – believe we should take 
disagreements seriously is due to a kind of inference to the best explanation. 
Having a disagreement with someone who is as competent at reasoning as I am 
and has access to the same evidence that I do indicates that one of us has made 
an error, but we cannot tell from the mere fact of disagreement which one of us 
has erred. Sidgwick makes this point as follows:  
 
For if I find any of my judgements, intuitive or inferential, in direct conflict 
with a judgement of some other mind, there must be some error 
somewhere: and I have no more reason to suspect error in the other mind 
than in my own… (Sidgwick, 1981/1907, p. 342).  
 
Christensen’s (2007) famous dinner bill case makes this particularly clear.53 
Christensen asks us to imagine a scenario in which friends go out for dinner, an 
activity that they frequently participate in. At the end of the meal, two friends 
figure out how to split the bill. They are equally good at the kind of arithmetic 
that is required to perform the task and they both have the same evidence (the 
bill), but they come up with two slightly different amounts at the end of their 
calculations. It is clear that one of them has made an error, but it is not clear just 
from their disagreement which one of them it is (Christensen, 2007 , p. 194). 
Their disagreement has provided them with evidence of a mistake. That there is 
some modal world in which someone disagrees with a particular belief does not 
give the agent any new evidence (Carey, 2011 , p. 378). Merely possible 
disagreement does not serve the signalling function that actually expressed 
                                                        
52 Interestingly, Kelly (2005) agrees with this point and this is why he thinks that disagreement 
can sometimes be a useful epistemic tool, even though he does not think it should be afforded a 
high epistemic status.  
53 Both Kornblith (2010) and Carey (2011 ) use this example to make a similar point to what I 
make here.  
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disagreement does, and so it should not be given consideration in the way that 
we give actual disagreements consideration.  
 
I find both the Sceptical Argument and the Signalling Argument convincing. It 
does seem that failing to distinguish between the epistemic significance of actual 
and merely possible disagreement results in a scepticism so widespread that it 
cannot be acceptable. Further, giving merely possible disagreement epistemic 
status fails to recognise that the reason we give actual disagreements epistemic 
weight is because they provide us with evidence of potential errors.  
 
However, accepting that merely possible disagreement should not be afforded 
the same epistemic status as actual agreement, or any epistemic status at all, 
does not mean that we are stuck with the conclusion that the tyrannical dictator 
and Mbeki are off the hook because no disagreement was actually forthcoming in 
their cases. In order to make sense of these cases we need to distinguish between 
“merely possible disagreement” (there is some possible world in which there is 
disagreement with my view) and “suppressed actual disagreement” (there is 
actual disagreement in this world, but that disagreement has not been expressed, 
because of suppression). While the former is not epistemically salient, the latter 
should be. Further, both the case of the tyrannical dictator and Mbeki are cases of 
suppressed disagreement, not of merely possible disagreement.  
 
5.4. Actual, but suppressed, disagreement 
 
There is still something puzzling about how instances of suppressed actual 
disagreement might be epistemically significant. In both of the cases that have 
motivated this chapter – the tyrannical dictator and the Mbeki case – we can 
imagine that the agents did not know that disagreement had been suppressed. 
The tyrannical dictator might have killed off the potential dissidents without 
knowing that they would later go on to disagree with him (he had them killed for 
reasons other than their dissent). Mbeki might not have known that the members 
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of his party feared him.54 In both of these instances, from the agent’s perspective 
it might just look like nobody has disagreed and silence might (wrongfully) be 
interpreted as assent – this is clearly a more widespread problem. How then 
could suppressed disagreement be epistemically relevant if the agents do not 
even know that it is happening? Phrased slightly differently, suppressed 
disagreement does not give them any new information, much like the case of 
merely possible disagreement, and so it is unclear how suppressed disagreement 
can have any epistemic relevance at all. 
 
To get a grip on this issue, it will be helpful to better understand what a 
reasonable response to silence is. Imagine a case in which an agent makes an 
assertion, and is greeted only with stony silence in response – what would a 
reasonable interpretation of that silence be? Are they getting any information 
from the silence? Should they be getting any information from it? Answering 
these questions will help us understand what the obligations are on agents in 
scenarios of suppressed disagreement. In particular, if it turns out that the agent 
should be getting information from the silence (which I will argue that they 
should, in certain circumstances), then this distinguishes suppressed 
disagreement from merely possible disagreement, because the agent is actually 
getting information from the (silent) response, while they would get no new 
information in cases of merely possible disagreement.  
 
In what follows, I address only instances of literal silence. But there is clearly a 
range of related phenomena in contexts of suppression. In particular, there will 
be cases where those who are suppressed still make utterances, but in which 
they have been effectively silenced. For instance, when West and Langton (1999) 
talk about pornography “silencing” women, they do not mean that women are 
literally no longer permitted to speak. They mean that women are no longer 
properly heard when they speak (to use the appropriate technical language, their 
speech acts do not achieve “uptake”) (McGill, 2013, p. 206). We can also imagine 
                                                        
54 In fact, this seems like a plausible reading of Mbeki’s own assessment of what happened, given 
the content of his recent letters to the public, in which he attempts to defend himself against 
accusations that he had been ‘aloof’ and ‘overly sensitive toward criticism’ during his time as 
president (Mbeki, 2016). 
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cases in which suppressed individuals explicitly assert assent, but only as a result 
of their suppression– when Kim Jong-un makes an assertion into a crowd in 
North Korea everyone will cheer regardless of whether they actually agree with 
what has been asserted.55 The members of the North Korean crowd have been 
effectively silenced, even though they are not literally silent. I will not be dealing 
with these more complicated cases here, but hopefully some of the lessons from 
the following discussion will also help to shed light on these other kinds of cases. 
For now, I will just address the question of what an agent should reasonably take 
from literal silence in response to their assertion.  
 
Goldberg argues that silence in response to an assertion is typically taken to 
indicate assent (forthcoming), and he later goes on to argue that one has a 
normative entitlement to interpret silence as assent under normal 
circumstances, because typically if someone disagrees with your assertion they 
will speak up (unpublished manuscript). By contrast, Tanesini  (forthcoming) 
argues that a speaker has no such entitlement. On Tanesini’s view, when a 
speaker makes an assertion they invite listeners to respond, but the listener is 
under no obligation to do so, even if they do not accept the content of the 
assertion. Because the hearer is under no obligation to offer a response, even if 
they disagree, the speaker is not entitled to take silence to be acceptance 
(Tanesini, forthcoming, pp. 7-8). For example, I might give a talk in the 
Philosophy Department, and none of the audience members will be obliged to 
express their disagreement with me during the question and answer period, even 
if they do actually disagree. If nobody raises their hand when it comes time for 
discussion, that does not mean that I am entitled to believe that everyone in the 
audience agrees with everything I have said – a more plausible explanation might 
be that I was so boring that nobody can muster the energy to disagree with me by 
the time the opportunity becomes available.  
 
Also in contrast to Goldberg, Beatty and Moore (2010) suggest that we should 
find complete consensus with some position to be suspicious.  Complete 
                                                        
55 Thanks to Susanne Burri and Wlodek Rabinowicz , who both independently suggested this 
example to me.  
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consensus, they argue, might indicate that some coercion was involved. In 
explaining a comment by Elster (1986/1997), in which he argues that he would 
feel more comfortable passing a law that had a persistent minority opposed to it 
than one that had unanimous support, they say:  
 
… [W]hat had worried him was the possibility that a unanimous decision 
might be due to some sort of conformism – perhaps resulting from 
intimidation, the suppression of alternative viewpoints, or self-censorship 
– rather than from a proper deliberation of the alternatives (Beatty & 
Moore, 2010, p. 198).  
 
They go on to say:  
 
…[N]o one expects unanimity in politics; not in light of culture, class, 
gender, and other differences. If a diverse voting body were to report 
unanimous agreement on an issue or candidate, one might well wonder if 
all the parties had freely spoken their minds  (Beatty & Moore, 2010, p. 
199).   
 
In summary, when an agent asserts something and receives silence as a response, 
it seems that this might indicate a range of things. Under some circumstances it 
might indicate assent, but in others it may just be that the listeners were too 
bored to respond, or that the disagreement had been suppressed. Listeners can 
have a range of reactions to an assertion and silence might mask some of those 
reactions. Or in some cases the silence might be an expression of the reaction – 
such as might be the case when the agent is too bored to bother responding.  
 
In the second quote from Beatty and Moore above, they point out that silence is 
particularly suspicious in political environments, where we would expect there to 
be a wide variety of differing opinions and debates. When an agent makes an 
assertion about something in a political context and receives only silence in 
response, it seems like something strange is going on. 
 
 So far in this chapter I have been treating the tyrannical dictator and Mbeki as 
though they were ordinary epistemic agents assessing their evidence in ordinary 
ways. In some ways, this is obviously the correct approach – an agent will only 
ever have the capacities of an ordinary epistemic agent (unless they are some 
kind of genius), regardless of the role that they occupy. However, it does seem 
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that agents might have very specific epistemic obligations, depending on their 
social positioning – we expect medical doctors to keep abreast of recent 
developments in treatments, but we do not have similar expectations of 
epistemic agents in other roles. Goldberg (2015) refers to this as an agent’s ‘role-
specific obligations’ (p. 3).56 How one ought to react to silence in response to an 
assertion might vary depending on context and the role that the agent is playing 
in that context. It is plausible that bearers of political office have role-specific 
obligations to pay attention when their assertions are greeted only with silence 
and to find this a bit suspicious.  
 
There seem to be at least two reasons why those occupying political office might 
have role-specific obligations to pay attention to the reactions to their assertions 
and be alert to the possibility of suppression. The first (as correctly pointed out 
by Beatty and Moore) is that one would expect debate in a political context, given 
the wide variety of perspectives and opinions that are expressed in political 
environments, and silence might indicate coercion or suppression. The other is 
that bearers of political office might have power that could result in others being 
cautious about expressing contrarian viewpoints, and they should be alert to this 
possibility.   
 
This then solves the problem of ‘suppressed disagreement’ associated with 
culpable ignorance, without falling into the sceptical conclusion. This is done by 
distinguishing suppressed disagreement from merely possible disagreement, in 
that the former sometimes carries information, while the latter never does. In 
particular, silence as a response sometimes counts as information or evidence of 
suppressed disagreement – this is true in cases where the normal response 
would not be silence, such as in political contexts. 
                                                        
56 Goldberg (2015 ) suggests incorrectly that Feldman adopts a similar position when he 
discusses the notion of “role oughts” (p.10). However, Feldman’s idea of a “role ought” differs 
from Goldberg’s idea of role-specific epistemic obligations. Feldman (2004) argues that we have 
certain role-specific moral obligations, such as caring for one’s children in one’s capacity as a 
parent. He suggests that similarly we are subject to epistemic obligations in our role as believers – 
that is, we are all subject to this obligation because we all occupy the role of “believer”. And he 
argues that our obligation in our capacity as a believer is just to believe well. This obligation 
attaches to everyone in their capacity as a believer, not to any other role that one might fill (such 
as being a politician, or a medical doctor, etc.) (Feldman, 2004, p.174) 
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This then raises the question of how the silence came about in the first place. So 
far, the emphasis has been on the agent’s responses to expressed disagreement 
and to silence. Nothing has been said about the blameworthiness of the subject 
relative to the circumstances that resulted in the disagreement being suppressed. 
This will be addressed in the following section.  
 
5.5. The circumstances of silence 
 
In assessing whether an agent is blameworthy, and exactly what they are 
blameworthy for, it is important not just to have an account of what an 
appropriate reaction to silence might be, but also of how blameworthiness might 
be connected to the circumstances in which that silence arose. There are at least 
four possible scenarios here, and depending on which scenario the agent finds 
herself in, this will have an impact on whether she is blameworthy and what she 
is blameworthy for. They are (in order of what I suspect is increasing 
culpability):  
 
1) The agent did not suppress the disagreement, and she could not 
reasonably have been expected to know about the existence of the 
disagreement, or that the disagreement had been suppressed (e.g. silence 
in apparently normal conditions).  
2) The agent did not suppress the disagreement, but there were cues that 
should have alerted her to the suppression (e.g. there was silence in a 
context where one would have ordinarily anticipated debate). That is, 
there were aspects of the context that were relevant to the assessment.  
3) The agent suppressed the disagreement, but she did not know that she 
had suppressed the disagreement (perhaps she is oblivious to how 
frightening her peers find her), but there were cues that should have 
alerted her to the suppression (e.g. there was silence in a context where 
one would have ordinarily expected there to be debate).  
4) The agent suppressed the disagreement and she knew that she had 
suppressed the disagreement (e.g. she is an Idi Amin style dictator who 
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kills those who disagree with her, but it might not be as extreme as in this 
example suggests – intentional side-lining in politics would be 
sufficient).57 
 
I take it that the agent in scenario 1) is obviously not culpable for her ignorance, 
while the agent in scenario 4) is obviously culpable. The agents in scenarios 2) 
and 3) are more complicated 
 
The agent in 2) will not be culpable for the circumstances of the suppression, but 
will still be culpable for her ignorance if she failed to pick up on the silence that 
was masking the suppressed disagreement (assuming the silence was unusual in 
that context).58 The agent in 3) will be responsible for her ignorance if she failed 
to pick up on the cues. Additionally, she may also be blameworthy for the 
circumstances of the suppression (Tanesini, forthcoming). For instance, perhaps 
the agent is arrogant, and it was her arrogance that suppressed the 
disagreement. Under these circumstances she might also be blameworthy for the 
epistemic injustice inflicted on those who were silenced (Fricker, 2007). This is 
not a small harm to inflict on someone. Miranda Fricker (2012) describes it thus:  
 
The intrinsic wrong of testimonial injustice is the epistemic insult: the 
subject is undermined in their capacity as a knower, and so as a rational 
being. The insult goes deep. If we accept that our rationality is part of the 
essence of human beings’ distinctive value, then to be perceived and 
treated as lesser in one’s capacity as a knower is to be perceived and 
treated as a lesser human being.  (p. 294) 
 
Additionally, it should be noted that there might be aspects of the very structure 
of scenarios in which silence is the result of a power imbalance that may make it 
less likely for the agent to notice that they are suppressing disagreement. Again I 
draw on Fricker (2012):  
 
                                                        
57 Thanks to Jonathan Birch for suggesting these four scenarios to me.  
58 If the agent has a cognitive impairment that limits their ability to detect normal social cues, 
then that might count as an excuse on their part and get them off the hook. But for most agents, it 
is reasonable to expect them to be sensitive to ordinary social cues.  
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If you are the one doing the crushing [suppressing the disagreement] 
…then not only are you not in a position to know what it is like to be 
crushed, but also – and this is a separate point – your general picture of 
the social world in which such crushings take place will be an unhelpfully 
partial perspective, the perspective of the powerful (p. 288). 
 
It might just be an unfortunate fact about the social world that those who are 
most likely to unwittingly suppress disagreement with their views – the arrogant, 
the powerful, etc. – are those who are the least likely to notice that they are doing 
so. But this won’t get them off the hook morally.  
 
The case that Fricker uses to motivate what is at stake in scenarios of unwitting 
suppression is that of a police investigation into the stabbing and killing of a 
black teenager in London in the early 1990s by a group of white teenagers. The 
victim’s friend witnessed the attack, but the police acted in ways that effectively 
suppressed his testimony. They did not help to calm him down after he had just 
witnessed the murder of a friend so that he would be in an appropriate state to 
testify, they did not ask him for his testimony, when he offered his testimony they 
did not take it seriously, and they did not take him along on searches of the local 
area even though he would have been able to identify the perpetrators of the 
crime if he had seen them. Fricker describes him as having been ‘pre-emptively 
silenced’ (2012, p. 293) (much like the potential dissidents in the tyrannical 
dictator case and the party members in Mbeki’s case). As a result of pre-
emptively silencing his testimony, the police were unable to gather enough 
evidence to convict anybody for the crime. In the subsequent report that 
assessed what went wrong in the investigation, it was concluded that 
institutional racism had played a role in the suppression of the key witness’s 
testimony – the police officers on the scene assumed that the black teenager was 
part of the trouble and not a valuable source of information about what had 
happened. The report also noted that the policemen involved might not have 
been aware of their racism – it was just part of the culture of being a member of 
the British police force in the early 1990s (Fricker, 2012, pp. 291-300). It would 
be very strange to conclude that the police officers are not morally responsible 
for silencing the key witness’s testimony, and ultimately bungling the case, 
because they were unaware of their racism, even though they may still be less 
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culpable than they might otherwise have been due to their position in a social 
context where racism was not questioned.  
 
This is slightly puzzling. Normally we only hold agents morally responsible for 
things that are under their control. That assumption has underpinned this whole 
chapter – ignorance can provide a plausible excuse for otherwise blameworthy 
action because it can show that the agent was not fully in control of that action; 
had they known differently they would have (hopefully) acted differently. But 
how then can we hold someone morally responsible for something that was 
ultimately the result of something that they may not even have been aware of – 
being arrogant or racist, or having some other character flaw that resulted in 
suppressing interlocutors who would have had valuable information to offer had 
they been allowed to offer it?  
 
Given the similarities between the cases of the unknowingly racist police officer 
and the unwittingly arrogant interlocutor, a useful first place to look for help is to 
the literature on moral responsibility and implicit bias. The implicit bias 
literature is potentially useful because part of what characterises implicit biases 
is that the agent is unaware that they have them.  
 
A range of views on culpability is represented in the implicit bias literature.  On 
the one end of the spectrum are those who bite the bullet, and argue that we 
cannot hold individuals morally responsible for their implicit biases, because 
they lack awareness. Saul comments: “A person should not be blamed for an 
implicit bias of which they are completely unaware” (2013, p. 55). Similarly, 
Zimmerman  (1997) argues that in cases where an individual is unaware of the 
wrongness of their racist action they cannot be held morally responsible for it 
(Zimmerman, 1997, pp. 425-426).59 
                                                        
59 There is some difference between Saul’s view and Zimmerman’s. Saul is concerned with cases 
in which the individual is unaware that they hold implicit biases, even though they might be 
aware of the wrongfulness of holding such biases, while Zimmerman is concerned with cases in 
which the individual is unaware of the wrongness of the bias, regardless of whether or not they 
are aware of holding the bias. Saul’s concerns are closer to the concerns that I have in this chapter 
– that is, how do we assess culpability in cases where the individual is unaware of aspects of their 
beliefs or character that result in their engaging in wrongful action?  
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Holroyd (2012) argues against Saul’s position, by drawing on Doris’s  (2002) 
work in behavioural science and social psychology. Doris argues that we lack 
stable characters, and our actions are more the result of context and habit than 
anything else; most (perhaps all) of our actions are automatic. Holroyd uses 
Doris’s empirical findings to argue that if the vast majority of our actions are 
automatic, then we are not aware of the underlying motivations for almost all of 
our actions, and so awareness is too demanding a requirement for moral 
responsibility, and would require that we abandon attributions of moral 
responsibility in almost all cases (Holroyd, 2012, pp. 293-294).  
 
Abandoning the awareness requirement strikes me as quite a blow to the way we 
usually think about moral responsibility, and too controversial a way to try and 
maintain attributions of blameworthiness in cases of arrogant interlocutors. I am 
going to approach the awareness requirement from a slightly different angle. The 
reason we are interested in awareness is because we are ultimately concerned 
with whether the agent is fully in control of her action, and it is control that 
allows for attributions of moral responsibility. Ultimately awareness of one’s bad 
“character”60 and of one’s implicit biases is irrelevant if one has control over the 
processes that form one’s character and one’s implicit associations.   
 
The natural first place to look for guidance on responsibility and character is 
Aristotle. Aristotle argues that individuals can be held morally responsible for 
their bad character traits (and therefore the harms that flow from those traits) 
because individuals have control of their characters. In his discussion of what 
kinds of ignorance will successfully excuse in cases of wrongful action, he argues 
that if ignorance is the result of inattentiveness it will not provide a successful 
excuse, even if the agent is just an inattentive sort of person (that is, if 
inattentiveness is part of his character), because the agent has control over 
whether or not they are an inattentive sort of person. He states it thus:  
                                                        
60 Character is in inverted commas here because Doris contests whether there is such a thing as 
character at all, but even he agrees that our language is imbued with talk of character (Doris, 
2002, p.15). In the interests of not straying too far from my main argument here, I am going to 
keep talking about character.  
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But presumably he is the sort of person who is inattentive. Still, he is 
himself responsible for becoming this sort of person, because he has lived 
carelessly. Similarly, an individual is responsible for being unjust because 
he cheated, and for being intemperate, because he has passed his time in 
drinking and the like; for each type of activity produces the corresponding 
sort of person. This is clear from those who train for any contest or action, 
since they continually practice the appropriate activities. [Only] a totally 
insensible person would not know that a given type of activity is the 
source of the corresponding state; [Hence] if someone does what he 
knows will make him unjust, he is willingly unjust (Aristotle, NE 114a3-
13).  
 
If it is the case that agents have control over whether or not they have arrogant 
characters (even Doris (2002) believes that habituation is important and 
something over which we have control, and Holroyd  (2012) argues that we have 
long-range control over our implicit associations), then it is irrelevant whether 
the agent is aware that they are being arrogant and crushing disagreement in any 
particular case, because they could have avoided being an arrogant sort of person 
in the first place. Being unaware that one was arrogant and suppressing 
disagreement therefore won’t get the agent of the hook morally – that is, it won’t 
get one off the hook for actually suppressing disagreement, as well as for not 
noticing a case of suppressed disagreement given reasonable cues.  
 
We now have an account of what a reasonable response to silence might be, and 
we have some idea of the agent’s varying culpability relative to their role and the 
context that produced the silence. It is now time to return to the central case of 
this thesis – that of Mbeki – to see if this analysis helps us to better understand 
his blameworthiness.  
 
5.6. Did Mbeki really suppress disagreement? 
 
So far it has been argued that suppressed disagreement cannot count as an 
excuse from ignorance in many cases.  There will be some instances in which the 
agent did not suppress the disagreement and could not have known that there 
was a disagreement that had been suppressed (leaving them blameless), such as 
in case 1 discussed in the previous section. But in many circumstances, even if 
the agent had not been responsible for the suppression, they should have noticed 
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its markers – such as silence where one would have expected debate (case 2). In 
other situations, like case 3, the agent will also be responsible (either knowingly 
or unknowingly) for having suppressed the disagreement, in which case they will 
be responsible both for their ignorance and for the epistemic injustice associated 
with silencing their interlocutors.  
 
Where does Mbeki fall? Up until this point it has been assumed that Mbeki did 
suppress disagreement within the ANC, but there is some controversy 
surrounding this claim. In this section I will defend the claim that Mbeki 
suppressed disagreement, and thus that his ignorance about HIV and AIDS was 
culpable, and that he was morally responsible for the consequences of his AIDS 
denialism. 
 
On the one end of the spectrum, it is often argued that Mbeki obviously 
suppressed disagreement, particularly on the issues of HIV and AIDS, by ousting 
those who openly disagreed with him. In particular, individuals who support this 
view cite the removal of Madlala-Routledge from her position as Deputy Minister 
of Health, due to her outspoken support for mainstream AIDS science as evidence 
of this (Keeton, 2009; Nattrass, 2007 ). However, this only happened in 2007 – 
seven years after the main epistemic action concerning AIDS in South Africa had 
already occurred (that is, seven years after Mbeki had considered the evidence 
and formed his beliefs concerning HIV and AIDS). While Madlala-Routledge’s 
removal might count as evidence of the persistence of AIDS denialism in South 
African politics, it seems strange to suggest that this was the kind of 
disagreement that Mbeki should have been on the lookout for when he was 
forming his beliefs about HIV and AIDS in 1999. It should also be noted that 
Madlala-Routledge was the only cabinet member who was removed from her 
position by Mbeki during his presidency (Vale & Barrett, 2009). So it seems 
implausible that Mbeki was suppressing disagreement in quite such a heavy-
handed way as actively ousting dissenting interlocutors.  
 
On the other end of the spectrum is the position that Mbeki was not suppressing 
disagreement at all within the ANC. Rather, it might be suggested that Mbeki was 
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just one amongst many within the ANC who held denialist views about HIV and 
AIDS, and that he was merely continuing a long tradition of suspicion about AIDS 
within the party. On this view, he did not suppress disagreement within the ANC, 
because there was no disagreement to suppress. Steinberg (2011) gestures 
toward this view when he states in an article on AIDS in South Africa that: “Mbeki 
was not necessarily the outlier he is often said to be” (Sternberg, 2011). It is clear 
that some forms of AIDS scepticism within the ANC do substantially pre-date 
Mbeki. In 1988 Jabulani Nxumalo (aka ‘Mzala’) – a celebrated intellectual within 
the ANC in the 1980s – wrote: 
 
[T]hat the theory of African origin of AIDS was ‘yet another justification 
for… racist prejudice’, that Africans were being deliberately misdiagnosed, 
and that there was evidence that HIV might have been invented in the 
‘laboratories of the military-industrial complex’ of the West? (Gevisser, 
2007, paraphrasing and quoting Mzala)  
 
Similarly, Jonny Steinberg reports an incident in Johannesburg, in August 1988, 
where a group of sociologists presented early research on HIV and the South 
African mining sector. They predicted that a combination of migrant labour paths 
and the broken families that had become closely associated with the mining 
sector would result in a substantial increase in HIV infection rates. At this point, 
HIV prevalence in South Africa was only 0.1 %. Cyril Ramaphosa, a leading 
member of the ANC (it is often claimed that Ramaphosa was Mandela’s preferred 
candidate to succeed him as president), was in the audience. It is rumoured that 
after the presentation Ramaphosa contacted the head of the research team to 
request that the paper not be published, “complaining that the research 
presumed black men to be promiscuous and was thus tinged with racism” and 
that he successfully prevented the research findings from being published within 
South Africa (Steinberg, 2011).  
 
There was clearly scepticism surrounding HIV and AIDS within the ANC long 
before Mbeki entered the debate. It should also be noted that Mbeki himself 
endorsed mainstream AIDS science until 1998 (that is, he accepted that HIV 
causes AIDS and endorsed the position that an anti-retroviral programme should 
be made available) (Chikane, 2013, p. 258).  
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However, both Mzala and Ramaphosa’s scepticism is of a very different sort to 
Mbeki’s. Unlike Mbeki, neither question the connection between HIV and AIDS. 
Mzala explicitly endorsed the existence of HIV, but believed a conspiracy theory 
in which HIV was created in a laboratory. Again, Ramaphosa does not question 
the existence of HIV, or the causal relationship between HIV and AIDS. Rather, he 
argued that the sociologists’ predictions of exponential increases in infection 
rates in South Africa were based on racist beliefs about African sexuality, which 
is consistent with mainstream AIDS science. Neither of these positions should 
thus be taken as precursors to Mbeki’s view, or as offering support to it, given 
how different they are from Mbeki’s own stance.  
 
The two extreme positions – that Mbeki openly ousted those he disagreed with, 
or that he was just continuing a long history of ANC scepticism about AIDS – both 
seem implausible. But it does seem obvious that Mbeki was suppressing 
disagreement in more subtle ways. In a more recent piece by Steinberg (2017, 
forthcoming) he describes the debate about AIDS within the party as having been 
“muted”:  
 
The politics of the controversy were painful and difficult. While it is clear 
that there was a great deal of unease about Mbeki’s position both in the 
ruling African National Congress (ANC) and in the health department, 
criticism of Mbeki from within the ranks of the country’s former liberation 
movement was muted (Steinberg, 2017 , p. 5).  
 
Steinberg’s commentary gains support from Feinstein, who was a member of the 
ANC at the time, and a Member of Parliament. He describes the climate of debate 
at the time as follows:  
 
During the Mandela years the caucus room had resonated with sharp 
debate and discussion, passionate argument and profound polemic, the 
discourse that has characterised the ANC and the internal resistance 
movement, a broad church all of whose congregants felt able to speak 
their mind and argue their view. On 28 September 2000, two years after 
Thabo Mbeki had assumed the leadership of the ANC, the caucus reflected 
a more disciplined, choreographed and constrained party, a party fearful 
of its leader, conscious of his power to make or break careers, conscious of 
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his demand for loyalty, for conformity of thinking. (Feinstein, 2009, p. 
111)   
 
It does seem that Mbeki suppressed the debate about HIV and AIDS within the 
ANC in the early 2000s. It would be overstepping my mark to theorise too much 
on how the mechanism of suppression operated, so I will keep my speculation on 
this issue brief.   
 
One plausible account might be that his arrogance suppressed disagreement. 
Tanesini (forthcoming) provides an explanation for how this might occur. She 
argues that when an interlocutor’s contributions are ignored (or in more severe 
cases, belittled) by an arrogant agent, this demoralises the interlocutor, and 
eventually she might give up on trying to make any contribution at all (McGill 
(2013) makes the same argument). The quote at the start of this chapter suggests 
that this is what was happening in the Mbeki case – Mbeki had ignored 
disagreement on various historically contentious issues (such as negotiating with 
representatives from the apartheid state, and abandoning communism once 
democracy had been achieved), and had luckily been right on previous issues 
despite neglecting peer disagreement with his view (by all appearances, moral 
luck had operated in his favour even though he acted irresponsibly). In the case 
of AIDS, he assumed that he would come out on the right side yet again, and so 
refused to entertain alternative perspectives on this issue. This reading of the 
case gains further credibility in light of another quote from Mbeki’s biographer, 
Gevisser:  
 
One of Mbeki’s great weaknesses, even some of his most loyal comrades 
have told me, is that he often does not trust others to filter data for him: 
he likes to hear it himself directly from the source, and to make his own 
decisions (Gevisser, 2007 , p. 734).  
 
An alternative reading of the case would be that Mbeki did not suppress 
disagreement himself, but that the culture of the ANC at the time was one of 
deference to authority. Those who make this argument appeal to the fact that the 
ANC was a militarised resistance group under apartheid, where deference to 
authority was a necessary part of the organisation’s survival (as is the case with 
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any militarised group) (Butler, 2005). If this the correct description of what 
happened, then Mbeki would not be responsible for suppressing the 
disagreement, but he might still be responsible for not noticing that the stony 
silence within the ANC caucus was masking disagreement with his view – he 
would thus be responsible for one thing fewer than under the alternative 
description. However, it seems unlikely that this is the correct description of 
events. In the quote from Andrew Feinstein above, he reminisces about the lively 
culture of debate within the ANC under the Mandela presidency, and explicitly 
points out the contrast to the Mbeki presidency, where debate was not permitted 
within the ANC caucus. If it were the case that a culture of deference to authority 
had been carried over from the ANC’s years in exile, we would expect to see this 
in the Mandela presidency too, which we don’t. It thus seems more likely that 
Mbeki suppressed disagreement within the ANC.  
 
It is thus plausible that Mbeki’s arrogance silenced peer disagreement with his 
view. Regardless of how Mbeki silenced disagreement within the party, Steinberg 
and Feinstein offer a compelling case that debate was suppressed during the 
Mbeki years. Further, it is clear that political contexts are such that one would 
expect debate, and so the silence should have been troubling. He is thus culpable 
for his ignorance and blameworthy for his resulting action.  
 
5.7. Conclusion  
 
The focus in this chapter has been on trying to make sense of suppressed 
disagreement in the context of assessing instances of possible culpable 
ignorance. The puzzle was that procedural epistemic obligations require that one 
pay attention to expressed disagreement from one’s epistemic peers, but that 
silence if often taken to be assent with one’s assertions. This becomes a problem 
in cases of suppressed disagreement, where silence should not be taken as 
assent, but the agent might not even know that there is disagreement underlying 
the quiet. It was argued that in certain cases, and depending on the agent’s role, 
they should be on the lookout for the markers of suppressed disagreement – such 
as silence where one would typically expect debate. Further, this helps us make 
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sense of the Mbeki case, where he was both responsible for suppressing the 
disagreement and for not paying attention to the eerie quiet in response to his 
view. On this reading, his ignorance is culpable and he is morally responsible for 
his actions.  
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6. Concluding remarks  
 
6.1. Philosophical methodology and engagement with the world 
 
This thesis began with the recognition that offering a detailed assessment of a 
real world case is an unusual project in analytic philosophy and requires 
some defence. It is obvious that philosophical rigour can be beneficial for 
helping to clarify certain aspects of real-world cases, and much of this thesis is 
focussed in that direction. But that is unlikely to convince the nay-sayers; 
those who believe that no philosophical benefits can be achieved from real-
world study. Chapter 1, therefore, offers an account of the philosophical 
benefits that can be achieved by paying attention to the world. Three 
arguments were provided: 1) the streamlined hypothetical cases that are 
typically favoured in philosophy run the risk of accidentally excluding 
important support factors in their construction, and real-world cases can act 
as a check that this has not occurred; 2) real-world cases help to ensure the 
external validity of philosophical findings via Cartwright and Hardie’s 
‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical searches’; and 3) the world provides material for 
generating new hypotheses, challenging existing theories, and for extending 
philosophical concepts.  
 
The philosophical benefits that have accrued via the detailed case study in 
this thesis are of the third type. This case uncovers philosophical issues and 
relationships that would not have been obvious otherwise. In particular, it 
brings attention to the ambiguity surrounding the relationship between 
mono-causal and multi-causal accounts of disease explanation (Chapter 4), 
and the problem of suppressed disagreement (Chapter 5).   
 
It becomes salient that there is a problem with the relationship between 
mono-causal and multi-causal accounts of disease explanation because too 
strict a divide between these accounts excluded socio-economic factors from 
the explanation and made the southern African AIDS epidemic difficult to 
account for. On one plausible reading of the South African case, Mbeki became 
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aware of this explanatory gap and consulted non-mainstream scientists in an 
effort to remedy it. If this is the correct interpretation of the Mbeki case 
(which I think it is), this should put pressure on us to integrate these two 
accounts (which I endeavour to do). This only becomes a significant problem 
in urgent need of attention when viewed in the context of the case.  
 
Similarly, the problem of suppressed disagreement only becomes salient in 
the context of the Mbeki case. There is a pre-existing philosophical literature 
on what one ought to do in face of peer disagreement, and there is a literature 
on silencing, but it is not immediately evident that issues of silencing are 
relevant to what one ought to do when confronted with suppressed peer 
disagreement. The relationship between these philosophical issues only 
becomes clear when one sees them interact in context.  
  
This thesis has thus provided an illustration of how engagement with the real 
world can be philosophically beneficial, by helping us uncover philosophical 
issues and relationships.   
 
6.2. Was Mbeki reasonable in consulting non-mainstream scientists?  
 
One of the questions that motivated this thesis was to determine whether 
Mbeki was reasonable in his consultation of non-mainstream scientists. 
Typically, it has been “believed that insofar as his views were sincerely held, 
he was mad” (Steinberg, Forthcoming, 2017, p. 5). But we also know that 
Mbeki was an “intelligent and politically shrewd President” (Posel, 2008, p. 
18), and so to dismiss him as stupid and/or crazed would be too quick. I 
endeavour to take his position seriously.  
 
In order to assess Mbeki’s decision to include non-mainstream scientists on 
his advisory panel, I start (in Chapter 3) by using Lakatos’s theory of scientific 
research programmes (with some additions from Thagard) to examine the 
state of the scientific debate surrounding AIDS. If the scientific debate was 
genuinely uncertain or contested (which Mbeki seems to believe it was), then 
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it would be reasonable for him to include non-mainstream AIDS scientists on 
his panel; if not, this decision becomes more difficult to justify. I argued that 
both the viral theory and the immune overload theory (which would later 
become the most promising denialist position) were plausible aetiological 
descriptions of AIDS in the early 1980s, but that by the mid-1990s the viral 
theory was well-corroborated (the virus was found in the T-cells of AIDS 
patients; a correlation was discovered between higher viral loads and more 
severe cases of illness and more rapid deaths; and ARVs were extremely 
effective from 1996 onward). The viral theory offered a progressive research 
programme. By contrast, the immune overload theory made ad hoc 
theoretical adjustments to account for the expansion of the disease into new 
risk groups, and those adjustments did not lead to novel predictions and 
corroborations. The immune overload theory was degenerating. Further, on 
Thagard’s account, the immune overload theory had become pseudoscientific, 
due to the unwillingness of its devotees to solve its problems, or engage with 
alternative progressive research programmes. The viral account therefore 
superseded the immune overload theory. However, the acceptance of the viral 
theory resulted in the loss of some explanatory power. There were aspects of 
the disease that were difficult to explain in strictly viral terms, such as the 
disproportionate prevalence of AIDS in southern Africa. Further, these issues 
could plausibly be resolved by appealing to aspects of the now-discarded 
immune overload theory, particularly by appealing to the aetiological role of 
poverty.   
 
In Chapter 4, I argue that Mbeki’s initial decision to consult non-mainstream 
AIDS scientists was plausibly the result of the explanatory gap that was 
created when HIV was accepted as the sole cause of AIDS. Further, I argue that 
this gap was the result of too strict a divide between mono-causal and multi-
causal accounts of disease; whereby a disease is either infectious and mono-
causal, or lifestyle-related and multi-causal. This picture left no space for 
diseases that are infectious, but also subject to socio-economic causal factors. 
In order to remedy this problem, a picture of disease explanation is required 
that is multi-causal (in order to capture the socio-economic drivers of 
  169 
disease), but still maintains the causal salience of microbial sources of illness. 
I concluded that the best way to deal with this concern is to look at it as a 
causal selection problem – that is, a question of how to distinguish between 
‘causes’ and ‘enabling conditions’. Further, I suggest that Woodward (2011) 
provides some guidance on how one might do this with rigour.  
 
Ultimately, it is concluded that there is a sense in which Mbeki’s inclusion of 
non-mainstream scientists on his panel was not entirely reasonable, given 
that the scientific debate on these issues had been resolved some time before 
Mbeki became president. However, there are elements that make his decision 
seem not entirely unreasonable. The first being that as a scientific layperson 
he might not have had access to the intricacies of the debate, and so it might 
have appeared to be contested from the outside – especially given how 
impressive Duesberg’s pre-denialism credentials were. Further, there was a 
genuine explanatory gap that Mbeki noticed, and one which was deeply 
relevant to him as the president of South Africa. That he consulted scientists 
who could help address those concerns does not seem unreasonable, even 
though he ultimately reached the wrong decision as a result. It thus seems 
that there were elements of his decision that were unreasonable (because the 
scientific debate had been resolved) and other aspects that seem more 
understandable (there was a gap in the viral account).  
 
6.3. Was Mbeki morally responsible for the consequences of his policy? 
 
The consequences of Mbeki’s refusal to make ARVs available via the public 
health system were severe – best estimates indicate that it resulted in 171, 
000 avoidable new infections and 343,000 deaths over the 1999 – 2002 
period (Nattrass, 2008, p. 157). As a result, there have been calls from South 
African civil society to assess whether he can be held personally morally 
responsible for these harms (see Geffen (2009)). Chapter 5 undertakes this 
assessment.  
 
I frame this as being a question of culpable ignorance. Given the severity of 
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the harms associated with Mbeki’s action, it initially seems that he must be 
morally responsible. However, ignorance frequently excuses in moral cases, 
and Mbeki might have an appeal to ignorance available to him – had he really 
known that HIV causes AIDS, and that ARVs are successful, he would have 
made the treatment available (or so the hypothetical excuse goes). But 
excuses from ignorance are only successful if the ignorance itself is not 
culpable. One way that culpable ignorance can be avoided is to pay attention 
to disagreement from one’s epistemic superiors and peers. Ideally, Mbeki 
should have listened to his epistemic superiors – the scientific experts – but 
part of what seems to have gone wrong in this case is that he was confused 
about who the genuine scientific experts were. Given that confusion, he 
should have turned to his epistemic peers for guidance; this time, on the 
question of which scientists to trust. The senior membership of his political 
party would have counted as his epistemic peers, because they would have 
had access to the same (or similar) evidence as him and it is likely that they 
are similarly competent at reasoning, they are also less likely to be considered 
biased by Mbeki. However, when we look at the state of debate within the 
political party at the time, there is eerie silence, particularly on the issue of 
AIDS. Commentators argue that there was substantial disagreement with 
Mbeki at the time, but that members of the ANC feared him, and were thus too 
afraid to make their disagreement known. Disagreement within the party had 
been suppressed. I go on to argue that suppressed disagreement can carry 
information in certain situations, particularly in political contexts, where 
debate is to be expected. I conclude that Mbeki’s failure to recognise the 
silence for what it was thus makes his ignorance culpable and his resulting 
actions blameworthy. Further, he is additionally blameworthy for the harms 
associated with suppressing disagreement within the ANC in the first 
instance.   
 
Ultimately, although there are aspects of Mbeki’s actions concerning AIDS that 
are understandable, he is morally responsible for the harms that resulted from 
AIDS denialism.  
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